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Mass media as a source of information about extreme natural phenomena 
in Southern Poland 
 
Wojciech Biernacki, Anita Bokwa, Bolesław Domański, Jarosław Działek, Karol 
Janas and Tomasz Padło  
 
Abstract 
The paper presents the preliminary results of the project entitled ‘Public attitudes and 
behaviours concerning extreme natural phenomena in Southern Poland’, carried out in the 
years 2005-2008 at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. The aim was to study the 
public perception of floods, strong winds and landslides in a representative group of Polish 
citizens, living in rural and urban areas, who experienced the mentioned extreme phenomena 
and those who did not. The frequency of occurrence of extreme phenomena influences their 
perception, which is then reflected in people’s actions, e.g. those who experienced a few floods 
are much more careful about future flood predictions and undertake much more precautions to 
protect themselves than those who experienced only one flood event. Mass media are the 
preferred means of information and they play a key role in shaping the understanding of 
environmental problems. However, the quality of information in the media is usually rather poor 
and burdened with a strong negative emotional load. 
 
Keywords: extreme natural phenomena, Southern Poland, mass media, public attitude 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mass media are the main source of information about environmental issues for the adult part 
of society in most countries. They connect us with the part of the world which is beyond our 
personal observation and enlarge the scope of phenomena we can experience indirectly 
(McQuail, 1994). In Poland, mass media were owned and controlled by the state until 1989 
when communism collapsed. Therefore, until the end of 1980s, the environmental information 
delivered to society was controlled and limited. Since 1990, an independent mass media market 
in Poland has developed, following the patterns known from Western Europe and USA. 
However, the process has been influenced by the same factors as the economic development 
of the country, e.g. weakness of the national economy, little financial potential of the national 
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investors, lack of formal regulations concerning many issues not known in the communist 
system or their constant changes. That is why Polish mass media should be rather perceived as 
being still in the process of creation, development and shaping. So is the public awareness and 
attitude towards environmental issues (Kocik, 2000). The present paper is an attempt at 
showing some links between those two elements. 
 
2. Methods and materials 
 
In the years 2005-2008, a project entitled ‘Public attitudes and behaviours concerning 
extreme natural phenomena in Southern Poland’ has been carried out in the Institute of 
Geography and Spatial Management at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. The aim 
of the project was to study the public perception of floods, strong winds and landslides in a 
representative group of Polish citizens, living in rural and urban areas, who experienced the said 
extreme phenomena and those who did not. The analysed area included 6 of 16 Polish 
administrative regions (‘voivodships’), located in Southern Poland (Podkarpackie, Małopolskie, 
Dolnośląskie, Świętokrzyskie, Śląskie and Opolskie ‘voivodships’) with a total area of 
86,432,500 sq. km and 15,289,000 inhabitants (figures from 2005). Fifteen localities of various 
size and type were selected, which is shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
Table 1. Localities in Southern Poland selected for the study. 
Occurrence of: 
Locality 
Number of 
inhabitants Type ‘Voivodship’ flood strong wind landslide 
Grabownica 3,000 village Podkarpackie X   
Porąbka 
Uszewska 1,300 village Małopolskie X   
Laskowa  2,700 village Małopolskie X  X 
Ząb 1,300 village Małopolskie  X  
Targanice 3,300 village Małopolskie  X  
Lachowice 2,200 village Małopolskie X  X 
Hucisko 370 village Świętokrzyskie  X  
Jordanów 5,200 small town Małopolskie    
Maków 
Podhalański 5,700 small town Małopolskie X   
Polanica Zdrój 6,700 small  town Dolnośląskie X   
Kłodzko 28,500 middle-size town Dolnośląskie X   
Sandomierz 25,600 middle-size town Świetokrzyskie   X 
Ostrowiec 
Świętokrzyski 74,200 middle-size town Świętokrzyskie X   
Bielsko Biała 177,000 city Śląskie    
Opole 127,600 city Opolskie X X  
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Figure 1. Maps with localities in Southern Poland included in the study. 
 
In most localities, people experienced one or two kinds of extreme phenomena, but in two 
localities none of them occurred. The localities are of various sizes (from a village to a city) and 
are located in different geographical regions: the Carpathian Mountains, the Sudety Mountains, 
The Carpathian Foothills, Kielce-Sandomierz Upland, Sandomierz Basin, and Silesian Lowland. 
Another factor taken into consideration while choosing the localities for the study referred to the 
social links in the community connected with the duration of residence. 
The selected extreme natural phenomena were those characteristic for Southern Poland. 
Floods of various sizes often occur in the mountains and landslides are typical for the 
Carpathians built of the Flysch complex. Strong winds are also typical for mountainous areas, 
but recently an increase in the occurrence of very strong winds and tornadoes (fortunately of 
much less spatial extent than those in North America) can be observed in non-mountainous 
areas, which used to be a very rare case so far. All mentioned phenomena are difficult to be 
predicted in terms of the time and place of occurrence and the possibilities of decreasing the 
loss risk caused by them are differentiated.  
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The first part of the study presented in this paper was carried out by means of 
questionnaires. Three different questionnaires were prepared, each to analyse a different 
extreme phenomenon. In every questionnaire, the first questions concerned the subjective 
perception of danger caused by the possible occurrence of a certain phenomenon and the 
frequency of its actual occurrence. Then we asked about the possibilities of obtaining support in 
case of occurrence of the phenomenon and the expectations concerning authorities responsible 
for that support. The next issue were the reasons of economic losses and possibilities of their 
diminishing. Subsequent questions concerned people’s preparedness in case of occurrence of 
the phenomenon, including concrete actions undertaken by them. Then we asked about the 
sources of information about that particular phenomenon and preferred solutions concerning 
information flow. The questionnaire ended with questions concerning the person’s direct 
experience of the phenomenon, duration of residence in the locality, age, gender, education, 
place of work and monthly income. 
 
Table 2. Type of questionnaires distributed in the studied localities 
and rate of return.  
Locality 
Questionnaire 
type 
Number of 
copies sent 
Rate of 
return (%) 
Grabownica flood 200 38.5 
Porąbka Uszewska strong wind 200 54.5 
Laskowa 
flood,  
landslide 
200 
200 
55.5 
51.0 
Ząb strong wind 200 43.0 
Targanice strong wind 200 56.0 
Lachowice landslide 200 55.0 
Jordanów flood 200 57.0 
Maków Podhalański flood 200 51.5 
Polanica Zdrój flood 200 90.5 
Kłodzko flood 400 41.8 
Sandomierz landslide 280 61.4 
Ostrowiec 
Świętokrzyski 
flood 400 80.0 
Bielsko-Biała 
flood,  
landslide 
400 
200 
48.0 
68.5 
Opole 
flood,  
strong wind 
600 
200 
66.8 
36.5 
Hucisko strong wind 140 56.4 
  194 
 
The presented sequence of questions allowed us to learn what people think and know about 
an extreme phenomenon, what they do to protect themselves against it and why (i.e. whether 
the knowledge and perception is translated into any real actions), and finally what are the 
sources of information, whether people see the need to learn more and how they would like to 
get more information. Therefore, the role of the mass media as a source of information about 
extreme phenomena is presented in the context of real local experience. 
The questionnaires were distributed in 15 localities in the period from September to 
November 2006. Table 2 shows how many copies were delivered to particular localities and 
sent back. Totally, 4620 questionnaires were distributed via schools to the inhabitants of the 
selected localities and 2646 were filled in and returned, which gives the rate of return at the 
level of 57%. Most questionnaires (74.7%) were filled in by women, 58.4% of the respondents 
were 36-50 years old and 47.4% had secondary level education. In 71.3% of cases, the monthly 
income per person did not exceed 1000 PLN (about 260 EUR). 
Finally, there were 1667 flood questionnaires, 459 strong wind questionnaires and 520 
landslide questionnaires analysed.  
 
3. Attitudes and knowledge about extreme phenomena  
 
All flood questionnaires (1667 copies) were divided into three groups depending on the real 
occurrence of the flood in a certain locality and its presence in respondents’ memories: 
1. A few floods occurred in the last 10-15 years, including one really extreme flood, and over 
50% of the respondents remembered that extreme one, while about 20% remembered more 
than one flood; 
2. Only one extreme flood occurred in the last 10-15 years and over 80% of the respondents 
remembered it well; 
3. No flood occurred in the last 10-15 years and about 60% of the respondents did not 
remember any flood. 
In each group there were respondents from localities of different sizes and types. Direct 
experience of flood increases the sense of being endangered by that phenomenon and its 
possible reoccurrence (declared by about 75% in groups 1 and 2 and only 28.1% in group 3). It 
is also associated with the opinion that the floods cause now much higher economic losses than 
before (57% in groups 1 and 2 and 37% in group 3).  
Out of the 1667 persons who filled in the flood questionnaire, 51.5% declared that they felt 
not well prepared for flood, while for strong winds the share was 56.4%. The smaller the locality, 
the higher percentage of people convinced to be little prepared for flood or strong 
winds/tornados. Strong winds are perceived as more difficult to be predicted than floods which 
is proved by the answers to the question about the possibilities of diminishing the economic 
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losses caused by extreme phenomena; 49.7% of the respondents declared that the flood losses 
can be partially diminished, while for strong wind losses the share was 40.1%. As many as 
45.5% of the respondents declared that very little can be done in case of strong winds, while for 
floods it was only 11.9%. Again, the inhabitants of cities were more optimistic in their opinions 
than the persons from villages and small towns.  
Most respondents (66.2%; 53.9% in villages and 74.7% in cities) are convinced that the main 
causal factor responsible for flood losses is a poor condition of the flood protection infrastructure 
and large investments would solve the problem (Table 3). The extraordinary size of flood is 
blamed by 19.9% of the respondents (24.2% in villages and 14.3% in cities), while only 13.8% 
points to wrong location of houses, built in the flood terraces (21.9% in villages and 13.0% in 
cities). The answers to that question, analysed in the three groups mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, show an interesting feature. In the localities from group 2, 70% of the 
respondents declare that the main factor is a poor condition of the flood protection 
infrastructure. In group 1, only 59% agree with it, while twice as many persons in group 1 admit 
that the main factor is a wrong location of houses.  
 
Table 3. Main factor responsible for disastrous effects of 
 floods (% of answers). 
Type of 
locality 
Extraordinary 
size of flood 
Poor flood 
protection 
infrastructure 
Wrong 
location of 
houses 
village 24.2 53.9 21.9 
urban area: 19.3 67.9 12.8 
small town 23.9 60.6 15.6 
medium 
sized town  
21.7 68.1 10.3 
city 14.3 74.7 13.0 
mean 19.9 66.2 13.8 
 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that in the areas where there were no floods recently, people 
strongly believe in the effectiveness of the flood protection infrastructure, while those who 
experienced the flood probably try to minimize their personal responsibility and look for causal 
factors either in the unpredictable nature of the event or in insufficient flood protection 
infrastructure. At the same time, they do not want to admit that the location of their houses may 
be of significant importance. That conclusion is additionally supported with the answers to the 
question concerning whether the respondents perceive the area where their houses are located 
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as endangered by the flood or not. In group 1, 64.7% of the respondents answered ‘yes’ while in 
group 2 it was only 30.4% and in group 3 the rate reached 83.2%. 
 
4. Protection activities  
 
Out of all respondents who filled in the flood questionnaire (1667 persons), 42.2% of them 
declared that their house was located in the area endangered by the flood occurrence. In that 
group, 18% of the respondents on average declared that they had undertaken activities to 
protect their houses against a flood (Table 4). However, the rate varied from 45.2% in villages to 
7.4% in cities, so the larger the locality, the less is done in terms of individual flood protection. 
The same tendency can be observed in the case of individual protection against strong winds 
(23.5% in villages and 9.3% in cities). The protection activities realized by small groups of 
inhabitants are most popular in small towns (31.5%), which can be a result of strong social links 
in those communities. The protection activities were studied also in the groups of respondents 
defined in the previous section due to the flood occurrence. There is a significant difference 
between group 1 and 2. Persons from group 1 undertake protective actions almost twice as 
often as those from group 2, who have experienced only one big flood event. 
 
Table 4. Respondents’ activity (in %) concerning protection against floods and gales 
(answers only from those who consider their house as located in areas endangered by floods 
or storms). 
Type of 
locality 
Personal activities 
to protect their 
houses 
Protection 
activities in 
small groups 
Application to local 
authorities for flood 
protection 
House protection 
against gales 
village 45.2 26.0 44.0 23.5 
urban area: 14.7 16.0 16.4 9.3 
small town 27.9 31.5 33.9 - 
medium sized 
town  
15.4 19.4 15.9 
- 
city 7.4 5.1 8.2 9.3 
mean 17.9 17.0 19.3 21.4 
 
 
The majority of the respondents (over 60%) are convinced that local authorities should 
organize and sponsor protective activities against floods (see Table 5). Only 17% of them 
declared that they should have done something themselves, together with their families, and 7% 
of them counted on their neighbours. However, in case of storms, the opinions were quite the 
opposite. About 70% of the respondents answered that individual actions are of greatest 
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importance, which is due to the technical nature of the protection facilities used against both 
hazards. People living in villages are much more willing to act on their own than the inhabitants 
of the cities. 
 
Table 5. The main factor responsible for protecting households against floods and storms 
according to the respondents (% of answers) 
Individuals with 
their families 
Individuals with 
neighbours 
Local 
authorities 
Higher level 
authorities 
Type of 
locality 
flood storm flood storm flood storm flood storm 
village 27.4 70.5 3.6 5.7 51.8 18.2 17.3 5.7 
urban area: 15.5 58.2 7.7 10.4 62.6 26.9 14.2 4.5 
small town 21.3 - 10.8 - 56.7 - 11.1 - 
medium sized 
town 
12.9 - 9.2 - 66.5 - 
11.3 - 
City 13.9 58.2 4.2 10.4 63.2 26.9 18.7 4.5 
mean 16.9 68.5 7.2 6.4 61.4 19.6 14.6 5.5 
 
 
5. Mass media as the source of information 
 
Personal experience is an important source of information about extreme phenomena. 
However, even in the areas often affected by floods, strong winds or landslides, only about 50% 
of the respondents point to personal observation as a source of information. The most popular 
source is local mass media, referred to by 68% of all respondents. The third source (in case of 
24.8% of the respondents) is information acquired from the family members and friends. A 
surprisingly low rate of 5% is associated with school education. It is comparable with the impact 
of information distributed in the form of leaflets (5.7%). Information provided by schools is 
usually detached from the local environmental context, so it does not contribute much to 
increasing knowledge about the local environment. Besides, mass media have been a much 
more important source of current information for adults than school experience from many years 
ago (Burgess and Gold, 1985). Neither the frequency, nor the extent of economic losses had an 
impact on the presented pattern of answers. However, the pattern differed for the localities of 
various sizes and types. In villages, local mass media are the source of information about 
natural hazards for 60% of the respondents, while in cities for 82.4% of them. Personal 
observations are significant for 57.2% of the villages’ inhabitants, while in cities it is only 39.8%. 
Finally, family and friends deliver information to 30.1% of people in rural areas and only to 
18.5% in cities. The results prove that rural communities are much more dependent on natural 
phenomena than urban ones, and social links are much better developed there than in the 
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atomised urban social environment. This is also reflected in the answers to the question 
concerning preferred methods of environmental information flow. Inhabitants of villages prefer 
direct contacts and meetings (41.3%), while people living in cities would rather obtain necessary 
information via mass media (62.7%). The declared interest in various information sources did 
not depend on demographic features, financial situation or the place of work, which only proves 
the dominant role of local mass media among the indirect sources of information.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
The results presented above prove that the frequency of extreme phenomena occurrence 
influences the perception thereof, which is then reflected in people’s actions. Those who 
experienced only one big flood try intensely to diminish the cognitive dissonance and deny that 
their houses are located in the area endangered by floods. That mechanism is known as a way 
of eliminating inconsistent and contradictory information when confronted with unpleasant facts 
or unavoidable phenomena (Aronson, 2002). Those people also act according to the threat 
denial response; they do not undertake actions aimed at improving flood protection 
infrastructure because they do not believe that such an extreme event can take place again 
during their lifetime (Shippee et al., 1980). Those who experienced a few floods are much more 
careful in such predictions and undertake much more precautions to protect themselves, which 
agrees with the results of Laska (1990). 
Mass media play a key role in shaping the understanding of environmental problems by the 
inhabitants of Southern Poland, which complies with the results obtained in other countries (e.g. 
Stamm et al., 2000). Unfortunately, the quality of such information is usually rather poor and 
burdened with a strong negative emotional load. Polish mass media follow the pattern described 
by Mitchell (2000) and create concerns by overemphasizing the powerlessness of human 
beings when confronted with natural forces. Another important factor is the very limited time and 
space dedicated to environmental issues in Polish mass media, which is, among other factors, 
the effect of the lack of strong green lobby in Poland. What is worse, quite often correct 
information delivered by scientists is turned into the wrong one by the journalists who tend to 
oversimplify facts and detach them from the context (Biernacki, 2007; Bokwa, 2007). A good 
example is the disastrous flood of 1997 that affected 10% of Poland's territory. The media 
immediately adopted the terms: ‘the flood of the century’ and ‘the flood of the millennium’ and 
associated it with a false conviction that such flood could not happen in the next 100 or 1000 
years. 
Usually there is no analysis of the nature of a particular phenomenon or ways of protection 
against it in the mass media; instead, the inconveniences resulting from the phenomenon are 
stressed. Therefore, journalists increase the feelings of unexpected danger rather than help to 
build useful knowledge about natural phenomena (Biernacki, 2007). Piotrowski and Armstrong 
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(1998) argue that stories about natural disasters included in newspapers are much more 
detailed and in-depth than TV and radio reports. Unfortunately, it is not true in the case of Polish 
newspapers (Biernacki, 2007), which only proves their incomplete development mentioned 
earlier.  
Mass media are the preferred way of obtaining information, which means that local 
authorities responsible for natural hazard risk management should consider using that powerful 
tool to a much wider extent than so far in order to raise public awareness and knowledge 
concerning extreme natural phenomena. 
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Media uses and social representations of climate change 
 
Rosa Cabecinhas, Alexandra Lázaro and Anabela Carvalho 
 
Abstract 
A survey study with Portuguese participants (N=614) was carried out to investigate the 
relationship between practices of media consumption, the use of other sources of information, 
and social representations of climate change.  
Results show a moderate level of knowledge about climate change, a high level of concern 
and a high level of perceived risk towards the potential effects of climate change, emotionally 
negative images associated with climate change, and low frequency of climate-friendly 
individual behaviour. News media are reported to be the main sources of information on climate 
change and are positively assessed in terms of credibility.  
Practices of media consumption are a predictor variable of individual mitigation actions, 
behavioural intentions, concern about climate change and, in a smaller degree, knowledge 
about climate change. However, they have little impact on risk perceptions and on the emotional 
valence of the images associated with climate change.  
 
Keywords: climate change, media, social representations, attitudes, risk 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Research on the relationship between mediated messages and social representations and 
behaviours points to many interconnected factors and a complex network of influences. Several 
studies have suggested that the media play an important role in heightening awareness and 
concern in relation to climate change with impact on behaviours being relatively unclear 
(Krosnick, Holbrook & Visser, 2000; Mazur & Lee, 1993). While citizens’ knowledge of climate 
change has been the focus of various studies (Bord, Fisher, & O’Connor, 1998; Brechin, 2003; 
Dunlap, 1998; Stamm, Clark & Eblacas, 2000), including the relationship with media content 
(Bell, 1994; Corbett & Durfee, 2004), attention has also been directed in the last few years 
towards affective factors in people’s understanding of the issue (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni et 
al., 2006) and towards behaviour and behavioural intentions (e.g. Nave & Schmidt, 2002).  
This paper reports on work carried out within the framework of social representations (e.g. 
Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Jovchelovitch, 1996; Moscovici, 1961). Research findings regarding 
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cognitive, affective and behavioural dimensions associated with climate change (i.e. knowledge, 
concern and risk perception, actions and behavioural intentions) are here interpreted in that 
theoretical context. Social representation theory aims at understanding common knowledge, 
which is grounded in language and in daily life, and at explaining how scientific concepts are 
integrated into everyday thinking and action (Moscovici, 1984). Social representations are ‘a set 
of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual 
communications’ (Moscovici, 1981: 181) and are influenced by both informal communication 
and the media. They integrate cognitions, affects and actions (Jovchelovitch, 1996). Similarly to 
the concept of attitudes, they comprise cognitive and affective dimensions, as well as 
behavioural intentions. The main distinction is that attitudes are generally conceptualized as an 
‘individual’ state, even if influenced by the social environment, while processes of social 
construction and social sharing are central in social representations.  
Several multi-nation studies have demonstrated that lay people’s knowledge of the causes of 
climate change is low (e.g. Brechin, 2003; Dunlap, 1998), and that people seem to have a 
broader representation of environmental issues that does not distinguish accurately the factors 
involved in different problems. For instance, people often mention air pollution as a cause of 
climate change or global warming, and often confuse ozone depletion with climate change (Bord 
et al., 1998; Brechin, 2003; Dunlap, 1998; Stamm et al., 2000).  
Concern with climate change is not as high as concern with other environmental problems, 
such as air and water pollution (e.g. Brechin, 2003). It has been shown that concern depends on 
weather conditions (people show more concern under bad weather conditions; Ungar, 1992) 
and increases with extended media coverage (Krosnick, Holbrook & Visser, 2000). People 
associate climate change with a moderate to high risk, but these risks tend not to be perceived 
as a personal threat (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). They are seen as 
stronger in distant places and in the future rather than in the spatial and temporal proximity of 
the respondent (Leiserowitz, 2005), or, in the case of a Portuguese sample (Cabecinhas, 
Lázaro & Carvalho, 2006), as strong both in distant places (hurricanes, tsunami) and locally 
(draughts, fires). Affective imagery associated with climate change is mostly negative and is 
dominated by melting ice caps, rising temperatures, destruction and diseases (Cabecinhas et 
al., 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2006).  
Regarding willingness to take individual action, people accept undertaking some effort to 
mitigate emissions (e.g. acquiring domestic appliances and cars that are more energy-efficient) 
but do not generally support policies that interfere greatly with the convenience of their daily life 
(e.g. using the car less, carpooling, decreasing the use of heating and air-conditioning; Bord et 
al. 1998; Nave & Schmidt, 2002).  
Research has shown that cognitive dimensions (knowledge on climate change), emotional 
dimensions (affective dimensions such as concern, risk perceptions and mental imagery), and 
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behavioural dimensions (such as behavioural intentions and reported behaviour in the mitigation 
of climate change) are not coherently related. This has been termed as the value-action gap or 
the attitude-behaviour gap (e.g. Blake, 1999; Bord et al., 1998; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). For 
instance, Nave and Schmidt (2002) found out that people viewed climate change as a worrying 
problem and agreed that a solution was needed, but did not report using the car less and failed 
to recognize the importance of causes such as the use of fossil fuels and consumption of 
electricity. 
Despite the fact that the media are considered a key source of information for the public 
about science issues (e.g. Nelkin, 1987), very little research has been done on the influence of 
media coverage of climate change on audience perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Scholars 
in the USA have shown that people build meaning about unobtrusive environmental issues, 
such as climate change, mainly through the media (Wilson, 1995; Corbett & Durfee, 2004).  
In this paper we report results from a survey study with a Portuguese sample conducted in 
2007. The study investigated the relationship between patterns of media consumption and 
social representations of climate change and was based on the following research questions: 
How do practices of media consumption relate to perceptions of risk and responsibility and to 
attitudes towards climate change? What is the emotional valence of images spontaneously 
associated with climate change? What is the relationship between cognitive, affective and 
behavioural dimensions towards climate change? What are the predictor variables of climate-
friendly attitudes and behaviours? 
We report findings on media consumption and its effects on cognitive, affective and 
behavioural dimensions of social representations of climate change. The cognitive dimension 
was defined as the knowledge level about the causes of climate change; the affective dimension 
comprised concern about climate change, risks perceptions and mental imagery; the 
behavioural dimension addressed reported individual behaviour and individual behavioural 
intentions. 
We expect the media to be the main source of information about climate change and 
patterns of media consumption to affect the level of knowledge about the causes of climate 
change and the affective involvement with climate change. We expect to find a gap between 
respondents’ representations of climate change and their actions (intended or reported).  
Socio-demographic variables such as sex, education, age and place of residence have not 
been shown to affect systematically lay representations of climate change (e.g. Dunlap, 1998). 
Accordingly, we do not expect our results to be significantly affected by those variables. 
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2. Method 
 
Participants: 614 Portuguese people (308 women and 306 men); mean age = 30.59 (SD = 
12.99; range 18-75 years); 237 living in rural areas and 377 in urban areas; with diverse levels 
of education, areas of professional activity and professional situations. 
Materials: Questionnaire covering the dimensions analyzed in this paper – degree and 
patterns of media usage; attitudes towards information sources; knowledge of climate change, 
concern, risk perceptions, behavioural intentions and environment-friendly practices, and 
perceived barriers to perform them – as well as other dimensions, such as attributions of 
responsibility and perceptions of relative justice.  
Procedure of data collection: The questionnaire was administered in March 2007 in the 
northern part of Portugal. Participation was voluntary. Response times ranged from 25 to 40 
minutes. 
Procedure of data treatment: after an exploratory descriptive analysis of the data, we 
performed a factor analysis to group the participants according to their patterns of media 
consumption.  
The impact of patterns of media consumption and socio-demographic variables on social 
representations of climate change was analyzed by two MANCOVAS. For the first MANCOVA, 
the dependent variables were the following: a knowledge index of causes of climate change; 
risk perceptions and level of concern about climate change; and emotional valence of the 
images associated with climate change. For the second MANCOVA, the dependent variables 
were reported actions of mitigation of climate change and behavioural intentions. After exploring 
correlations between variables, we also conducted a series of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analyses (MLRA; stepwise method), in order to find the predictors for each of the dependent 
variables mentioned above. 
  
3. Results 
 
3.1. Degree and patterns of media use 
 
Respondents were asked to rate how often they gathered information on climate change 
from different sources (5-point scale ranging from 1=‘very often’ to 5=‘never’). As expected, the 
media topped the information sources on climate change (see table 1). Overall, the most used 
source was television news. Respondents reported to use it frequently and significantly more 
often than the other sources. The second most used sources of information were newspapers, 
followed by televised films and documentaries. The least used sources of information were 
books, publications and leaflets, and events (such as conferences and exhibitions).  
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Table 1. Use of sources of information on climate change 
Sources of information Mean (SD) Factor 1 Factor 2 
TV news 1.81 (1.81)  .810 
Newspapers (printed or online) 2.29 (1.14)  .684 
TV films and documentaries 2.57 (1.15)  .530 
Family, neighbours, friends or colleagues 2.71 (1.06)   
Internet (excluding sites of newspapers, 
radios and TVs) 
2.89 (1.36) .772  
Magazines 2.89 (1.10)   
Radio 3.01 (1.14)  .645 
School or university  3.36 (1.40) .774  
Books 3.40 (1.10) .680  
Publications or leaflets 3.41 (1.08)   
Events (conferences, exhibitions, etc.) 3.97 (1.05) .701  
% of variance explained  38.15 12.72 
Note: Mean ratings are based on a 5-point scale (1= very often, 5 = never); Factor Analysis:  
K-M-O measure of sampling adequacy = .818; Bartlett’s test – Chi-Square = 1457.95; p < 
.001 
 
Sources of information were divided into two factors obtained by an exploratory Factor 
Analysis (method varimax): ‘more actively sought’ sources of information (internet; school or 
university; books; and events) and ‘mass media’ (TV news; Newspapers; Radio; TV films and 
documentaries) – factors 1 and 2 in table 1 respectively. Together these factors explained 50.87 
of the total variance (see table 1). Items with loadings lower than 0.5 were excluded from the 
factor. For each factor, respondents were divided according to the reported degree of use of 
sources of information on that factor: heavy users (above the median) and occasional users 
(below the median). For factor 1 the median was 3.50 and for factor 2 the median was 2.25. 
This distinction was used in other analyses.  
 
3.2. Perception of sources of information on climate change 
 
Participants were asked to rate the trustworthiness of sources of information about climate 
change in a 5-point scale ranging from 1=‘trust very much’ to 5=‘do not trust at all’ (see table 2). 
Overall, respondents expressed a high degree of trust in information coming from scientists and 
experts, followed by information from health professionals, environmental or consumer 
associations, the European Union and teachers. Respondents had some trust in media sources 
and people they know (family, friends, neighbours and colleagues), and expressed mistrust in 
information coming from sources such as government, local authorities and corporations.  
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Table 2. Trust in sources of information on climate change and assessment of their coverage of 
climate change 
Trust in sources of information on climate change  
(5-point scale: 1= trust very much, 5 = do not trust at all) 
Mean (SD) 
Scientists/experts  1.46 (0.64) 
Health professionals/doctors  1.77 (0.73) 
Environmental/consumer associations  1.89 (0.73) 
European Union 2.01 (0.77) 
Teachers  2.01 (0.71) 
Newspapers  2.05 (0.71) 
Television  2.12 (0.72) 
Radio  2.16 (0.69) 
Journalists  2.17 (0.71) 
Internet (excluding sites of newspapers, radios and TVs) 2.25 (0.71) 
Family, friends, neighbours or colleagues 2.37 (0.70) 
Government 2.67 (0.77) 
Local authorities 2.72 (0.72) 
Corporations  2.74 (0.78) 
  
Assessment of the most used mass medium 
(5-point scale : 1= very good, 5 = very bad) 
 
Clarity of explanations of climate change  1.90 (0.70) 
Accuracy of scientific and technological information on climate change  2.05 (0.73) 
Analysis of policy and economic options to fight climate change 2.22 (0.73) 
 
 
Globally, this pattern of results is in accordance with studies conducted before, both in 
Portugal (e.g. Lázaro, Cabecinhas & Carvalho, 2007) and in other countries. For example, a 
widespread mistrust in government, politicians and corporations has been found on studies 
conducted in the UK (e.g. Blake, 2001; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). In contrast, scientists, university 
and social networks are among the most trusted sources of information.  
Participants were asked to indicate the medium they used most frequently as a source of 
information on climate change. The answers were, in order of importance: TV channels (76,4% 
overall; public service TV channels RTP 1 and RTP 2 - 52,1%; commercial channels SIC or TVI 
- 24,3%), newspapers (18%) and radio stations (2,2%). As the majority of the participants 
mentioned a TV channel we divided participants into three groups according to their choices: 
users of a public service TV channel; users of a commercial TV channel; and users of TV as a 
secondary mass medium. These categories were used in further analyses. 
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Participants were also asked to rate the medium they used most frequently in a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1=‘very good’ to 5=‘very bad’ regarding clarity of explanation of the climate change 
issue; accuracy of scientific and technological information; and quality of analysis of policy and 
economic options to fight climate change. Overall, the medium that was most used by each 
respondent was assessed as providing clear explanations of climate change, and accurate 
scientific and technological information (see table 2). The analysis of policy and economic 
options to fight climate change was seen as good. The level of alarmism in the news about 
climate change was rated in a 3-point scale ranging from 1=‘excessive’ to 3=‘insufficient’. 
Overall, participants rated it as moderate (M = 2.01, SD = 0.47).  
These results appear excessively positive in comparison to other studies (e.g. Lorenzoni et 
al., 2007) and might be partially explained by the fact that the survey was presented to 
respondents as linked to the Department of Communication Sciences of a well-known university 
in Portugal. This could have elicited a social desirability bias and produced less critical answers 
towards the media. 
 
3.3. Knowledge of causes of climate change 
 
Respondents were presented with six items and asked to say whether each of them was a 
contributing factor to climate change (see table 3). We computed a knowledge index by adding 
one point for each correct answer and dividing it by the number of items. The index ranged from 
0 to 1. Results point to an overall moderate knowledge of the causes of climate change (M = 
0.67; SD = 0.17), which is apparently better than the low level reported by previous studies (e.g. 
Brechin, 2003; Dunlap, 1998). However, the dichotomous scale that we used meant that the 
chance of choosing the right option was 50%.  
Despite this moderate level of knowledge, people continue to show some confusion in 
relation to the causes of climate change, namely concerning the role of the ozone hole. In fact, 
only 5,7% of the participants gave the right answer concerning the item ‘ozone hole’. The 
depletion of the ozone layer, which is a quite distinct problem from climate change and which 
experts do not consider as a cause of the latter, was the item that received the highest 
percentage of answers as a contributing factor to climate change (94,3%). This is a finding 
commonly reported in the literature (Bord et al., 1998; Brechin, 2003; Lázaro et al., 2007; 
Dunlap, 1998; Stamm et al., 2000).  
Industrial processes (93.6%) and car use (93.6%) were correctly indicated as contributing to 
climate change. The loss of rain forests, car use, and the functioning of coal and oil power 
plants, which are also causes identified by experts, were considered contributors to climate 
change by participants in this study as well. However, 56% of participants considered that 
agriculture and animal husbandry do not contribute to climate change, when in fact they are 
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significant causes of greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, agriculture and animal husbandry was 
seen as the item with the lowest contribution to climate change (44.4%). 
By emphasizing industrial processes and car use, these results seem to reflect a better 
understanding of the causes of climate change than the results from the Portuguese sample of 
the 1992 Gallup survey (Dunlap, 1998) – by then the major causes of global warming that were 
chosen by respondents were loss of rain forests (89%), nuclear power plants (85%), coal and oil 
power plants (83%), automobile exhaust (77%), aerosol sprays (67%), and refrigerators and air 
conditioners (45%). However, it must be noted that the questions posed in each of the 
questionnaires were slightly different. 
 
Table 3.  Knowledge of the causes of climate change 
Percentage of respondents considering that this factor  
contributes to climate change 
% 
Ozone hole 94.3 
Industry  93.6 
Car use 93.6 
Loss of forests 86.9 
Functioning of coal and oil power plants  82.6 
Agriculture and animal husbandry 44.4 
 
 
3.4. Risk perceptions, emotional reaction and concern with climate change 
 
General risk perceptions and emotional reaction to climate change 
Respondents rated the likelihood of being personally affected by a set of factors, including 
climate change, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1=‘very likely’ to 5=‘unlikely’ (see table 4).  
 
Table 4. Mean risk perception 
Situation Mean (SD) 
Pollution 2.19 (0.94) 
Climate change 2.22 (0.94) 
Car accident 2.24 (0.97) 
Cancer 2.48 (1.00) 
Unemployment 2.50 (1.19) 
Violent crime 2.88 (1.05) 
Terrorism 3.34 (1.04) 
HIV infection 3.37 (1.23) 
Earthquake 3.38 (1.06) 
Note: 5-point scale (1= very likely, 5 = unlikely) 
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Respondents considered that is likely that they will be affected by ‘pollution’, ‘climate change’ 
and will suffer a car accident (these mean values did not differ significantly). The likelihood of 
being affected by other factors was considered lower. These results show that Portuguese 
citizens consider climate change a serious personal threat and contrast with conclusions of 
earlier studies in other countries (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The 
significant increase in the visibility of climate change in the media that took place in 2007 may 
contribute to explaining such a difference. 
Participants were asked to freely associate words with ‘climate change’ and to rate the 
emotional valence of those words using a 5-point scale ranging from 1=‘very positive’ to 5=‘very 
negative’. The emotional valence of the images associated with climate change was very 
negative (M = 4.45, SD = 0.79), which is enhanced by the feeling of vulnerability reported in the 
previous question. This result supports the view that participants see themselves as potential 
victims of climate change, as found in a previous study (Cabecinhas et al., 2006). 
 
Concern with climate change 
Respondents were asked how concerned they were with a set of environmental issues, 
including climate change, and answered in a 5-point scale ranging from 1=‘very much worried’ 
to 5=‘not worried at all’ (see table 5).  
 
Table 5. Mean concern with environmental issues 
 Mean (SD) 
Forest fires 1.74 (0.75) 
Air pollution 1.75 (0.79) 
Decrease of forests 1.82 (0.81) 
Ozone hole 2.05 (0.84) 
Climate change 2.05 (0.83) 
Lack of green spaces 2.35 (1.03) 
Use of genetically modified organisms 2.69 (0.99) 
Note: 5-point scale (1= very much worried, 5 = not worried at all) 
 
Respondents reported a high level of concern with climate change and said they were very 
or moderately concerned with all the other issues presented to them. The exception was 
genetically modified organisms for which concern was situated at the middle of the scale. 
Participants showed a high level of concern with forest fires, air pollution and decrease of 
forests. Levels of concern with the ozone hole and climate change were exactly the same. 
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Perceptions of risk associated with the impacts of climate change 
Respondents rated a set of possible consequences of climate change according to the level 
of perceived risk (5-point scale ranging from 1=‘very serious’ to 2=‘not serious’; see table 6). All 
the possible consequences were viewed as very serious or as moderately serious. Draughts 
and health problems were the consequences rated as most serious; ‘increased inequity 
between rich and poor countries’ and ‘increased forced migrations’ were rated as least 
seriously.  
 
Table 6. Mean risk perceptions for possible impacts of climate change 
 Mean (SD) 
Draughts 1.40 (0.66) 
Health problems 1.42 (0.68) 
Increase of hunger in the world 1.52 (0.87) 
Flooding 1.54 (0.73) 
Loss of animal and vegetable species 1.56 (0.81) 
Sea-level rise 1.56 (0.83) 
Hurricanes and storms 1.64 (0.77) 
Desertification 1.66 (0.82) 
Heat waves 1.73 (0.72) 
Cold waves 1.73 (0.81) 
Changes in agricultural production  1.99 (0.83) 
Increased inequity between rich and poor countries 2.00 (1.01) 
Increase of forced migrations 2.10 (0.94) 
Note: 5-point scale (1= very serious, 5 = not serious) 
 
 
3.5. Reported behaviours, intentions and barriers to action 
 
Reported pro-environmental behaviours 
Respondents rated the frequency of their pro-environmental behaviours in a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1=‘very often’ to 5=‘never’. The most frequent reported actions were using less 
heating and air-conditioning (M = 2.39, SD = 1.23), and the separation of waste for recycling (M 
= 2.53, SD = 1.30). Saving energy at home is an appropriate behaviour to combat climate 
change so this is a positive finding, even if heating and air-conditioning are less needed in the 
Portuguese climate than in other countries; recycling is arguably more effective for other 
environmental issues than climate change. Respondents reported to make a rare use of public 
transport (M = 3.07, SD = 1.36). The results converge partially with the literature – recycling and 
energy conservation at home are the most frequent actions that people are willing to undertake 
(as summarized by Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  
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Behavioural intentions to fight climate change 
Respondents were also asked to report the actions of mitigation of climate change that they 
had already undertaken or would be willing to adopt, using the following scale: 1 = already did, 2 
= planning to do in the short-term, 3 = planning to do in the long-term, 4 = not planning to do; 9 
= does not apply to my situation (see table 7). To replace conventional light bulbs with low-
consumption bulbs is a mitigation action that most participants had already undertaken or 
intended to do in the short-term. Most participants also reported that they were planning to 
acquire more energy-efficient domestic appliances in the short-term. The installation of solar 
panels was a mitigation action that participants typically planned to undertake in the long term or 
did not plan to undertake at all. In sum, participants had already undertaken or were planning to 
pursue in the short-term actions that involved little financial investment; actions that involved 
more financial cost, like improving a house from an environmental point of view, were not 
planned for the near future or were not planned at all. 
 
Table 7. Behavioural intentions towards actions of mitigation of climate change 
 Mean (SD) 
Replace conventional light bulbs with low-consumption bulbs  1.62 (0.93) 
Acquire more energy-efficient domestic appliances 2.23 (1.07) 
Take environmental aspects into account when acquiring 
high-budget items (e.g. a car, a house) 
2.53 (1.02) 
Improve insulation of home walls and roof 2.59 (1.11) 
Install solar panels 3.23 (0.23) 
Note: 4-point scale (1 = already did, 2 = planning to do in the short-term, 3 = planning 
to do in the long-term, 4 = not planning to do; 9 = does not apply to my situation) 
 
Perceived barriers to engaging in mitigation actions 
Respondents were asked to report why they did not do more to fight climate change by 
choosing any number of response options. Financial cost was the most chosen option (40.1% of 
respondents). Lack of information (32.4%) and lack of time (29.2) were also considered 
important barriers. Only 3.9% of the respondents mentioned that they did not do more because 
they were not worried with this issue; 16.6% did not believe that they could solve the problem; 
and 14.3% considered themselves too lazy to do more to fight climate change. 
This pattern of results is consistent with the high level of concern about climate change 
reported in table 4, but also indicates that participants feel helpless and that they are not 
sufficiently informed about mitigation actions. The way the media have been reporting on 
climate change in Portugal may play a role here as useful practical information for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has rarely been made available. The internet obviously offers a wide 
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variety of approaches and depictions of climate change but the analysis of Portuguese websites 
suggests that the dominant discourse is a techno-managerial one with the emphasis on national 
and international regulatory mechanisms (Carvalho, 2007).  
 
3.6. Effects of the use of information sources 
 
Effect of the use of information sources on knowledge, concern, risk perception and 
affective imagery associated with climate change 
We used a MANCOVA to analyse the effects of the use of information sources and socio-
demographic variables on the cognitive and affective dimensions of social representations of 
climate change. Four factors were used: ‘mass media’ and ‘more actively sought’ sources of 
information (2 levels in each factor: high and low consumption of information), type of TV 
channel (3 levels: users of a public TV channel; users of a commercial TV channel; and users of 
TV as a secondary medium) and sex (2 levels: female and male). The covariate was the age of 
the participant.  
The dependent variables were the knowledge index of causes of climate change, risk 
perception and level of concern about climate change, and emotional valence of the images 
associated with climate change. 
We found that the type of use of information sources affected significantly the knowledge 
index [‘more actively sought’ sources: F(4,533) = 3.37, p = .01; type of TV channel: F(8,1062) = 
2.24, p = .01]. Heavy users of ‘more actively sought’ sources (internet, school or university, 
books and events) showed a higher level of knowledge about the causes of climate change than 
occasional users [F(1,533) = 6.57, p = .01]. There was no significant difference amongst users 
of ‘mass media’ sources (newspapers, TV news, TV films and documentaries, and radio). Users 
of public service channels showed a higher level of knowledge than users of commercial 
channels [F (2,533) = 3.58, p = .03].  
Patterns of use of information sources did not affect significantly the perceived likelihood of 
being affected by climate change and the emotional valence of the images associated with 
climate change. 
The use of information sources affected significantly the level of concern with climate 
change. [‘more actively sought’ sources: F(4,533) = 3.37, p = .01, type of TV channel: F(8,1062) 
= 2.24, p = .01]. Heavy users of ‘mass media’ sources showed a higher level of concern about 
climate change than occasional users [F (1,533) = 5.65, p = .02]. Patterns of use of information 
sources did not significantly affect risk perceptions of the possible impacts of climate change.  
The sex of participants had a significant effect on the combined dependent variables [F 
(4,530) = 4.13, p = .01]. Subsequent ANOVAs showed that women were more likely to consider 
that they could be affected by climate change [F (1,533) = 3.78, p = .05], were more concerned 
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[F (1,533) = 6.95, p = .001) and showed more negative affective images [F (1,533) = 8.34, p = 
.004] than men. 
Interactions between variables did not produce a systematic pattern and therefore are not 
analyzed here. 
As expected, we found that the type of use of information sources affected significantly the 
level of knowledge about the causes of climate change, with heavy users of ‘more actively 
sought’ sources showing more knowledge than occasional users, and users of public TV 
channels showing more knowledge than users of commercial TV channels.  
Overall, the patterns of use of information sources did not affect the emotional aspects 
covered by our survey. These results contradict our expectations. The only exception was the 
level of concern with climate change: heavy users of ‘mass media’ sources showed a higher 
level of concern about climate change than occasional users.  
Results might be explained by the very frequent media coverage of climate change in the 
Portuguese media in 2007, which may have produced a high perceived likelihood of being 
affected by climate change as well as motivated negative images even in occasional users.  
 
Effect of the use of information sources on reported mitigating actions and behavioural 
intentions associated with climate change 
This MANCOVA analysed the effects of the use of information sources and socio-
demographic variables on the behavioural dimensions of social representations of climate 
change. It used the same factors and covariate of the previous analysis. The two dependent 
variables were mitigating actions and behavioural intentions associated with climate change, 
which were significantly affected by age [F(2,584) = 7.24, p =.01], ‘more actively sought’ 
sources of information [F(2,584) = 8.87, p =.01], ‘mass media’ sources [F(2,584) = 7.15, p 
=.001] and sex [F(2,584) = 3.42, p =.03]. Subsequent ANOVAs showed that: age significantly 
affects behavioural intentions [F(1,585) = 10.32, p < .01], which increase with increasing age (β 
= -.007, t = -3.21, p < .01); a higher consumption of ‘more actively sought’ sources of 
information increased the frequency of reported mitigating actions [F(1,585) = 13.76, p <.01] 
and behavioural intentions [F(1,585) = 7.84, p =.005]; a higher consumption of ‘mass media’ 
sources increased the frequency of reported mitigating actions [F(1,585) = 9.12, p =.003] and 
behavioural intentions [F(1,585) = 8.49, p =.004]. Sex did not produce a significant effect in a 
subsequent ANOVA.  
The interaction between the use of ‘mass media’ sources and sex was significant [F(2,584) = 
3.53, p =.03] and a subsequent ANOVA [F(1,585) = 6.33, p =.01] showed that reported 
mitigating actions are higher for women with high consumption of information than for men with 
high consumption of information.   
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3.7. Predictors of engagement with climate change 
 
After exploring the correlations between variables, we conducted a series of Multiple Linear 
Regression Analyses (MLRA), stepwise method, in order to identify the predictors of each of the 
previously mentioned dependent variables (knowledge of causes of climate change, risk 
perception, level of concern about climate change, emotional valence of images associated with 
climate change, reported actions of mitigation of climate change, and behavioural intentions). 
Knowledge about the causes of climate change was significantly predicted by two variables: 
level of schooling (β = .121, p < .003) and reported frequency of using ‘more actively sought’ 
sources of information about climate change (β = -.091, p<.027). These results show that 
knowledge about climate change increases with increasing level of schooling and heavy users 
of ‘more actively sought’ sources of information had higher knowledge than occasional users. 
However, the variance explained by this model is low (adjusted R2= .027). 
Two predictor variables were found for the perceived likelihood of being affected by climate 
change: respondents’ sex (β = .115, p < .005) and the reported frequency of using ‘more 
actively sought’ sources of information about climate change (β = .087, p < .032). These results 
show that women feel more vulnerable about climate change than men and that heavy users of 
‘more actively sought’ sources feel less vulnerable than occasional users. The variance 
explained by this model is low (adjusted R2 = .022). 
Level of concern with climate change was significantly predicted by two variables: frequency 
of using ‘more actively sought’ sources of information (β = .193, p < .001) and frequency of 
using ‘mass media’ sources (β = .142, p < .001). Heavy users of [both types of] sources of 
information felt more concerned about climate change than occasional users. The variance 
explained by this model is low (adjusted R2 = .082). 
Three predictor variables were found for reported mitigation actions: frequency of using 
‘more actively sought’ sources of information (β = .194, p < .001); frequency of using ‘mass 
media’ sources (β = .129, p < .001); and level of concern with climate change (β = .170, p < 
.001). Heavy users of sources of information reported higher frequency of mitigation actions 
than occasional users; and the higher the level of concern the higher the frequency of mitigation 
actions. The variance explained by this model is low but higher than for the previously 
mentioned models (adjusted R2 = .128).  
Four predictor variables were found for reported behavioural intentions: frequency of using 
‘more actively sought’ sources of information (β = .115, p < .010); frequency of using ‘mass 
media’ sources (β = .159, p < .001); age (β = -.188, p < .001), and level of knowledge about 
climate change (β = -.180, p < .001). These results show that heavy users of sources of 
information reported intentions to undertake mitigation actions in a higher degree than 
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occasional users; and that behavioural intentions increased with increasing age and knowledge. 
The variance explained by this model is low (adjusted R2= .099).  
Overall, socio-demographic variables had little impact on the results: sex affected only the 
affective dimensions, age affected the reported behavioural intentions and level of instruction 
affected the level of knowledge about climate change.  
The degree and patterns of use of information sources revealed some significant impacts. 
Statistically significant correlations were found between practices of use of information sources 
and reported individual mitigation actions, as well as between use of information sources and 
behavioural intentions. Use of information sources was also associated with concern about 
climate change (the higher the reported frequency of use of information sources the higher the 
level of concern) and, on a smaller degree, with knowledge about climate change (the higher 
the reported frequency of use of information sources the higher the level of knowledge). 
However, practices of use of information sources appear to have little impact on risk perceptions 
and on the emotional valence of images associated with climate change.  
However, the variance explained by the models is quite low, so we need to further explore 
the variables affecting levels of engagement with climate change. 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
As expected, social representations of climate change did not show a coherent pattern 
between knowledge, affective dimensions (concern, risk perception and affective images) and 
behavioural aspects, such as mitigating actions and behavioural intentions.  
Our sample showed a moderate level of knowledge about the causes of climate change. 
Knowledge seems to be increasing slowly over the past 15 years – the Portuguese sample in 
the Gallup’s 1992 survey showed a low level of knowledge (Dunlap, 1998). However, the 
majority of respondents did not recognize the contribution of agriculture and animal husbandry 
to climate change. Furthermore, there is still confusion about the role of the ozone hole, which 
respondents considered the main contributor to climate change. Recent studies conducted in 
other countries show that there is still a widespread association of the ozone hole with climate 
change (Kirby, 2003; Poortinga et al., 2006). This finding supports the view that people 
incorrectly relate climate change to other environmental issues, particularly stratospheric ozone 
depletion (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994) and that other dimensions (such as imagery) 
than knowledge are involved (Cabecinhas et al., 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2006). 
Knowledge of the causes of climate change was significantly affected by the patterns and 
degree of use of information sources: heavy users of ‘more actively sought’ sources revealed 
higher knowledge than occasional users and users of public service channels revealed higher 
knowledge than users of commercial channels. 
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Several affective dimensions were analyzed in this paper: general risk perceptions; concern 
with climate change; emotional valence of images freely associated with climate change; and 
risk perceptions about the possible impacts of climate change. Respondents rated the risk of 
being affected by pollution and by climate change as high in comparison with other risks. 
Respondents were very or moderately concerned with all the environmental issues presented to 
them. Concern with forest fires, air pollution and the decrease of forests was very high, followed 
closely by concern with the ozone hole and climate change. All the possible consequences of 
climate change were viewed as very serious or as moderately serious. Consequences on the 
‘physical’ world (draughts, flooding) were rated as more serious than ‘social’ consequences 
(‘increased inequity between rich and poor countries’ and ‘increased forced migrations’). The 
high levels of risk perception and concern with climate change were in accordance with the very 
negative emotional valence of the images spontaneously associated with the issue. 
Emotional reaction to climate change was significantly affected by the sex of the 
respondents and, in some cases, by patterns and degree of use of information sources: women 
showed a higher level of risk perception, felt more concerned and evoked more negative images 
than men; users of public service channels revealed higher concern than users of commercial 
channels; heavy users of information sources revealed higher concern than occasional users 
(for both types of sources). This result does not allow us to conclude that a higher use of 
information sources causes more concern as it may instead be concern that motivates the 
search for information, which may in turn reinforce concern. Further research on the motives for 
media consumption for environmental issues, particularly climate change, should address the 
relationship between motives and types of consumption and the way they reinforce each other. 
The level of behavioural intentions to fight climate change was relatively high. These results 
may be due to social desirability, but they suggest that people are aware that they can 
contribute to mitigating climate change through their individual behaviours. 
Behavioural tendencies were significantly affected by patterns and degree of use of 
information sources: heavy users reported higher levels of actions and more behavioural 
intentions than occasional users (for both types of sources); users of public service channels 
reported higher levels of actions and more behavioural intentions than users of commercial 
channels. The reasoning presented above about levels of concern also applies here: uses of 
information sources and behavioural trends may have a circular cause-effect relationship.  
Overall, there is a gap between the high level of concern, risk perception and affective 
imagery associated with climate change, on the one hand, and the frequency of mitigating 
actions, on the other hand. The perceived likelihood of being affected by climate change and 
levels of concern with the issue were very high (they increased considerably when comparing to 
an exploratory study conducted in 2006; Lázaro et al., 2007). Studies in other countries also 
found an increase in concern with climate change, particularly since 2003 (GlobeScan, 2006; 
  186 
cited by Lorenzoni et al., 2007). However, reported actions and intentions are still lower than 
expected for such high levels of concern and moderate-high level of knowledge of the causes. 
Our findings are consistent with the widely reported ‘value-action’ or ‘attitude-behaviour’ gap 
(e.g. Blake, 1999; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
Responses to our survey also pointed to an inconsistency between behaviour and 
knowledge levels. We found that increasing knowledge of the causes of climate change led to 
greater behavioural intentions, but it did not affect both the actual mitigation actions reported, or 
concern with climate change. This is a point that requires further exploration as new data 
becomes available. Conceptually, we can be highly concerned about an issue as long as we are 
aware of it and regardless of the level of knowledge. However, to act adequately to address 
climate change requires knowledge of the correct mitigating behaviours. 
Confronted with the question of why respondents did not fight climate change, they 
mentioned mainly individual barriers: financial cost involved, lack of information and lack of time. 
Other individual barriers have been suggested by research: lack of knowledge; uncertainty and 
scepticism; mistrust in information sources; externalising responsibility and blame; reliance on 
technology; climate change perceived as a distant threat; importance of other priorities; 
reluctance to change lifestyles; fatalism; and helplessness; together with social barriers such as 
lack of action by governments, business and industry; ‘free rider effect’; pressure of social 
norms and expectations; and lack of enabling initiatives (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
In conclusion, the media are the main source of information about climate change and 
practices of use of information sources have a significant impact on some dimensions of 
personal engagement with the issue – concern and, in a lesser degree, knowledge about 
climate change, as well as mitigating actions and behavioural intentions. However, the degree 
of use of information sources seems to have little impact on risk perceptions and on the 
emotional valence of images associated with climate change. 
Further theoretical developments should focus on social factors. Social identity has been 
shown to be an important influence on people’s pro-environmental behaviours (summarized by 
Lorenzoni et al, 2007) and literature on social representations emphasizes the role of 
interpersonal communication in the construction of a shared reality. Social representations are 
not simply given by the media or other sources of information. They are created and re-created 
in everyday social interaction (Moscovici, 1981). Analyzing social networks and social identity is 
a promising venue to understand lay people’s engagement with climate change.  
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Framing climate change and climate-proofing: 
From awareness to action 
 
Joop de Boer 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines two contrasting mental models that can be used to frame climate 
change and climate-proofing (i.e. adaptation and mitigation). The models refer to common 
causes and common effects, respectively. Climate change may be relatively easy to grasp if it is 
conceived as a common cause of different changes in nature. That is important to raise public 
awareness of the issue. However, climate-proofing will involve a different mental model. This 
model should consider all the measures necessary to produce the common effect of a climate-
proof country. In theory, such a mental model is far more difficult to communicate. These 
notions are illustrated with data from recent European surveys (Eurobarometer) on 
environmental and energy issues. The results suggest that the long-lasting rainfall and severe 
floods in Central Europe have had a significant impact on citizens’ concerns. Climate change 
was often framed in a way that articulates its associations with rain- and river-based problems. 
This supports the notion of climate change as a common cause of different changes in nature. 
In contrast, it appeared that many citizens had only vague ideas about the energy situation in 
their country and that a clear frame for climate-proofing decisions is lacking. 
 
Keywords: climate, frames, mental models, public opinion, European surveys 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the years to come many new tools will have to be developed for communication and 
learning on climate change and, in particular, the options that can make a society more climate-
proof (i.e. adaptation and mitigation). Taking the role of framing into account may significantly 
add to these tools, as climate change and climate-proofing can be framed and reframed in 
several ways. In the early 1990s, for example, many citizens of the developed countries saw the 
so-called ‘greenhouse gas effect’ or ‘global warming’ as an issue with potentially serious but 
geographically and psychologically distant consequences (Bord, Fisher and O'Connor, 1998; 
Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff and Read, 1994; Kempton, Boster and Hartley, 1995). Since then, 
however, various salient events, such as unusually long-lasting rainfall and severe floods in 
Europe, may have contributed to a reframing of the issue in terms of consequences that are 
much closer to people’s personal lives. This change may be happening through a process of 
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formal and informal risk communication in which risks that were largely implicit are reframed into 
more explicit risks. As this process will not stop here, it is particularly important to get more 
insight into the frames that people use to make sense of climate-related issues. As part of a 
larger multidisciplinary study to support communication and learning on climate change, this 
paper introduces some key theoretical characteristics of framing. Additionally, it explores which 
frames the citizens of different Western European countries use to recognize and understand 
climate-related issues. 
Frames are crucial micro-mechanisms in the continuous interactions between humans and 
the nonhuman natural world. Important insights into their role have been put forward by 
researchers in such varied fields as anthropology, linguistics, cognitive psychology, social and 
organizational psychology, management science, sociology, communication and media studies, 
social movements research, policy science, science studies, and philosophy. Due to disciplinary 
boundaries, however, much work has still to be done along the lines where these fields 
converge. The present paper takes as a starting point people’s interaction with the environment 
near to them, such as the room they are sitting in and the newspaper they are reading (see 
Figure 1). In this inherently perceptual process, frames are the coordinate systems that people 
use to align data from their memory and data from the environment, for example, to interact with 
objects in a three-dimensional space (Di Nocera, Couyoumdjian and Ferlazzo, 2006). Similarly, 
with regard to perception and understanding of more abstract issues, the term frame refers to 
the organizing principles by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or 
reorient their thinking about an issue (Chong and Druckman, 2007). In the literature on policy 
controversies (Schön and Rein, 1994), frames are often depicted in terms of ‘underlying mental 
structures’ of belief, perception and appreciation, which enable people to take shared or 
opposing political positions. Accordingly, frames are not just personal (and idiosyncratic) tools 
but also cultural structures. 
 
 
Figure 1. Frame-based information processing creates links between two data sets.  
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The main organizing principles for abstract information processing are language and mental 
models, including causal-chain structures, such as storylines. It is here that major differences 
may appear between people's beliefs about living kinds and artefacts. Recent research into 
children's thought processes has shown that even preschool children have intuitions about the 
essential properties of living kinds, which distinguish them from artefacts (Greif, Nelson, Keil 
and Gutierrez, 2006). One of these intuitions is the tendency to assume that living things have 
vital forces inside them that are responsible for growth and activity (Keil, 2006). In contrast, 
artefacts are developed to serve a function or a purpose. Preschool children, for example, do 
understand that dogs are different from tables. Dogs and other living kinds are seen as having 
an essence that works as a common cause of different dog-like phenomena (see Figure 2). In 
contrast, young children conceive of artefacts in terms of functions. Moreover, tables and other 
artefacts have to be assembled; their different constituting elements produce the table-like 
function as their common effect. People assume and prefer a common-cause structure 
regarding ‘natural’ categories (Ahn et al., 2001). Common-cause models are relatively easy to 
understand and can flexibly be extended or reduced. In contrast, common-effect models require 
more knowledge about the constituting elements and their mutual relationships. 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of the dog's essence as a common cause and the table-like function as a 
common effect. 
 
The common-cause model is not only relevant for purely natural phenomena, but also for 
people’s relationship to the habitable earth. Many stories about this topic have been collected in 
Glacken's (1967) seminal book on nature and culture in western thought from ancient times 
onwards. Each of these stories appears to capture one or more of the following themes: (1) the 
idea of a designed earth that constitutes a fit environment for human beings and other organic 
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life, (2) the idea of geographical influence on the character of human culture (‘geographical 
determinism’), and (3) the idea of humans as geographic agents who changed the earth from its 
hypothetical pristine condition. In the past centuries, the stories had strong moral undertones. 
Many unusual natural events, for instance, were seen as cues that something unpleasant is 
going to happen (‘omen of disaster’). During the Little Ice Age (from around 1300 until about 
1730), certain ‘unnatural’ climatic events were not only attributed to large-scale deforestation but 
also to the weather-making abilities of witches (Behringer, 1999). 
In modern times, the idea of humans as geographic agents is partly captured by a global 
model of environmental pollution. Basically, this is a common-cause model of the several ways 
in which human activities may threaten the essence of nature. The old notion of the balance of 
nature may reinforce the worry that modern humans are playing with things they barely 
understand. Kempton et al. (1995) suggest that many citizens of the United States applied a 
pollution model to climate change. Global warming was often seen as a subset of ozone 
depletion, due to overlapping features and the fact that the ozone issue was established first. 
The common-cause model may help people to become aware of the many ways in which 
climate change can become manifest, such as by changes at the North pole, in the Alps, in sea 
level and in patterns of rainfall. This may happen even if their understanding of these issues is 
not completely in line with established scientific knowledge about differences between climate 
change and ozone depletion. However, making a country climate-proof by adaptation and 
mitigation measures requires a completely different mental model. Climate-proofing should be 
driven by opportunities for technological, institutional and societal innovations, rather than 
purely by fear of the negative effects of climate change (Kabat, van Vierssen, Veraart, Vellinga 
and Aerts, 2005). Therefore, climate-proofing is a common effect of different constituting 
elements that have to be balanced carefully. The contrast between the two mental models is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
Because frames and mental models cannot be observed directly, their role in information 
processing has to be derived from comparisons of different situations, such as different sites 
where people are trying to make sense of what happens in their environment. In the case of 
climate change, for example, research may focus on comparing people who live in areas with 
different ecological and cultural circumstances. Interestingly, several recent multi-national public 
opinion surveys allow us to make such comparisons. This refers to some large data sets, such 
as the Eurobarometer surveys of the European Union, which are not specifically built for 
research into beliefs about climate change but which can fruitfully be used for that purpose. 
Although some data sets include a large number of countries, it was decided to focus the 
analysis on the countries that belong to Western Europe (i.e. the former EU 15 countries plus 
Norway and minus Greece). 
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Figure 3. Climate change is a common cause; climate-proofing is a common effect. 
 
A particular advantage of the data sets is that concerns about climate change can be 
examined in the context of concerns about other environmental issues, such as ozone depletion 
or natural disasters, and beliefs about energy technology. Hence, the research questions were: 
(1) is it possible to separate worry about climate change from worries about other environmental 
topics, (2) to what extent are citizens worried about climate change, (3) do citizens see linkages 
between climate change and energy, (4) what do these linkages indicate about their mental 
models? 
 
2. Method 
 
Two large data sets were chosen that allow us to put climate-related framing by the citizens 
of Western European countries in a broader environment and energy perspective. These are (1) 
Eurobarometer 58, conducted between 1 September 2002 and 7 October 2002 (after the 
August 2002 flooding in the Elbe and the Danube catchment areas) and focused on attitudes 
towards the environment (European Commission, 2002); and (2) Eurobarometer 57 (without 
Norway), conducted between 23 February and 4 April 2002 and focused on attitudes towards 
energy and energy technology (European Commission, 2003). Both data sets were documented 
and made available by the ‘Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Köln’. From each set, 
the most relevant questions about climate-related worries and beliefs were taken. 
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Clearly, multi-national data should be handled with great care. A crucial methodological point 
is that each country should be seen as a set of conditions, such as latitude, language, religion, 
education, and wealth (Scheuch, 1989), which makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly how the 
differences between the countries should be explained. In addition, differences in public opinion 
between countries are often less stable than the sample sizes (approximately 1000 persons per 
country) may suggest. Comparisons may also be hampered by differences in language and 
ways in which people answer survey questions. For instance, questions that are intended to 
measure people’s level of concern about environmental issues may generate a tendency to 
show a certain degree of concern about all the issues. In Europe, this tendency may be more 
widespread in the countries of the south than in those of the north (European Commission, 
2002; van Herk, Poortinga and Verhallen, 2004).  
Therefore, several statistical techniques were applied to adjust the scores for differences in 
response tendencies. A useful technique is multidimensional scaling by PROXSCALE (SPSS, 
2003), as the results are not influenced by overall score level differences in different groups. In 
addition, multiple regression analysis was used to transform the degree of worry about climate 
change into standardized residuals that were made independent from worries about other 
environmental issues. For purposes of presentation the data per country are arranged in an 
order that takes due account of their latitude and language, from Southern to Northern Europe. 
 
3. Results 
 
One of the potentially relevant ways of viewing climate issues is by putting them in the 
broader context of all the main environmental issues of our times. In Eurobarometer 58, 
respondents were asked to indicate their level of worry about 25 environmental issues, ranging 
from ‘destruction of the ozone layer’ to ‘industrial waste management.’ The technique of 
multidimensional scaling was used to place related worries together and non-related worries 
further apart. In the solution presented in Figure 4, four dividing lines were drawn on the basis of 
another analysis (Principal Component Analysis with oblique rotation of the first four correlated 
components; sharing 61 % of the common variance, all Eigenvalues >1).   
The results presented in Figure 4 indicate that there were clear patterns of worries among 
the citizens of the countries involved. In fact, all the environmental worries could be arranged in 
four broad clusters, which may be characterised as follows. Water pollution (e.g. rivers, coasts, 
ground and tap water) and industrial disasters (e.g. oil spills) make up the first cluster. The 
second one refers to some global environmental issues and includes climate change together 
with natural disasters and the ozone issue. The third cluster contains local issues and topics 
that appear to worry urban people in particular (e.g. hunting). The fourth cluster largely involves 
worries about potential hazardous activities, including the use of nuclear power and the 
management of chemical waste. 
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Figure 4. Multidimensional scaling of the worries1) taken from Eurobarometer 58 (n = 16054, 
Normalized Raw Stress .089). 
1) Question 39: ‘At present, are you very worried, fairly worried, not very worried or not at all 
worried about (…)’. 
 
The set of clusters showed that it was possible to separate worries about global 
environmental issues from the other ones. Citizens who were relatively more worried about 
climate change were often also relatively more worried about topics such as deforestation, 
extinction of species, natural disasters and ozone depletion. This pattern of associations may be 
the result of a common-cause model of thinking about global issues. Further, the set of clusters 
was used to shed more light on the relative level of worry about climate change and natural 
disasters. That is, a multiple regression analysis was applied to transform the degree of worry 
about climate change into standardized residuals that were made independent from worries 
about water pollution, hazardous activities and local issues. The same analysis was applied to 
the degree of worry about natural disasters. 
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Figure 5 displays the results of the analyses per country after standardization across the 
data set as a whole. It appears that the level of worry about climate change was relatively high 
in the countries of Central Europe. This pattern of results corresponds with higher levels of 
worry about natural disasters and, as depicted in Figure 6, higher partial correlations between 
both worries. 
The results of Figures 5 and 6 should be seen in relation to the long-lasting rainfall and 
severe floods that have stricken Central Europe since 1990. These events may have had a 
significant impact on people's worries about climate change. Among the citizens of countries as 
Austria and Germany, the levels of worry about climate change and natural disaster were 
relatively high and both items were significantly correlated. In these and other countries worry 
about natural disasters was higher in rural areas than in large towns.  
Interestingly, a river-oriented pattern was also found in the Netherlands, where 60% of the 
territory is located below sea level and 70% of the gross national product is earned in these 
flood prone areas (Kabat et al., 2005). The highest correlation between worry about climate 
change and natural disasters was found among citizens in the provinces that are river-oriented 
(r = .34, n = 524, p < .001) instead of coast-oriented (r = .23, n = 474, p < .001). This outcome is 
not really surprising, as the past decade has revealed that certain parts of the Netherlands are 
very vulnerable to river-based floods. However, especially in the lowlands with their long 
coastline, climate change may have much more consequences than rain- and river-based 
problems only. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean levels1) of worry about climate change and natural disasters per country. 
1) Standardized residuals (overall M= 0, SD = 1) of degree of worry about climate change and 
natural disasters, given people’s level of worry about water pollution, hazardous activities and 
local issues. 
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Figure 6. Partial correlations between worry about climate change and about natural disasters, 
given people’s level of worry about water pollution, hazardous activities and local issues. 
 
Linkages between climate change and energy issues were analysed on the basis of 
Eurobarometer 57. Many people in Western Europe agreed with the statement about the 
significant contribution of the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas etc.) to global warming. This 
connection was confirmed by more than 80% of the citizens in five of the countries (Figure 7). 
Although this indicates at least some general understanding of the issue, it should be added 
that there were also associations that indicate confusion. For instance, many citizens had the 
opinion that nuclear power also contributes to global warming (Figure 8). Explicit denial of this 
impact was higher in countries in the north where the average level of education is higher, but in 
these countries as well a large percentage agreed (overall, the correlation between length of 
education and agreement–disagreement with this item is r = .17 (n = 15036)).  
 
 
Figure 7. Percentage per country that agreed with the statement: ‘The use of fossil fuels (coal, 
oil, gas etc.) contributes significantly to global warming and climate change’. 
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Figure 8. Percentage per country that agreed (front row) or disagreed (back row) with the 
statement: ‘Nuclear power contributes significantly to global warming and climate change.’ 
 
These results underline the conclusion of public opinion researchers that many citizens of 
the European Union had only vague ideas about the energy situation (European Commission, 
2003). For example, the same data set revealed that Europeans gave high priority to renewable 
energy sources (conventional and new) and that they tended to overestimate the actual use of 
renewable energy sources in their country. This was particularly salient in the Netherlands 
where 23% gave the answer that renewable energy sources are used ‘much’ to produce energy 
in this country. Accordingly, many citizens had no idea about the steps that still have to be taken 
to make ‘renewables’ a more than marginal source of energy. These outcomes demonstrate 
that the common-effect model needed for thinking about a climate-proof country will not be easy 
to communicate. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Although far more research is necessary, the secondary analysis of the European surveys 
has produced valuable insights into climate-relevant information processing. Climate change 
was often framed in a way that articulates its associations with rain- and river-based problems. 
This indicates that the notion of climate change may be relatively easy to grasp if it is conceived 
as a common cause of various changes in nature. Policy-makers may need such an approach 
to increase public awareness of the issue. In contrast, many citizens of Western Europe had 
only vague ideas about the energy situation in their country. This illustrates that climate-proofing 
will involve a different mental model. It will require hard thinking to consider all the measures 
necessary to produce a climate-proof country. Paying attention to the distinction between a 
common-cause and a common-effect model may be of help in this context. 
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Communicating climate change in Portugal: 
A critical analysis of journalism and beyond 
 
Anabela Carvalho and Eulália Pereira 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses discourses circulating in the Portuguese public sphere(s) about 
climate change, and discusses the problems associated with representations of the issue in the 
press and television news. Understandings of risk and responsibility are given particular 
emphasis given their importance for problem definition and proposed courses of action. The 
study covers four print media: Correio da Manhã (a popular daily newspaper), Expresso (a 
quality weekly newspaper), Público (a quality daily newspaper) and Visão (a mid-market weekly 
news magazine). Various aspects of press coverage since 1990 are examined but we focus in 
more detail on four ‘critical moments’ between 2003 and 2007. A sample of recent television 
news from RTP1, 2: (both part of the public broadcasting company), SIC and TVI (private 
channels) is also analysed. Besides journalistic discourse, we look at some aspects of the 
communication of climate change by politicians, non-governmental organizations and other 
social actors, and how it relates to media discourses. 
 
Keywords: climate change, Portugal, media, social actors, discourse 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the context of Europe, Portugal is in a rather specific situation as it was allowed to 
increase its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 27% from 1990 levels in the period 2008-
2012 within the European Union’s burden-sharing policy with regard to the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2008 (UNFCCC, 
2008) and in fact already several years earlier, the country had exceeded this target by a 
significant margin, mainly due to increases in road transportation. This is a path that has been 
followed in many countries that are in a process of rapid economic transformation. Hence, 
analysing communication on climate change in Portugal not only sheds light on a social and 
cultural context where than has been much less research than in northern Europe and the USA 
as it may also provide hints to analogous realities.  
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Survey studies (Dunlap, 1998; Nave & Schmidt, 2002) indicate that, amongst the 
Portuguese population, there is a high level of concern and a relatively poor understanding of 
climate change, as well as little behavioural change towards mitigation of GHG emissions. The 
media play an important role in providing information and raising awareness about the issue 
(e.g. Wilson, 1995). The imagery produced and circulated in the media is likely to impact on 
social representations although processes of interpretation are rooted in particular lived 
experiences and social contexts (cf. Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). In turn, the media constantly 
draw on the discursive and social practices of individuals and institutions. The social 
construction of such a complex and multifaceted issue as climate change is closely tied to the 
pronouncements of a variety of social actors, such as politicians, scientists, corporations and 
environmental organizations. 
This chapter is part of a wider project that aims to understand the links between the 
discourse of social actors, the discourse of the media and social representations on climate 
change in Portugal. The goals of the chapter are as follows. Firstly, we aim to identify the main 
meanings of climate change in the discourse of a variety of social actors (policy institutions, 
scientists, non-governmental organizations, corporations, etc). Secondly, we aim to analyse the 
media’s discursive (re)construction of climate change and understand what the dominant 
discourses are; the relation between the discourses that are produced and circulated by social 
actors and the media discourse is one of the aspects to be considered. 
Climate change has many other dimensions but this chapter is mainly concerned with two 
aspects that are central to discursive and social practices: problem definition and proposed 
course(s) of action. Therefore, representations of the risk associated with climate change, which 
are grounded on knowledge as well as on social values, and discursive constructions of 
responsibility for preferred action plans are the main focuses. 
 
2. Research context 
 
Media attention to climate change has fluctuated significantly since the 1980s but in many 
countries there has been a markedly high volume of coverage in the last decade (cf. Boykoff 
and Roberts, 2007). In the same period, research interest in the roles of the media has grown 
considerably with scholars examining such aspects as the role of journalistic norms in media 
coverage of climate change (e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007), ideological filters in the 
representation of knowledge (Carvalho, 2007b), the activities of climate change ‘sceptics’ and 
their impact in the media (McRight and Dunlap, 2000), the influence of different forms of science 
reporting in perceptions (Corbett and Durfee, 2004) and narrative cycles in climate change 
news (McCommas and Shanahan, 1999). 
With its various space and time scales, non-linear cause-effect links, unclear manifestations, 
and multiple sources of responsibility, climate change is, in some respects, at odds with the 
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prevailing media quest for ‘facticity’ or the search for answers to the questions ‘who, what, 
when, where, how and why’. Amongst the factors that may contribute to placing the issue on the 
media agenda, the most important one is likely to be the agency of a number of social actors in 
talking about it. Multiple voices have ‘spoken for’ climate change in the last two decades. The 
scientific community first created the social problematicity of climate change insofar as it 
gathered, interpreted and presented data that suggested a connection between concentrations 
of GHGs in the atmosphere, global mean temperatures and human sources of GHGs 
emissions. The political process that ensued included a number of high-level international 
summits, institutions and legal frameworks, and engaged a variety of policy-makers, interest 
groups and environmental organizations. Despite the increasing consensus amongst scientists 
regarding the anthropogenic nature of the problem and its gravity, climate change has been 
contested in its scientific, political, economic and other dimensions. The media are a crucial 
arena in the negotiation of different understandings of the issue and in the production, 
reproduction and transformation of meanings of climate change. Studies about the US and the 
UK have shown the power of politicians in setting the media agenda and structuring the 
discourse (Trumbo, 1996; Carvalho, 2005). 
Whereas climate change may present difficulties as a potential news topic, some features 
make it attractive for media professionals. That is especially the case for the superlative nature 
of potential impacts: the range and reach of such impacts, which go beyond anything previously 
experienced, the number of affected people, the extent of damage that it may cause and the 
sheer potential for disruption of life-as-we-know-it. This high level of risk has motivated some 
hyped depictions of the problem and messages dominated by catastrophism. Weingart, Engels 
and Pansegrau (2000) suggested that this Pandora box view of climate change was prevalent in 
the German media since the mid-1980s. In the case of the UK, recent studies have pointed out 
the presence of alarmism in the press. Ereaut and Segnit (2006) concluded that representations 
of climate change fall into two main types of ‘linguistic repertoires’1: alarmist and optimistic. The 
first conveys an image of climate change ‘as as awesome, terrible, immense and beyond 
human control. (…) It is typified by an inflated or extreme lexicon, incorporating an urgent tone 
and cinematic codes. It employs a quasi-religious register of death and doom, and it uses 
language of acceleration and irreversibility.’ (2006: 7). The optimistic repertoires suggest that 
things ‘will be alright’ (p. 12) and include the following forms: ‘settlerdom’, ‘British comic 
nihilism’, ‘rhetorical scepticism’, ‘expert climate change denial’, ‘warming is good’ and ‘free 
market protection’. The pragmatic optimistic repertoires are a variation that suggests that ‘it’ll be 
alright if we do something’ (ibid.). ‘Establishment techno-optimism’, ‘non-establishment techno-
                                                 
1 Linguistic repertoires are ‘systems of language that are routinely used for describing and evaluating 
actions, events and people. A repertoire might include a distinctive lexicon, a set of grammatical or stylistic 
features, or particular images, metaphors, idioms, stories and categories.’ (Ereaut and Segnit, 2006: 12). 
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optimism’, ‘David and Goliath’, ‘corporate small actions’ and ‘personal small actions’ are its sub-
types. 
Ereaut and Segnit argue that the alarmist repertoire raises difficulties for acting upon climate 
change as it constructs it as being too big for individuals to tackle. Citizen agency is nullified in 
face of the scale of the problem. Therefore, the authors argue, this ‘contains an implicit counsel 
of despair’ (p. 14). Several researchers have recently argued that climate change 
communication that focuses on catastrophe and fear is often counterproductive as it leads to 
disbelief and apathy or to paralysis. A report produced by UNEP/Futerra (2005: 13) has 
suggested that a ‘‘fear’ message’ is unlikely to engage people. Moser and Dilling (2007) have 
also argued that fear-inducing communication on climate change can generate reactions of 
denial and rejection of the problem. 
In a more general diagnosis of mediations of climate change, Ereaut and Segnit (2006: 7) 
conclude that ‘in the British mainstream media today, the climate change discourse looks 
confusing, contradictory and chaotic.’ This fits in with Defra’s (2006: 7) evaluation of survey 
results: most people in the UK think that climate change ‘is confusing – they can’t see how it 
relates to them; won’t affect them personally; is a problem for the future, not now; and can’t be 
affected by their individual actions, because the problem is so big’.  
Research conducted in Portugal (Cabecinhas, Lázaro and Carvalho, this volume) also 
indicates that despite widespread concern and perceptions of risk people are ambivalent about 
solutions for climate change. The roles and responsibilities that people assign to different social 
actors, including themselves, and their views about the possible paths to pursue in dealing with 
climate change are both an individual and a social construct. Communication practices are key 
to these intersubjective negotiations of meaning: How are we to address the environmental 
crisis? What kind of measures should be put in place? What is to be expected from different 
agents? 
Dryzek’s (1997) analysis is a useful contribution to map understandings of the ‘politics of the 
Earth’. Viewing discourse as ‘a shared way of apprehending the world’ (1997: 8), Dryzek argues 
that four elements are central to all environmental discourses: (1) basic entities whose 
existence is recognized or constructed; (2) assumptions about natural relationships; (3) agents 
and their motives; and (4) key metaphors and other rhetorical devices (p. 15-18). By looking at 
the specificities of different narratives about humans’ relation with the environment, he identifies 
nine discourses. Emerging in the 1970s, the idea of finite resources and limits to growth led to 
survivalism, a discourse that was denied by prometheanism, the belief that humans can, like 
Prometheus, achieve progress and growth without boundaries. Beyond these two fundamentally 
different views, Dryzek organizes environmental discourses into three groups: reformist 
problem-solving discourses, sustainability discourses and radical discourses. The first group 
includes administrative rationalism, which constitutes the state and technical expertise into the 
 130 
principal environmental problem-solvers, democratic pragmatism, which believes in the 
mobilization of citizens and social groups to shape policy-making, and economic rationalism, 
that privileges market forces in addressing environmental problems. Sustainability discourses 
encompass two types: sustainable development and ecological modernization. Both discourses 
attempt to integrate environmental protection, economic growth and social justice, as well as 
safeguard the rights of future generations. Ecological modernization complements that with the 
idea that green policies and green technology can generate wealth. Finally, Dryzek points out 
two discourses that require radical shifts in the ways of dealing with the environment: green 
romanticism and green rationalism. While the former calls for a change in human 
consciousness, the latter suggests that environmental problems will only be solved by structural 
transformation and fundamentally different politics. 
In this chapter, the works of Ereaut and Segnit (2006) and Dryzek (1997) will be guiding 
references in the analysis of discursive constructions of risk and responsibility respectively, 
even though our analytical framework is broader and includes other features of discourse. 
 
3. Discursive constructions of climate change in Portugal 
 
In this part, we will analyse public discourses on climate change in Portugal starting with 
the communication of various social actors and later moving on to the media’s reconstruction 
of the meanings of the issue.  
 
3.1. Social actors’ communication on climate change 
 
As argued above, the interpretations of climate change advanced by various social actors 
define the debates that take place in societies. Some of those interpretations are likely to have 
a significant impact on media discourses. Our research was guided by the following questions: 
Which discourses on climate change are ‘out there’ in the Portuguese ‘public sphere’? Who 
speaks for this problem? What visions do different actors advance regarding climate change?  
In order to look for answers to these questions, we mainly focused on materials available in 
the Internet. Although not ‘universal’ in many ways, the Internet can be considered a 
showcase for the diversity of discourses that are put forth in modern societies, and, in many 
cases, it works as a relatively encompassing archive of documents. In the first six months of 
2006, we conducted several searches of the Internet with the following keywords: ‘alterações 
climáticas’ [climate change] or ‘aquecimento global’ [global warming] or ‘efeito de estufa’ 
[greenhouse effect] or ‘Protocolo de Quioto’ [Kyoto Protocol]. We thereby collected all 
available online documents of a wide range of policy and science-related institutions, non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations and other social actors2. Governmental 
programs, parliamentary speeches, NGO reports and campaign materials are some of the 
resulting materials. The following table presents the volume of collected data for each 
category of social actor. 
 
Table 1. Number of documents on climate change found in 
the Internet for each type of social actor. 
 
Type of social actor Number of  
documents 
Environmental NGOs 100 
Government 78 
Interest groups/Professional associations 30 
Corporations 23 
Universities/Research units 21 
Local government 7 
Others 19 
Total 278 
 
Table 1 shows that environmental NGOs have produced the highest number of documents 
on climate change available in the Internet. Although not entirely surprising, this is worthy of 
note. It should be emphasised that Quercus, the environmental NGO that intervenes publicly 
the most in Portugal, was responsible for around 90% of these documents, most of which are 
‘comunicados’ (communiqués/press releases3) dating from 1999 to 2006. Taking into account 
the foundational role of science for understanding climate change one could expect a higher 
number of articles from universities and research units. This may reflect both the relatively 
small number of Portuguese research projects on climate change and the non-proactive 
communication strategies of scientists. By distinguishing the central government from the local 
government, we aimed to shed light on local policies focusing on climate change. The low 
number of documents suggests that the issue is not viewed as a (communicative) priority. 
As a multifaceted and complex issue, climate change can be discursively constructed from 
different perspectives or angles. Knowing which are the macro-themes privileged by different 
social actors in their communication about climate change can not only reveal preferences and 
agendas but also help make inferences about the impacts of discourse in perceptions of 
climate change. To this purpose, we carried out a content analysis of all the documents. 
Based on initial assumptions and further confirmation by the analysis, we can state that the 
                                                 
2 Obviously, all the results of the keyword search that concerned other Portuguese-speaking countries 
were excluded. 
3 The term ‘comunicado’ means both communiqué and press release in Portuguese. 
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most important macro-themes in climate change discourses are ‘science’, ‘economics’ and 
‘politics & regulation’. These correspond to key aspects of the social emergence and 
management of this issue.  
 
Figure 1: Themes in social actors’ discourses. 
 
The method we employed consisted in determining what the dominant theme in each 
document was. Although loosing sight of other themes present in a text, we produced a simple 
but effective summary of the most important angles through which climate change is socially 
constructed. Figure 1 shows a clear prominence of the theme ‘politics & regulation’ in the 
discourse of most actors. As climate change has increasingly become a matter of policy 
management, a variety of social actors make regular pronouncements about regulatory 
options and measures. It is also telling that the economic dimension of the issue has almost 
the same number of occurrences as the scientific one, and that it corresponds to nearly half as 
many documents of environmental NGOs as politics & regulation. 
A finer analysis of social actors’ communication on climate change was pursued through 
Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Carvalho, 2008). The following aspects were taken in 
consideration: themes or objects of discourse (which aspect or angle of climate change was 
privileged); actors (which social actors were present in the texts and what were their roles); 
structure – or layout – of the text (e.g. what was chosen for the title and first paragraph) and 
lexical choices and rhetoric (e.g. metaphors). We also examined the discursive strategies of 
the various social actors (i.e., how they constructed reality in discourse towards a certain 
effect or goal) and attempted to detect values, preferences and worldviews or, more generally, 
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ideologies. Critical Discourse Analysis was helpful towards identifying types of discourse, 
according to Dryzek’s (1997) classification, as well as Ereaut and Segnit’s (2006) ‘linguistic 
repertoires’. 
The Portuguese government pronouncements on climate change tend to fit into one or 
more of three of Dryzek’s categories: administrative rationalism, economic rationalism and a 
neo-liberal version of economic modernization. The following excerpt of the ‘Communication of 
the Council of Ministers from 10 May 2001’ at the occasion of approval of the National 
Strategy on Climate Change offers insights into the government’s position: 
 
‘the Portuguese state is determined to honour its international commitments and ... takes up 
the role of regulating agent for the actions that different sectors of [economic] activity and 
citizens ought to undertake, keeping in mind that it is important to minimize possible negative 
impacts on society as a whole’ (Conselho de Ministros, 2001). 
 
Here, action on climate change is constructed as a commitment external to the country 
(‘international commitments’). The government uses a strategy of self-positioning as (passive) 
regulator of the actions of others. Whereas it makes no attempts to discursively engage 
society in mitigating climate change, it emphasises that society’s well-being should not to be 
affected by actions to that purpose, thereby associating potentially negative impacts to such 
actions. There are aspects of administrative rationalism and mainly of economic rationalism in 
this discourse. 
In the spring of 2003, two pronouncements related to energy policy are worth mentioning. 
On 13 March 2003, the government presented the ‘Guidelines of the Portuguese Energy 
Policy’ and on 3 April 2003 it publicly communicated decisions towards the liberalization of the 
energy market (merge of electricity and gas utilities; selling part of the state ownership). 
‘Market liberalisation’ was presented as the first goal (Conselho de Ministros, 2003) and 
‘benefits for the consumer’ (namely, lower energy prices) were highlighted (Ministério das 
Finanças/Ministério da Economia, 2003). The government argued that its decisions would 
reinforce the position of the Portuguese energy sector and improve the competitiveness of 
national companies (Conselho de Ministros, 2003). The Government Energy Policy was said 
to be structured into ‘three strategic axes’: ‘to guarantee the security of supply; to promote 
sustainable development; to stimulate national competitiveness.’ (ibid.) In a typically economic 
rationalism fashion, the withdrawal of the state from energy economics is here presented as 
desirable and the government construed as a facilitator of the free market. 
The public presentation of the legal ‘package’ entitled ‘Winning in the carbon economy’ on 
20 January 2005 provided the context for the government to put forth ideas that are clearly 
associated with an ecological modernization discourse. Climate change was presented as an 
opportunity to turn Portugal into a ‘winner in the carbon economy’ (Ministério do Ambiente e 
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do Ordenamento do Território, 2005). In other words, one could say that nature’s degradation 
appears as a chance to make money. 
Most of the documents available in the sites of official bodies are of a relatively technical 
nature and are written in a language that would be somewhat opaque for most lay people. 
Climate change tends to be constituted into a techno-managerial issue by the state, something 
that presumably does not contribute to engage citizens with the problem (cf. Carvalho, 2007a). 
As mentioned above, amongst environmental NGOs, Quercus produced the vast majority 
of documents on climate change available in the Internet. Most other NGOs do not make 
regular pronouncements on the issue. Quercus does not propose radical social changes to 
address climate change. It tends to adopt a discourse that crosses administrative rationalism 
with environmental modernization. An analysis of its ‘comunicados’ reveals that its main 
addressee is the government, from whom it normally calls for stricter limits on emissions or 
better implementation of policy. It often denounces faults in the government’s performance 
and recommends certain courses of action. Its promotion of political regulations, for instance 
through the introduction of a carbon tax applied to all uses of energy, suggests a discourse of 
administrative rationalism. Moreover, Quercus endorses the power of intergovernmental 
organizations and international law to reduce GHG emissions. The European Commission, for 
instance, is often mentioned in Quercus’ discourse. It is normally constructed as a reference in 
terms of environmental policy-making for putting pressure on the national government. For 
example, a joint communication of Quercus and four other environmental NGOs on 1 April 
2004 pointed out that, since the Portuguese Plan for Allocation of Emission Allowances 
2005/2007 did not mean any reduction in projected emissions and gave signs to the market 
that were contrary to the need for energy efficiency, the NGOs were left with no alternative but 
to submit a complaint to the European Commission against the Portuguese government 
(GAIA/GEOTA/LPN/Quercus/CPADA, 2004). The title of the document, ‘Climate change: 
Portuguese plan gives Licence to Emit’, made an analogy with a 007 movie’s title, a telling 
rhetorical device. Elsewhere, Quercus maintained that emissions reductions should not be 
seen ‘not as a mere obligation but mainly as an opportunity to turn our economy more efficient 
and therefore more competitive’ (Quercus, 2003), a view that is typical of ecological 
modernization. Nevertheless, Quercus’ analysis of Portugal’s performance is not optimistic; 
e.g., it stated on 31 January 2006 that the revised Portuguese Plan on Climate Change 
showed the ‘incapacity’ of Portugal to implement measures towards meeting its Kyoto 
obligations and had ‘lost credibility’ (Quercus, 2006). 
Our analysis suggests that, at the time of our search at least, Portuguese research on 
climate change had a relatively low salience/visibility in the websites of research institutions. 
The one important exception to this is the Scenarios, Impacts and Adaptation Measures 
project (SIAM, 2006), led by Filipe Duarte Santos, from the University of Lisbon. It had a 
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website with a number of documents available for downloading and was referred in other 
websites on scientific research and events. It should be pointed out that we found an 
interdiscursivity gap regarding Portuguese research on climate change: it is almost completely 
absent from documents of other social actors. For reasons of space we will not be able to go 
into detail in the analysis of the communication of other social actors here. We will simply note 
that in Portugal, unlike other countries, business and other private interest organizations do 
not normally deny the problematicity of climate change nor its anthropogenic origin.  
In terms of Ereaut and Segnit’s (2006) analysis, the discourse of social actors is dominated 
by a mildly optimistic outlook, except for environmental NGOs. While the government expects 
climate change to be addressed through regulation and economic measures, most other 
actors clearly avoid a dramatic discourse. There are very few references to the risks 
associated with climate change in the documents of Portuguese social actors available in the 
Internet. Scientists, for instance, occasionally appear to be over-cautious in communicating 
the potential impacts of climate change. NGOs do not convey a fatalistic reading of climate 
change but make a negative evaluation of the government’s performance. 
 
3.2. Journalistic discourses on risk and responsibility 
 
The media are both an arena where the discourse of other social actors gets amplified and a 
key social actor in the production and reproduction of the meanings of climate change. Our 
analysis focuses on three newspapers, a news magazine and four television channels. The print 
media that we analysed have some of the highest circulations in Portugal and are 
representative of a wide range of market segments and ideological tendencies: Correio da 
Manhã (a popular daily newspaper), Expresso (a quality weekly newspaper), Público (a quality 
daily newspaper) and Visão (a mid-market weekly news magazine). We searched for relevant 
texts in Correio da Manhã, Expresso and Visão by using their web-based archives. The search 
keywords were the same as in the searches for documents by other social actors: ‘alterações 
climáticas’ [climate change] or ‘aquecimento global’ [global warming] or ‘efeito de estufa’ 
[greenhouse effect] or ‘Protocolo de Quioto’ [Kyoto Protocol]. Difficulties of access to Público’s 
archive in some of the periods led to a careful manual search of the printed issues of this 
newspaper. We are confident that this has not significantly altered results. Given the importance 
of graphic aspects in Visão, the only news magazine in our sample, we decided to complement 
the website search with copies of the printed issues. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on four ‘critical moments’ between 2003 and 2007, 
which are (or can be perceived to be) linked to climate change in diverse ways. These are 
periods when events with the potential to stir up debate and reshape the meanings of the issue 
took place: a heatwave that occurred between 29 July and 15 August 2003; the public 
presentation of the Portuguese Plan for Allocation of Emission Allowances 2005/2007 (‘Plano 
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Nacional de Atribuição de Licenças de Emissão’ – PNALE) on 17 March 2004; the Kyoto 
Protocol’s entry into force on 16 February 2005; and the publication of the Summary for 
Policymakers (SPM) of the 4th Assessment Report (AR) by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (on the ‘Physical Science Basis’) on 2 February 2007, at the 10th 
Session of the Working Group I in Paris4. With these choices, we attempted to have a mixture of 
different moments/events of national and international relevance. 
Before we move on to the analysis of those critical moments, we will provide an overview of 
the volume of coverage in the four print media since 1990, when the issue first gained some 
public visibility in Portugal, in connection with the publication of the 1st IPCC AR. Our option has 
been to look at a number of critical moments: the Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; the 1st 
Conference of the Parties (COP1) to the UNFCCC in 1995; the 2nd IPCC AR published in 1996; 
the Kyoto summit of 1997 (COP3); the 3rd IPCC AR in 2001; the publication of the Portuguese 
National Plan on Climate Change (PNAC) in 2001; and, more recently, the four moments 
described above plus the occurrence of the Katrina hurricane in the US in 2005. 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there have been significant fluctuations throughout the years, 
particularly in the quality press. While previous science reports did not generate much media 
interest (with the exception of the 3rd IPCC report in Expresso), the 4th IPCC AR marked a clear 
‘boom’ in media attention. The conjunction of the AR with the publication of Al Gore’s book and 
movie, as well as the Stern report, may have led to a more receptive (if not avid) media attitude 
towards reporting on climate change knowledge. The international political summits that are 
generally perceived as most iconic, such as Rio’s and Kyoto’s, clearly led to an enhanced 
media interest while key national events, such as the publication of PNAC and PNALE, 
motivated very few articles. Contrary to possible expectations, extreme weather events were not 
very frequently associated with climate change, especially in the popular press. Finally, the 
differences in the volume of media coverage in the quality and the popular press are 
noteworthy: the former consistently dedicated a lot more space to climate change than the 
latter. 
 
                                                 
4 In order to be sure of including articles that may have been published in anticipation of a given event and 
those that may have been written in reaction to it, our search covered 14 days before and 14 days after the 
event. The periods under examination are therefore the following: 29 July-29 August 2003 (in the case of 
the heatwave, an unpredictable event, the search started at its outset and not two weeks before); 3-31 
March 2004; 2 February-2 March 2005; and 16 January-16 February 2007.  
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Figure 2. Number of articles on climate change in Correio da Manhã and Público, 1990-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of articles on climate change in Expresso and Visão, 1990-2007. 
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In the four critical moments that are the focus of this chapter, we examined press articles of 
every genre: news pieces, editorial notes, opinion articles, etc. We analysed all the articles on 
climate change published in those periods but will focus here on the articles that refer – or are 
related – to the event or issue that was considered critical. The Critical Discourse Analysis 
method described in the previous section was also employed for the press articles. Besides 
examining the individual articles we undertook a comparative analysis of the discourse of the 
various print media, which provided insights into the alternative ways of representing reality. 
 
a) Reporting on the 2003 heatwave 
 
One of the most severe heatwaves ever registered in Europe took place in August 2003. It 
affected a number of countries with a death toll in excess of 30000 people (over 2000 in 
Portugal) (UNEP, s/d). The heat contributed to widespread forest fires totalling an area of 
425000 hectares in Portugal. 
In a piece from 10 August 2003, Correio da Manhã suggested that there could be a link 
between the heatwave and global climate change. It interviewed several scientists but did not 
appear to ‘force the evidence’, sticking instead to words such as ‘[the heatwave] may be a 
signal that climate change is taking place’ (Ramos, 2003c), as uttered by scientists. However, 
the search for confirmation of the above-mentioned link led to the question also being posed to 
the Secretary of State for the Environment: ‘Do you think that there are signs of climate change 
already?’. He gave a much more assertive answer than researchers: ‘Yes. In fact, (…) the 
heatwave (…) is completely abnormal. It may be a clear sign that human-induced global 
warming may be happening faster and more strongly than [what the IPCC forecasts]’ (Ramos, 
2003b). 
Visão quoted Filipe Duarte Santos and Carlos da Câmara, the vice-president of the 
Meteorology Institute, to suggest a causal relation with the greenhouse effect (Sá, 2003). Even 
though the scientists’ words that were cited did not actually attribute the heatwave to climate 
change, the selected quotes and their juxtaposition implied that the two factors were connected. 
This news magazine printed a long piece on the impacts of the heat on people’s lives that 
included their names, personal stories and coping strategies, such as jumping into the river with 
the clothes on (Oliveira, Ruela and Sá, 2003). Such portraits of social reality are part of an 
empathy-inducing strategy commonly used by the popular press. Whereas this has commercial 
purposes, it also has significant social effects some being arguably of a disciplinary nature (e.g. 
accommodation to suffering as others suffer too). A text box associated with this article carried 
an alarmist message. Under the headline ‘Bleak future’, it read: ‘the last 15 days (…) may have 
been a warning: the end of this century will be an amplified version of this choke. In the 
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scenarios of the SIAM project (…), heatwaves may last up to 20 consecutives days by the coast 
and two months in the interior regions of the south. (…) Save yourself whoever can.’ 
The popular press is often accused of excessive simplifications, exaggerations and 
distortions of scientific knowledge. A more complex picture emerged in our analysis. Both 
Correio da Manhã and Visão appealed to scientific authority as they quoted several scientists; 
in fact, more than Expresso did in this period. In one article, Correio da Manhã spoke of 
‘different models of simulation of the evolution of climate’ (Ramos, 2003a), thereby 
acknowledging the non-unicity of knowledge. However, science was indeed distorted at times 
and errors were detectable, possibly contributing to public confusion about climate change. For 
instance, in several articles of Visão there was a mix-up between weather and climate: the 
headline of one article about the heatwave was ‘Climate: Crazy heat’ (Oliveira, Ruela and Sá, 
2003)5. Discourse analysis suggested a different conclusion than the quantitative analysis 
regarding the link between the heatwave and climate change in these media. 
In one of its articles on the heatwave, Público offered an overview of knowledge on climate 
change in a restrained language close to science’s pointing out that scientists ‘avoid jumping to 
the conclusion that what is happening is irrefutable proof of climate change’. While the headline 
clearly stated that ‘Heatwave does not prove global warming’ (Público, unattributed, 2003), the 
likelihood of similar events becoming more frequent was emphasized in the caption of a picture 
of youngsters cooling off in a fountain: ‘What we are witnessing is a sample of what is in the 
store for the planet in a scenario of climate change’. The association between the heatwave and 
the scenarios of the SIAM project was also made elsewhere (Garcia, 2003). 
Expresso established a link between the heatwave and global climate change with a large 
degree of certainty: ‘The abnormal heat is already a consequence of climate change felt 
throughout the planet’ (Expresso, unattributed, 2003a). Yet, in other articles it referred to climate 
change as an (uncertain) ‘theory’ (Expresso, unattributed, 2003b) and spoke uncritically of its 
impacts as potentially positive for access to resources: ‘research also reveals a positive aspect 
in the disappearance of the ice [in the Arctic]. Norway and Russia believe that it may be a 
promising region for exploration of oil and gas, which will become easier’ (ibid.). 
This critical moment had all the ingredients to potentially induce an alarmist reading of 
climate change: extreme heat, widespread forest fires and a very high number of heat-related 
deaths. However, there was no (direct) association between the rise in mortality and climate 
change. More generally, even though there was one example of alarmism, we cannot state that 
the predominant depiction of those events was a fatalistic one.  
In this period, there is little reflection on how to address climate change. Therefore, Dryzek’s 
discourses do not quite apply, except for an article in Correio da Manhã on the possibility of a 
                                                 
5 A similar confusion was also present in another article (Sá, 2003). 
 140 
carbon tax where trust in regulatory measures is promoted through the voice of the Secretary of 
State for the Environment – a clear example of administrative rationalism. 
 
b) Representing national responsibilities and the role of business 
 
PNALE is critical because it determined the emission levels that the state allowed 
corporations to have for free (i.e. without purchasing emissions rights). Nevertheless, it 
generated a quite low level of media attention. 
Correio da Manhã only carried one article on the subject, which brought up some aspects of 
administrative rationalism but gave priority to business competitiveness: 
 
‘“Portugal will not go forwards alone with the introduction of ecotaxes”, the Secretary of State 
for the Environment stated yesterday during the presentation of [PNALE]. José Eduardo 
Martins said that Portugal aims to meet Kyoto’s objectives, but will not adopt measures that 
hurt the competitiveness of its companies.’ (Ganhão, 2004) 
 
The headline suggested sympathy for this political decision: ‘Government stops ecotaxes’. 
In Público there were two articles on PNALE. With the headline ‘Government allows the 
increase of polluting emissions until 2008’ (Garcia, 2004), one of them represented a quite 
different discourse relative to Correio da Manhã. It was a critical view of the government’s 
permissiveness referring to the fact that emission allowances superseded industry’s 
expectations, and a reminder that Portugal had already gone beyond its Kyoto target and 
needed to reduce its GHG emissions. It also included a reference to the critical reception of 
PNALE by environmental NGOs. The other article was headlined ‘EDP claims that the plan has 
costs’ (Público, unattributed, 2004). It conveyed the view of the public electricity company on 
the financial costs of implementing PNALE. 
While one newspaper chose to highlight a view of national interest associated to business 
competitiveness and the free market, displaying a preference for values associated with 
Dryzek’s economic rationalism, the other communicated a preference for stricter government 
regulations. 
Expresso awarded the issue only a small note in the Economics section, which highlighted 
the ‘bonus for emissions’ (headline) at a time when Portugal was already ‘slipping away’ from 
Kyoto (Expresso, unattributed, 2004). 
Visão did not publish any articles on PNALE. 
 
c) Interpreting the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force 
 
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005 was a potentially meaningful 
time for the media to raise questions such as: What is the significance of the Protocol? What 
are the challenges? What implications does it have for Portugal?  
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On 17 February 2005, Correio da Manhã reported on the criticisms made by the leaders of 
Bloco de Esquerda, a leftist party, of the environmental performance of some of the biggest 
Portuguese corporations (Gonçalves, 2005). This is a rare example of the media denouncing 
corporate responsibility. However, the article’s headline ‘Kyoto Protocol attacked in Setúbal’ is 
misleading and inaccurate. It was the violation of the Protocol – and not the Protocol itself - that 
was attacked. In a piece highlighting the USA’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, Correio da 
Manhã referred several times to GHGs as ‘polluting gases’ and to the countries that emit the 
highest levels of GHGs as the ‘biggest polluters’ (e.g. B.C.M., 2005). These lexical choices, 
which are also found in pieces from other sources (e.g. Ribeiro, 2005a) indicate that climate 
change is socially constructed in the context of the familiar (and quite vague) framework of 
‘pollution’, something that may, in itself, have significant implications for public understanding of 
the issue (cf. Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001) 
Visão’s main piece on Kyoto, ‘There it is!’ (Ribeiro, 2005a), was written in a popular 
language style and punctuated by irony and sarcasm regarding the Protocol, its implementation 
and its impacts. Another piece, ‘The weakest link’ (Ribeiro, 2005b), criticized Portugal’s 
environmental performance arguing that while the country was lagging behind in its obligations 
climate change was already having impacts there. These are examples of some scepticism 
regarding political responses to the problem. They represent the opposite of what Ereaut and 
Segnit (2006) called ‘establishment optimism’. 
Expresso also threw a critical look at the Portuguese situation à propos the Kyoto Protocol’s 
entry into force. Using various voices, including several NGOs, an article headlined ‘Kyoto not 
met’ (Tomás, 2005) called into attention the fact that Portugal was seriously skidding away from 
emissions targets and that policy plans to reduce emissions needed to be urgently 
implemented. A similarly pessimistic tone could be found in Expresso’s Única supplement on 18 
February 2005: ‘It is very difficult to find signs of hope in environmental policies in Portugal’ 
(Expresso, unattributed, 2005). In these approaches the state was to blame for the problems 
but it was also the one social actor that a variety of voices claimed that had to act. 
Contrastingly, a piece in the Economics section of the paper conveyed a techno-managerial 
perspective on carbon and the ‘carbon economy’. It was all about earnings, costs, profits and 
companies (P.L., 2005). 
On 16 February 2005, Público carried four articles on climate change and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The main article referred to the international politics of climate change and the 
difficulties on getting agreement on the Protocol (Fernandes and Garcia, 2005). A note recalling 
the tense days of COP-3 in 1997 when the Protocol was forged (Fernandes, 2005a) reinforced 
this idea while a piece with questions and answers offered a didactic summary of what was at 
stake (Fernandes, 2005c).  
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Ricardo Garcia (2005b) produced an overview of the implementation of the Portuguese plan 
on climate change. Looking at a number of sectors, from transport policies to sources of energy, 
from forestry to energy efficiency, he traced a dark picture of the situation. This was also the 
message on the front page of the paper where a headline read ‘Kyoto Protocol in place, but 
Portugal far off target’. A few days earlier, the decision by the European Union not to define new 
quantitative targets for its emissions and to opt for a wait-and-see approach was also 
represented in a critical light with inclusion of comments by NGOs like Greenpeace (Garcia, 
2005a). 
On 17 February 2005, two pieces focused on interstate issues. While one spoke of the 
limitations of Kyoto in face of the reductions needed to address climate change and mapped 
resistances and offences, with analysis of the positions of China, the USA and other countries 
(Fernandes, 2005b), the second one, headlined ‘Two difficult steps’ (Garcia, 2005c), identified 
the two main challenges posed to the ‘international community’: fulfilling the Kyoto commitments 
and reaching a post-Kyoto agreement. Again, climate change was here framed as a matter of 
international politics. 
There were similarities in the representations of climate change in the four media in this 
period. It is perhaps not surprising that all chose to refer to the international politics surrounding 
the Kyoto Protocol, and that the US’s withdrawal from the process and the challenges involved 
in reaching consensus were highlighted. There was acknowledgement of the Protocol as a 
positive move but there were also reservations and doubts. Hence, one cannot speak of 
generalized optimism. All the media we analysed referred to the Portuguese performance with 
regard to GHG emissions and conveyed a negative outlook. Público produced the most 
thorough analysis thereof. 
 
d) Reading the state of knowledge and projecting the future  
 
The IPCC’s 4th AR was prepared by over 600 authors from 40 countries and reviewed by a 
similar number of scientists, as well as by governments. Working Group I (WG I) assessed the 
scientific knowledge on the drivers of climate change and projections for the future. The 
Summary for Policy-makers of the WG I’s part of the report was discussed meticulously and 
agreed on a line-by-line basis by representatives of 113 governments at a meeting in Paris and 
publicly presented on 2 February 2007. 
In this critical period, several articles in Correio da Manhã were close to an alarmism 
discourse in the sense that they put a great emphasis on risk (or the threats) posed by climate 
change. The lexicon and the metaphors present in some of the texts were emotionally charged 
and suggestive of impending negative events: ‘On the way to climate disaster’ (I. Ramos, 2007); 
‘Climate turned inside out’ (D. Ramos, 2007); ‘Earth threatened by warming’ (A.P./F.J.G., 2007); 
‘Water threatens Portugal’ (Saramago, 2007a). One article carried a particularly demoralizing 
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message: ‘Experts claim that the Earth has reached the point of no return. This means that 
even with all the good will of the most developed countries in the world, which are most 
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and environmental catastrophes are 
a reality about to happen’ (A.P./F.J.G., 2007). 
 
Still, articles that suggested that it was already ‘too late’ and that there was no point in acting 
were relatively rare. For instance, in an article entitled ‘On the way to climate disaster’, the 
journalist wrote that ‘There is little time left to stop the process’ (I. Ramos, 2007). This is an 
acknowledgement of the urgency of action rather than of the uselessness of action. 
Nevertheless, the headline may be considered alarmist – the adverbial phrase ‘on the way to’ 
locates an undetermined subject (presumably the planet and all its inhabitants) en route to 
‘disaster’. There is a great extent of fatalism in this discursive construction.  
To put this type of discourse into perspective, it should be noted that these were only four 
out of the 18 articles on climate change published in this period6. While in most articles, there 
was no clear option for a fearful or hopeful discourse, there were several where optimism 
regarding the establishment’s capacity to deal with the problem was clearly present 
(Cotrim/Lusa, 2007; Queiroz, 2007). 
Visão did not publish any articles on the IPCC’s AR. On 15 February it carried several pieces 
on hybrid cars. As expectable, there were references to CO2 emissions but the main focus was 
on the ‘fashionable’ nature of these cars, which many ‘famous’ people were driving (Montez, 
2007). Purchasing these cars was presented as the solution to climate change: a clear example 
of techno-optimism associated with personal actions.  
Expresso dedicated the whole month of February 2007 to the environment. In its 3 February 
issue, it carried 15 articles that mentioned climate change. Several focused on 
intergovernmental politics (e.g., Cardoso, 2007; Gautrat, 2007) while others referred to specific 
issues such as processing of waste, an art exhibit with environmental concerns and the 
attempts by some institutions to be carbon neutral, from the Rock in Rio concert to Expresso 
itself. These articles were of a variety of genres, from editorial to humour. They are important 
because they denote a widening of the analysis of the sources and the meanings of climate 
change, as well as some reflexivity. 
The headline of Expresso’s main article on the 4th IPCC AR, ‘Climate change has human 
causes’ (Expresso, unattributed, 2007a), is a journalistic oddity in the sense that it conveyed a 
                                                 
6 There was one more article that had elements of alarmism – ‘Politicians do not foresee the dimension of 
the catastrophe’ (Azenha, 2007) – but also of some hope in the resolution of the problem. Under the 
headline ‘Scandal hits global warming’ (Saramago, 2007b), typical of a popular paper, Correio da Manhã 
carried a piece on 3 February 2007 which spoke of evidence having been ‘distorted’ by the IPCC to avoid 
alarmism; a ‘climate of suspicion’ among the UN delegates to the Paris meeting; and of accusations of 
members of the IPC ‘giving in to pressures’ to convey a less dramatic account of the knowledge on climate 
change. 
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message that was not news. The anthropogenic origin of climate change had been asserted 
with an increasing degree of confidence since the 2nd IPCC AR in 1996. Therefore, the choice of 
headline can arguably be associated with a culture of relative climate change scepticism in this 
newspaper. 
An editorial note in this issue justified the emphasis on environment and climate change by 
saying that these were important matters that deserved attention, even though ‘we don’t know 
to what extent human activity contributes to [climate change]’ (Expresso, unattributed, 2007b). 
The newspaper opted for a discourse of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘moderation’: ‘Expresso does not 
intend to (…) conduct the opinion of its readers (…) We do not aim to go back to the stone age, 
not to use energy or forbid cars and polluting industries, but we know that if each of us and each 
company is a little more careful we will live a better future.’ (ibid.) The IPCC’s scenarios indicate 
that this ‘little steps’ approach is insufficient to address climate change. This discourse is typical 
of a historical period when environmental protection has become mainstream and opposition to 
it is socially unacceptable. It exemplifies continuing and powerful forms of resistance to the 
social transformations that are required to address the environmental crisis. 
Another way of denying the need for change was present in an opinion article with the title ‘A 
heated discussion’. It involved a strategy of dis-accreditation of those who claim for action. The 
following excerpt illustrates some of the lexical choices and metaphors employed in this kind of 
rhetoric: ‘In the climate conversation, which has gained (…) a holy status, what impresses are 
not just the anticapitalistic impulses of the majority of the tribe. What impresses is the old 
illuminist idea that the world is redesignable by human action only.’ (Coutinho, 2007; our 
emphasis). 
The discursive terrain of Expresso is complex with a variety of discourses and framings. The 
leader of the SIAM project, Filipe Duarte Santos (2007), authored an invited editorial on 3 
February entitled ‘The risk and the challenge’ where he explained what was at stake and 
presented the mitigation of GHGs and adaptation to climate change as the two available 
responses, seemingly value-neutral and equivalent. Research and development of renewable 
energies and of technologies for sequestering CO2 were presented as the solution to achieve a 
sustainable world. A discourse of technological optimism such as this one is particularly 
powerful when originating in the field of science, which has a considerable social and political 
legitimacy. In other pieces the issue was represented in light of economic rationalism; for 
instance, Tomás and Franco (2007) focused on the carbon market, transactions, price 
fluctuations and alike, and constructed Kyoto as a financial burden. 
Público published seven articles on climate change on 3 February 2007. Citing several 
scientists linked with the IPCC, the main article on the 4th AR emphasised the growth of 
confidence in scientific claims regarding the anthropogenic nature of climate change and in 
forecasts of the impacts of climate change (Garcia, 2007). The framing here was closer to 
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science than in the reports of the other media: for instance, the article explained the differences 
between the meaning of ‘very likely’ and ‘likely’ [that a certain temperature increase will occur]. 
Another piece on the AR’s main conclusions (including remaining areas of uncertainty) followed 
the same line (Público, unattributed, 2007). 
Garcia (2007) described several aspects of the process involved in writing up and 
negotiating international agreement on the AR: the pressure of some governments, the 
concessions, the adjustments, etc. This discursive (re)construction of science in its social 
contexts may contribute to a better public understanding; at the same time, such an account 
carries the risk of generating public suspicion in relation to science and scientific claims. In this 
article, however, the journalist reassured readers that they should trust the AR: ‘Several of the 
report’s main authors that Público listened to stated that the final version did not change the 
scientific conclusions’. 
Other articles on 3 February 2007 included an overview of the standings on climate change 
of key states such as the US, the EU and Canada; the Portuguese absence in the IPCC 
meeting; the views of a representative of Quercus and of Ricardo Trigo, a Portuguese scientist. 
Even though the key event in this period was related to science, 19 articles focused on politics 
or claims made by politicians and only nine on science. 
 
In the last period examined in this chapter, corresponding to the publication of the IPCC’s 4th 
AR, we also examined television news coverage of climate change. We focused on the main 
news programme of the nationally broadcast television channels in Portugal: RTP1, RTP2 (then 
named 2:), SIC and TVI. In order to make our analysis more manageable we limited the data as 
follows. On the day of the public presentation of the IPCC’s 4th AR, 2 February 2007, we 
compared the coverage in two randomly selected channels: 2:, part of the public broadcasting 
network RTP, and SIC, one of the commercial channels. In the rest of the period (16 January-16 
February 2007), we opted for a random sampling of days and channels, adding to a total of 22 
news pieces mentioning ‘climate change’ or any of the other search keywords. 
In terms of methodology of analysis, we combined elements of Critical Discourse Analysis 
with semiotic analysis (Fiske and Hartley, 1978) in order to examine the multimodal messages 
of the news programmes. Keeping in mind the main theoretical references and the goals of this 
chapter we tried to answer the following questions: How were the risks associated with climate 
change represented? Which courses of action with regard to climate change were privileged 
and which agents were attributed responsibility in dealing with the problem? 
 
On 2 February 2007, SIC’s representation of the conclusions of the IPCC was relatively 
alarmist as a result of the word and image choice. The ‘headline’ (i.e., the words appearing on 
the screen at the beginning of the piece) that framed this news story was the following: ‘Global 
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warming: ONU makes a dramatic appeal’. Against an orange background of what appeared to 
be rock (a meteorite?) and a ball of fire (a planet?), the anchor stated that the conclusions of the 
IPCC were ‘frightening’ (Figure 4). Although ‘the experts say that some effects are already 
unavoidable, it is still possible to avoid the worst with an urgent intervention’, he claimed. In the 
following piece, a journalist said that the IPCC had warned that the ‘the world is in danger’. In a 
good example of the specificities of televised communication about this complex issue, SIC 
showed images of a variety of places where, it suggested, climate change was being felt: air 
pollution in China, flooded streets in Asian towns (Figure 5), land affected by drought, and 
melting glaciers. This was taken further with a separate piece that the anchor introduced by 
saying: ‘Today only there are several concrete examples that the weather seems in fact to be 
going mad’. The images that followed were of a sand storm which caused a yellow snowfall in 
Siberia; a storm in Florida with strong winds and rain; heavy snow and ice that caused car 
accidents in other regions of the US and in Canada; torrential rain and flooding in Jakarta; a 
tornado alert and flooding in Australia.  
Television may have an unparalleled potential in the creation of a sense of immediacy and 
urgency. But how do we move forwards from there? The ways in which television links the 
problem of climate change with solutions are crucial for understandings of how we can address 
this issue. In SIC’s reporting on 2 February 2007, the audience was told that ‘specialists insist 
that alternative energies are the only way out’ while images of dozens of modern windmills were 
shown. After this deterministic statement about technical solutions, a separate piece focused on 
the need to reduce the use of fossil fuels and referred examples of solutions that were mostly 
associated to governmental measures: ‘the EU has demanded less-polluting cars’; ‘the British 
have a new tax for people who fly’ and the ‘US state of California sued the car industry 
demanding to be financially compensated for pollution’. There was no reference to individuals, 
to corporations or to local authorities. 
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Figure 4. Jornal da Noite, SIC, 2 February 2007 
 
 
Figure 5. Jornal da Noite, SIC, 2 February 2007 
 
 
In 2: the headline of the opening piece on 2 February 2007, ‘Global warming: a human 
cause’, focused attention on scientific certainty about human responsibility in the causation of 
climate change. The starting imagery, consisting mainly of world temperature maps (Figure 6), 
was more sober and closer to science’s than the one used by SIC. Through the voice of the 
news anchor we hear about forecasts of ‘multiple extreme phenomena’ and the possibility of 
‘millions of climate refugees’ in the future. Later, interviews with participants in the IPCC 
meeting were interspersed with images of the disappearance of glaciers and of floods.  
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Figure 6. Jornal 2, 2:, 2 February 2007 
 
 
Figure 7. Jornal 2, 2:, 2 February 2007 
 
 
Interviewees proposed diverse ways forward. First, there was an unidentified man who could 
be a scientist or a politician, saying: ‘What we now have is the power of science that enables 
citizens to go to their leaders, to businesses, to supermarkets, to car dealers, to energy 
companies and to ask ‘what are you doing about these findings? How are you being a part of 
the solution? How are you helping to address the greatest threat to our life on this planet?’’ This 
was followed by an interview with Durão Barroso, President of the European Commissions 
(Figure 7), who maintained that ‘there’s a whole technical set of mechanisms [sic] that go from 
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investment in technology to (…) emissions trading that allow, according to all available scientific 
evidence, reaching a 20% reduction in GHG by 2020’. Finally, Jacques Chirac, the President of 
France, was shown proposing the creation of an international organization in the field of the 
environment in order to address the problems we are faced with. These proposals represent 
various discourses: democratic pragmatism with hints of sustainable development; economic 
rationalism mixed with techno-optimism; and faith in international politics, which could represent 
a form of administrative rationalism. 
Due to space constraints, we will only refer briefly to the remaining news pieces that were 
analysed. Five stories focused on the impacts of climate change; three of those were linked to 
the publication of a scientific report of the SIAM project and were shown on the same day (22 
January). They included an interview with Filipe Duarte Santos. Another six stories referred to 
the intergovernmental politics of climate change and especially the European Union’s (EU) 
plans in this area. The EU and governments were the main actors here. There were ten pieces 
on renewable energies in the news programmes that we analysed. All but one were excluded 
from our sample as they did not refer to climate change even though nearly all referred to the 
‘environment’ or to ‘green’ energy; five of these involved governmental actors. Finally, five 
stories focused on other policies to reduce GHGs, four of which on a legal change in car 
taxation in Portugal. The argument presented for the change was the need to reduce ‘pollution’ 
and no link was made with climate change, which led to the exclusion of those stories. The rest 
of the news stories in the sample referred to isolated topics such as Al Gore’s visit to Portugal 
and an action by Greenpeace. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the Portuguese press suggests that alarmism is not a very common 
‘linguistic repertoire’ (Ereaut and Segnit, 2006). In Público and Expresso, even the articles that 
present some of the starkest forecasts about the impacts of climate change cannot be 
considered alarmist in the sense that scientific claims do not appear to have been exaggerated 
by journalists nor can it be reasonably argued that newspapers exploited feelings of fear or 
promoted a fatalistic reading of climate change. Although it had some expression in the mid-
market and popular press, alarmism was not dominant there either.  
The case of television is somewhat different. Images are an important element in its search 
for ‘facticity’ and their use may promote more emotionally-charged – and possibly scientifically 
inaccurate – readings of reality. While science avoids establishing cause-effect links between 
the greenhouse effect and specific weather events, the language of television promotes, as we 
saw, a ‘now and here’-type approach. Therefore, the very nature of the medium of 
communication leads to a tendency to represent climate change as a more tangible 
phenomenon than in the press. It also promotes a more dramatic picture of the issue because 
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video can only register what has already happened and therefore cannot be avoided. Still, 
televised news stories tended to emphasise the need to act urgently rather than it the idea that 
‘It’s too late! (So we might as well slit our wrists, or carry on polluting).’ (Ereaut and Segnit, 
2006: 12).  
Optimism cannot be considered dominant either. The idea that is up to the political system to 
solve the problem of climate change underpinned many articles but, despite this attribution of 
responsibility to the ‘establishment’, most media did not promote a belief in the ability of 
Portuguese political institutions to do it. As we have seen with the case of television stories, 
there appears to be signs of techno-optimism with associations of renewable energies with 
innovation, economic competitiveness and environmental protection. However, this is not 
normally linked explicitly with the struggle against climate change. 
The study reported here leads us to conclude that Ereaut and Segnit’s (2006) categorization 
of discourses into alarmism and optimism (with the variation of pragmatic optimism) is an 
excessive simplification of the variety and complexity of discursive constructions of climate 
change found in the media. 
In the terms of Dryzek’s (1997) discourse categories, we found that administrative 
rationalism is dominant in the discourse of social actors and also has an important presence in 
the media. Ecological modernization and economic rationalism also have a significant 
expression. The solution for climate change is generally expected to come from the state and/or 
from the market with technology playing a role as well. There were no clear instances of either 
survivalism or prometheanism in the Portuguese media that we analysed (although some 
pieces in Expresso went somewhat in the direction of prometheanism). Green romanticism and 
green rationalism were also absent from the discourses of social actors and the media as no 
substantial transformations were called for in either human consciousness or political structures. 
Governmental actors were frequently present in the media representation of climate change 
and so were their views, positions and proposals. Although there were several critical views of 
governmental performance in the press, analyses of political alternatives were relatively sparse 
(Público stood out in this respect, offering more frequent and more in-depth policy analysis). 
International political events, and especially intergovernmental summits, have tended to lead to 
most media coverage. In contrast, key national decisions have not sufficiently scrutinized, as we 
saw with PNAC and PNALE. Corporate responsibility, a key aspect in terms of causes and 
solutions for climate change, has rarely discussed in the media. It should also be noted that the 
voices of civic groups have a relatively low visibility in the media (Quercus is the most 
commonly mentioned NGO, which fits in with their proactivity in communicating about climate 
change). The analysis of wider corpora of texts than what is covered in this paper has led us to 
conclude that there is a gap in terms of cross-sectoral analysis as well, given that neither the 
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media nor other social actors normally examine the GHG impact of new road systems or land 
use planning, for example.  
Climate change is thus viewed mainly as a matter of international politics with the primary 
locus for governance of the issue being the ‘global’. There is therefore a disconnect between 
the ‘global’ problem and its preferred ‘global governance’ and many of the actual national and – 
particularly – local forms of causation. The naturalization of this particular way of relating to 
climate change is likely to discourage citizen individual and collective agency. 
Scientific knowledge on climate change is generally represented as consensual in the 
Portuguese media regarding the nature of the problem and the anthropogenic factors that 
produce it. Expresso occasionally gives some space to ‘sceptical’ views but most of the cases it 
does so in less ‘serious’ genres than news, such as opinion articles and humour, i.e., scepticism 
comes in a dissimulated way; still, this ‘muted’ scepticism represents less than 5% of the total 
number of texts. 
In order to understand media discourse on climate change research needs to go beyond 
journalism and examine the discourses of different social actors. This paper has examined 
these two aspects but has done so in a relatively separate fashion. Future studies should aim to 
bridge these domains and incorporate analysis of both media texts and the communicative 
strategies of social actors, as well as the media’s production practices, including professional 
routines, values and organizational constraints. 
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Climate change and the daily press: 
Did we miss the point entirely? 
 
Cecilia Rosen Ferlini and Javier Crúz-Mena 
 
Abstract 
Even though most of the public debate regarding climate change seems to be centered 
today on the politics of potential post-Kyoto agreements and, to some extent, on the science 
and technology of mitigation and adaptation, the old questions of whether such a thing as 
‘global warming’ actually exists and whether or not industrialised society is to blame for it still 
pop up every now and then in the media. This persistence ought to be surprising because the 
Third Assessment Report (TAR) issued in 2001 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was quite clear in its statement that climate change is real and most probably 
caused by human activity. We have made a partial review of the coverage of the various 
Reports issued by IPCC during 2001 to analyse the degree to which the daily press identified 
(or not) this qualitative shift and whether or not it characterised it as representative of a scientific 
consensus regarding these two points. Our data suggests that the shift in discourse was not 
entirely lost on what could be characterised as ‘prestige press’, but that Mexican dailies 
remained oblivious to it throughout the news cycle. We also present a model of science 
journalism's functionality to assess the degree to which these qualitative differences in coverage 
may have be relevant to the public. 
 
Keywords: climate change, science journalism, IPCC 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a rather casual commentary caught on TV the leader of the opposition in Spain, Mariano 
Rajoy, managed to put himself – and a certain cousin of his – on the wrong side of the spotlight 
by stating that climate change ‘cannot be turned into the greatest world problem’, given that not 
even ‘the world’s ten most important scientists can guarantee tomorrow’s weather in Sevilla (El 
País, 2007a).’ Quite clearly, Rajoy made the common mistake of confusing weather with 
climate. Admitting that he doesn’t ‘know a lot’ about this matter, Rajoy, a candidate to become 
Spain’s Prime Minister, opted to quote his cousin, a Physics Professor. ‘I assume he must 
know’, he said, and then proceeded to display their ill-fated argument: If tomorrow’s weather 
cannot be predicted by even the best scientists, ‘how can anybody say what will happen in the 
world in 300 years?’ 
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Whether or not Rajoy’s scepticism is representative of what a sizable portion of the 
population believes to be true concerning climate change, it is, at the very least, a high profile 
example of how the principle of authority can be invoked to question the wisdom of some 
experts based solely on the differing opinion of some other experts. Incidents such as this have 
more than merely anecdotal value because the media tend indeed to rely heavily on ‘expert 
opinion’ as valid sources to back up nearly all sorts of claims. And although a simple ‘tit for tat’ 
strategy may seem appropriate to reach balance in press coverage, this is not necessarily the 
case when the subject involves scientific controversy (Mooney, 2004). The risk is that by giving 
equal weight to different experts (whether or not their expertise is equally legitimate), journalists 
may breathe artificial life into controversies already settled among scientists. 
Here we hypothesise that this may well have been the case with the coverage of climate 
change of anthropogenic origin. We postulate that the year 2001 marks a turning point in the 
subject inasmuch as it was the first time that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) explicitly formulated and answered the two questions most relevant to the debate (IPCC, 
2001). We will examine the reasons why most of the media consider the IPCC to be the ultimate 
expert source on the subject, and so, once the Panel reached a consensus on the existence 
and the causes of global climate change, the scientific debate may be considered to have 
reached a point, during 2001, in which, if not entirely over, at the very least the focus changed 
from existence and sources to the more pressing issues of vulnerability, impact and adaptation. 
In very simple words, the IPCC Reports of 2001 were an announcement to the world that 
climate researchers were sufficiently satisfied that the global climate was indeed changing and 
that humankind was in no small measure behind the observed trends. 
In this work we set out to examine to what extent the daily written press relayed to its public 
this shift in the scientific debate, comparing the coverage in Mexico and abroad. Furthermore, 
we develop a model of quality in science journalism with the aim of analysing how relevant the 
differences in coverage may have been for the general public. 
 
2. The climate debate 
 
Rajoy’s episode, late in 2007, happened in an environment in which most of the Spanish 
press either expressly condemned or mocked it, or at least presented it in such a light that left 
him vulnerable to criticism (El País, 2007a). This, however, has not always been the case. It 
could be argued that until quite recently some media outlets still lent credence to sceptics nearly 
just as much as to IPCC members, which led to comparable space and/or time in coverage and 
left the impression that the debate was still wide open among experts (Rosen, 2007). It is easy 
to see how this would tick off those who are in the know regarding the science of climate 
change, but our concern here is with the average citizen, who may depend on the media to 
acquire relevant information. 
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We thus turn first to IPCC as a journalistic source for science writers covering the global 
climate debate. It is worth noting that the Panel shies away from calling itself ‘the ultimate 
authoritative voice’ on the matter, as many media outlets routinely do. What it does state indeed 
is that ‘a main activity of the IPCC is to provide in regular intervals an assessment of the state of 
knowledge on climate change’ (IPCC, 2007). It can be argued that it is correct to have chosen 
the singular in ‘the state of knowledge’ based on the fact that IPCC’s Reports convey the 
agreement not only amongst its close to 3,000 experts but also of government representatives 
and stake holders which are supposed to go through these documents line by line before they 
are made public. Rosen (2008) has made a detailed analysis of the way in which IPCC operates 
with the main goal of reaching consensual agreement on both the scientific facts behind climate 
change as well as the interpretations and predictions from those very facts.  
We thus may consider IPCC as not only a legitimate source for science journalists, but 
indeed as an often indispensable one. It then follows that the presentation of IPCC’s Reports, 
which so far has occurred only every 5 to 6 years, ought to be main news events for the 
international media. But what about other scientific sources, particularly those who do not share 
the interpretations contained in IPCC’s Assessment Reports? In her analysis, which claims to 
be thorough but not exhaustive, Rosen (2008) was able to establish the huge disparity in the 
number of scientific papers with views contrary to IPCC in peer-reviewed journals. Conspiracy 
theories aside, these two facts might give journalists pause to consider how best to balance 
their coverage between sources. We argue, however, that regardless of how much space 
and/or time is devoted to contrary views1, there appears to be no legitimate journalistic reason 
not to cover in depth the contents of IPCC Reports when they are released. 
One such occasion took place in 2001, in a news cycle lasting from January to September of 
that year with at least four major events corresponding to the release of Reports from each of 
IPCC’s three Working Groups plus the final Synthesis Report. The first (January 20, Shangai) 
and last (September 29, Wembley) deserve special attention in this work because they contain 
explicit claims which clearly shift the focus of the scientific debate regarding the existence of a 
global climate change and the weight of the human contribution to it. Table 1 shows the exact 
phrases contained in the documents ‘Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis’ (IPCC, 2001a) 
and ‘Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report’ (IPCC, 2001b). If the average reader were to 
pose the following questions: ‘Is global warming for real?’ and ‘Is humankind in any significant 
way causing it?’, then reading these few phrases ought to at least let the public know that 
thousands of scientists participating in IPCC along with government representatives from 
hundreds of nations have reached a consensus on both questions, and, furthermore, that in 
both cases the answer is affirmative. These are by no means extremely technical questions, 
                                                 
1 Rosen (2008) also noted that there is no such thing as a coordinated opposition to IPCC on the science 
of climate change, but rather a dispersed chorus of so called contrarians. 
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only imaginable from the brightest of minds, highly specialised in climate science. These are, on 
the contrary, precisely the sort of questions that one might expect ordinary people to be 
pondering regarding climate change. 
So a great divide appears to have formed as early as 2001 between the experts on the field 
and the common citizen. Our question here is this: should the press have done something about 
it? 
 
Table 1. Exact phrases quoted from Reports made public by IPCC in 2001 in which the Panel 
explicitly addresses the questions of existence of global climate change and human contribution 
to it. 
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report 
 
‘The global average surface temperature has 
increased over the 20th century by about 
0.6°C’. 
 
‘Temperatures have risen during the past four 
decades in the lowest 8 kilometres of the 
atmosphere’. 
 
‘Changes have also occurred in other 
important aspects of climate’. 
 
 ‘The Earth’s climate system has demonstrably 
changed on both global and regional scales 
since the pre-industrial era, with some of these 
changes attributable to human activities’.  
 
 
‘An increasing body of observations gives a 
collective picture of a warming world and other 
changes in the climate system’. 
‘An increasing body of observations gives a 
collective picture of a warming world and other 
changes in the climate system’. 
‘Concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases and their radiative forcing have 
continued to increase as a result of human 
activities’. 
‘Concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases and their radiative forcing have 
continued to increase as a result of human 
activities’. 
‘There is new and stronger evidence that most 
of the warming observed over the last 50 years 
is attributable to human activities’. 
‘There is new and stronger evidence that most 
of the warming observed over the last 50 years 
is attributable to human activities’ 
 
 
3. A functional model for journalism 
 
The question of what is the press expected to do with the information it gathers lies at the 
heart of the debate over the purpose of journalism. It is, furthermore, essential to our analysis 
since we aim to gauge the social relevance of failing to convey to the public the shift in the 
scientific discussion of climate change. 
There is a plethora of ideas regarding the social purpose of journalism. We have placed our 
starting point alongside Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), who state that ‘the primary purpose of 
journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing.’ 
Alas, such a statement begs the question of how exactly can regular citizens make use of their 
daily newspaper or favourite radio newscast to reach as grand a purpose as exercising freedom 
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and government for themselves. Without losing any of the soundness of Kovach and 
Rosenstiel’s postulate, we argue that the practical side of it can be seen more easily from the 
vantage point of the practising journalist. Take, for instance, the Report from IPCC’s Work 
Group 1 on the scientific basis of climate change, released in January 2001. There may have 
been as many ways of deciding which information points to include in any specific note as there 
were journalists writing notes about it. However, those who had the social function of journalism 
on their minds would very likely have tried to identify the information which would leave their 
public in better position to make use of their freedom and to influence their own government on 
the issues. This, of course, is not an easy task, for each citizen has its own particular way of 
trying to go about the business of putting their freedom to good use. And while some are quite 
vocal and place calls to their representatives or write letters to the papers, most tend to believe 
that the only instance of action available to them comes at the voting booth once every number 
of years. How, then, can journalists be expected to prioritise, in line with the social function of 
their trade, the huge amount of information to which they are exposed by IPCC? 
We propose that the answer, and indeed a system for identifying specific information points, 
stems from the very question of how can citizens use information from the media in any 
significant way. Whether they exercise their freedom very often or only when they vote, the one 
thing that every citizen can do is decide. And it is precisely here that journalists can try to serve 
their public by giving them, at the very least, the information which they deem most relevant to 
their decision processes regarding the issues they are informing them about.  
We have thus arrived at a functional model for journalism which pins the quality of the 
coverage at least partly on whether or not it satisfies its social purpose by giving the public the 
information needed to make relevant decisions. The advantage for the public should be 
obvious. And for their part, journalists operating under these philosophy may find themselves in 
a better position to sift through large volumes of information guided by the purpose of looking 
first and foremost for those points without which their public would be in a weaker position to 
make decisions. 
 
4. The model at work 
 
We can now go back to the two questions which we hypothesised that the general citizen 
might want to have answered regarding the debate on climate change back in 2001. Except that 
now, instead of looking to the media to read or hear or see someone else’s answers (be it a 
legitimate expert on the field or Rajoy’s cousin), each citizen will be given information intended 
to help them make up their own minds. They may of course choose not to do so, if they are 
more inclined to invoke the principle of authority. But this is irrelevant to the journalist who 
decides to inform the decision process, regardless of whether the decision will be made or 
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deferred. Once the journalist has identified the most important decisions the public might want 
to make, the method will systematically prioritise the information points towards that end. 
 
Table 2. Decision grid. The left column contains potential decisions that citizens might want to 
be able to make, and on the right we show information points extracted from IPCC reports 
which we deem relevant to the decision processes 
 
Decisions  Information points from IPCC Reports 
Is there really such a thing 
as global warming?  
• Mean temperature records reported by IPCC show a sharp 
increase in recent decades, driving the total rise to 0.6ºC ± 
0.2ºC during the 20th century 
Why do scientists think that 
global warming is not due to 
natural climate variability? 
• These increases in mean global temperature are unprecedented 
in the historical record of the last few centuries (the famous 
‘Hockey stick’ graph) 
• Numerous computer simulations of global climate show that, 
without CO2 forcing, the planet would probably have not 
increased its mean global temperature nearly as much 
Why do scientists think that 
human activities are 
responsible for global 
warming? 
• Human activities have significantly increased CO2 emissions to 
the atmosphere since the current industrial era began 
• According to the greenhouse model of atmospheric climate, 
greenhouse gases have the effect of trapping heat in the 
atmosphere, thus driving the increase in mean global 
temperature 
• Graphs of mean global temperature vs. time strikingly follow the 
corresponding graphs of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere 
How dangerous is this 
warming trend?  
• Coastal areas and small islands will be vulnerable to rises in 
sea level 
• Extreme weather events will tend to be even more extreme 
more frequently 
What demands could I 
make from my government 
in relation to climate 
change? 
• Local planning based on the review of suggested strategies and 
available technology for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
and adaptation to climate change 
 
 
Earlier we proposed that the average citizen might have faced two specific questions about 
climate change in January 2001: ‘Is global warming for real?’ and ‘Is humankind in any 
significant way causing it?’ It seems quite hard to find any other questions as legitimate or as 
urgent as these two. More importantly, they are at the root of potential decision processes by 
the public, and thus they could guide journalists in their coverage. The key is to construct a 
simple table containing a few decisions that citizens might want to be able to make, and then 
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searching for the information points which seem to be more relevant to those decisions. For the 
case of IPCC’s Reports of 2001, Rosen (2008) elaborated the array shown in Table 2. Slightly 
rephrasing our two original questions and expanding them into a few more subsidiary ones we 
composed a grid with five potential decisions and the corresponding information points to enrich 
the decision processes. Note that all information points in Table 2 can be extracted from any of 
the four reports released by IPCC during 2001, and so all of them were readily available to 
journalists covering climate change. In this way, the coverage is guaranteed to have at the very 
least information which has been deemed to be essential to help citizens make up their minds 
on issues in which they have the potential to decide either to take action or to demand action 
from their governments. Or, in the words of Kovach and Rosenstiel’s original statement, ‘to be 
free and self-governing.’ Since all these considerations apply just as well to those cases in 
which the essential information happens to come from scientific sources, we can trivially 
extrapolate the model to the field of science journalism (Crúz-Mena, 2002). 
 
5. Methodology 
 
Once a model is available to gauge the quality of press coverage on its functionality one can 
proceed to perform content analysis in search of specific information points. In the case under 
study, concerning the reports from IPCC in 2001, we were interested in the question of whether 
the press relayed the relevant information for the public to be able to decide if global climate 
change was for real and to what extent did humankind have a hand on it. This information may 
have appeared in the form shown on Table 2 or in any other equivalent formulation.  
We analysed the coverage of three nationally distributed Mexican daily newspapers (La 
Jornada, Reforma and El Universal) and three major overseas dailies (Le Monde, from France; 
El País, from Spain; and The New York Times, from USA)2. This choice is admittedly not 
exhaustive, but at least at the Mexican level it is indeed representative. Online searches and 
hard copy analysis were made for each newspaper from September 1, 2000 to January 1, 
20023. All in all, 29 notes were identified, as shown in Table 3. Details about the selection 
criteria and keywords used in search engines will be published elsewhere (Rosen, 2008). Two 
substantial differences jump out immediately between the coverage by Mexican newspapers 
and the three dailies abroad: the dimension of the coverage, as measured by the sheer number 
of notes, and the delay with which the Mexican press started following the trail of this global 
story.  
 
                                                 
2 Results from Le Monde are not included in this study because the analysis is still ongoing. 
3 Originally we had set out to search only between January 1 to December 31, 2001, but we noticed some 
newspapers had ran stories as early as October 2000, so we decided to consider a lengthier news cycle. 
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Table 3. Summary of press coverage. A total of 29 notes were identified, 24% of which were 
published well in advance of the release of the very first report. The three Mexican newspapers 
studied account for 13.7% of the total coverage analysed in this study, or slightly less than 15% 
of the amount of notes published by the three foreign newspapers. 
 
IPCC Meeting The New York Times El País Le Monde 
El 
Universal Reforma 
La 
Jornada 
Total: 29 7 7 11 1 1 2 
Advanced stories, October 
2000 
26/10/00 
28/10/00  
03/11/00 
03/11/00 
03/11/00 
18/11/00 
16/01/01 
   
The Scientific Basis 
(Shangai, January 2001) 
18 /01/01 
23/01/01 
 
23/01/01 
 
24/01/01   22/01/01 
Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability (Geneva, 
February 2001) 
19/02/01 
22/02/01 
14/02/01 
19/02/01 
20/02/01 
21/02/01 
21/02/01 
 
20/02/01  19/02/01 
Mitigation (Accra, March 
2001) 
 
10/02/01 
 
06/03/01     
Plenary Meeting (Nairobi, 
April 2001)  03/04/01     
Synthesis Report 
(Wembley, September 
2001) 
 25/09/01     
(No identified meeting)   
21/02/01 
07/03/01 
27/03/01 
 19/04/01  
 
 
But the ultimate goal of our analysis, and indeed the test to which our method should be 
subjected, is the confrontation between the information points in our decision grid (Table 2) and 
the contents of the published notes. In retrospective, the most important piece of information to 
be gathered from all IPCC reports during 2001 was the consensus amongst scientists and 
government representatives regarding the existence of a marked warming trend in mean global 
temperatures and the partial contribution of human activities to this trend. In Table 4 we have 
isolated the exact phrases with which The New York Times and El País conveyed this particular 
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information point4. None of the Mexican newspapers informed about it. We also compared the 
rest of the information points in our Decision Grid to the actual coverage. A summary of this 
comparison is shown in Table 5, with dates and sources, when these were identified. It is worth 
noting that none of our information points was left without at least one of the newspapers having 
mentioned it. In the same vein, though, alternative hypotheses to the greenhouse gas model of 
global warning seem not to have been considered legitimate back in 2001, for only one 
newspaper picked it up, and then with no attributable source. 
 
Table 4. Shift in scientific debate. All three Mexican newspapers failed to inform about the newly 
established consensus amongst scientists regarding the existence and partial human 
contribution to a global warming trend. (NYT=The New York Times; EP=El País) 
 
Information Point Date/Newspaper Exact quote 
IPCC confirms there is 
consensus amongst 
scientists regarding global 
warming 
26/10/00 NYT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18/01/01 NYT 
 
 
 
 
23/01/01 NYT 
 
 
 
23/01/01 EP 
 
 
 
 
23/01/01 EP 
       
‘Greenhouse gases produced mainly by the 
burning of fossil fuels are altering the atmosphere 
in ways that affect earth's climate, and it is likely 
that they have ''contributed substantially to the 
observed warming over the last 50 years,'' an 
international panel of climate scientists has 
concluded. (…)This represents a significant shift in 
tone.’ 
‘The draft finds that the warming in the 20th century 
was likely to have been the greatest of any century 
in the last 1,000 years for the Northern Hemisphere 
and that the 1990's was the warmest decade of the 
last millennium.’ 
‘New evidence shows more clearly than ever that 
temperature increases are caused mostly by 
pollution, not by changes in the sun or other natural 
factors’.  
‘There is no doubt: human activities are responsible 
for most of the planet’s global warming. This is one 
of the main conclusions of the United Nations third 
scientific report on climate change’.  
‘In light of new evidence and despite uncertainty, 
most of observed global warming during the last 50 
years is due, very likely, to rise in greenhouse 
concentration in the atmosphere, according to 
IPCC experts’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Le Monde did as much, but is excluded from this partial report. 
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Table 5. Summary of content analysis. Each of the 31 notes identified was read to see if any of 
the information points from our Decision Grid (Table 2) was included in the coverage, when and 
from what source. (NYT=The New York Times; EP=El País; LM=Le Monde; LJ=La Jornada; 
REF=Reforma, EU=El Universal) 
 
Information Point Date/Newspaper Source 
Time evolution of mean 
global temperature  
19/02/01 LJ 
23/01/01 LJ 
18/04/01 REF 
 
 
23/01/01 EP 
03/04/01 EP 
18/01/01 NYT 
22/01/01 NYT 
Osvaldo Canziani  
Unidentified IPCC Report 
‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ report, 
‘Scientific basis and Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios’.  
No source 
IPCC Third Assessment Report 
Shangai draft report 
IPCC report 
Alternative hypothesis 
(Sun, glaciations, 
volcanism) 
18/04/01 REF 
 
No source 
 
Relationship between 
greenhouse gases and 
temperatures rise 
23/01/01 LJ 
18/04/01 REF 
23/01/01 EP 
18/04/01 REF 
23/01/01 EP 
20/02/01 EP 
23/01/01 EP 
19/02/01 EP 
26/10/00 NYT 
28/10/00 NYT 
22/01/01 NYT 
10/02/01 NYT 
19/02/01 NYT 
18/04/01 REF 
23/01/01 LJ 
03/04/01 EP 
28/10/00 NYT 
22/01/01 NYT 
26/10/00 NYT 
 
Unidentified IPCC Report  
Unidentified IPCC Report  
Unidentified Authors  
Jorge Sánchez Sesma  
IPCC experts 
IPCC experts 
IPCC experts  
James McCarthy 
‘The panel’ 
Most recent IPCC synthesis report  
Shangai Report 
First Report 
First Report  
Report 
Report 
IPCC Third Assessment Report 
IPCC 
Shangai Report 
Panel members (interviews) / Kevin Trenberth 
 
Anthropogenic origin of 
greenhouse gases 
23/01/01 EP 
23/01/01 EP 
23/01/01 EP 
The authors 
IPCC 
IPCC experts 
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Temperature projections 
from greenhouse gas 
emissions 
22/01/01 LJ 
18/04/01 RE 
23/01/01 EP 
19/02/01 EP 
03/04/01 EP 
26/10/00 NYT 
22/01/01 NYT 
 
Unidentified IPCC Report 
Unidentified IPCC experts 
James McCarthy 
James McCarthy 
IPCC Third Assessment Report 
Draft report 
Unidentified IPCC report 
Impacts and vulnerability 
19/02/01 EP 
20/02/01 EU 
18/04/01 RE 
20/02/01 LJ 
20/02/01 EP 
19/02/01 NYT 
22/02/01 NYT 
‘A United Nations study’ 
No source 
‘A thousand pages document’/ Michael Zammit  
Ernesto Jáuregui / IPCC Report 
No source 
‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ report 
Switzerland report 
Scale (local /global)   
20/02/01 EU 
 
19/02/01 LJ 
23/01/01 LJ 
18/04/01 RE 
23/01/01 EP 
19/02/01 EP 
20/02/01 EP 
20/02/01 EP 
03/04/01 EP 
19/02/01 NYT 
22/02/01 NYT 
‘A thousand pages document disseminated by the 
IPCC’ 
‘Some researchers’ 
Report  
No source  
‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ Report  
Ohio University/ Greenpeace Studies 
IPCC Report 
IPCC Third Assessment Report‘ 
Analysis from an influent net of scientists’ 
No source 
Adaptation and mitigation   
19/02/01 NYT 
22/02/01 NYT 
19/02/01 LJ 
23/01/01 LJ 
06/03/01 EP 
 
19/02/01 LJ 
10/02/01 NYT 
19/02/01 NYT 
18/04/01 RE 
25/09/01 EP 
 
‘Impacts, Adaptation…’ report 
Switzerland report  
Osvaldo Canziani 
Klaus Toepfer 
‘Climate change experts and 100 government 
representatives’/‘An UN speaker’ / Group III report 
Osvaldo Canziani 
‘A report scheduled for next month’ 
‘Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’ report‘ 
‘Most of IPCC researchers’ 
IPCC scientists/ ‘A report to be published next 
October 1’  
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The subject of quality in journalism has proven to be a tough nut to crack for both practising 
journalists and researchers in mass communication, but it seems plausible to argue that in the 
case of the climate change debate, back in 2001, the public would have been poorly served if at 
the end of a news cycle lasting roughly one full year the media has failed to recognise that a 
couple thousand scientists under the umbrella of the most respected organisation in the field 
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had reached a consensus on the most basic of questions: Yes, global warming is for real, and 
Yes, we, humankind, have been causing a good portion of it. 
Yet our analysis shows that the three Mexican daily newspapers which arguably form the 
cream of the crop at the national level did just that: they failed to inform their readers about the 
strongest findings reported by the IPCC up to that moment. Furthermore, the combined total of 
4 notes published on climate change by La Jornada, Reforma and El Universal seem to point to 
a serious difference between them and The New York Times, Le Monde and El País as far as 
editorial decisions are concerned. The 25 notes found in these foreign newspapers suggest that 
the Mexican Editors were either unaware of the seriousness of the issues presented by IPCC, 
or simply unwilling to devote the necessary means to give their readers a good coverage. Or 
both, indeed, because had it been merely a matter of placing climate change at the lower end of 
their editorial priorities, the Mexican newspapers would have had the possibility of covering all 
IPCC Meetings of 2001 with at least wire services and dispatches from news agencies. Instead, 
none of them had continuity throughout the news cycle, only La Jornada had more than one 
note during the whole year, and Reforma lagged until the first three meetings had taken place 
before publishing their first ink on the subject. 
But the numbers – telling as they are – fail to touch on the gravest part of the analysis. To 
say that the coverage was poor because it was scant is not saying nearly enough. What exactly 
did the Mexican public miss out on? Was there any practical social value attached to the 
information they did not receive from these three major newspapers? To answer these 
questions the concept of quality of journalism has to be taken beyond the simple parameters of 
number and placement of notes. Indeed, it has to be turned into the concept of functionality: 
what good is journalism to its readers, beyond infotainment and scandal? What function does it 
serve in the life of the people it is written for? If we accept the notion presented here that 
journalism ought to strive to inform the decision processes to which the public, comprised as it 
is of free citizens, is entitled to, then the social value of the unpublished information should be 
gauged by its relevance to those very decision processes. 
In such case, Table 4 proves that the Mexican newspapers analysed here seriously let down 
their readers by failing to inform them of the shift in the scientific debate regarding climate 
change up to 2001. Moreover, Table 5 offers further proof that the Mexican public reading any 
or all of these three newspapers would have been left ill-informed to decide on matters such as 
public strategies to mitigate emissions or to adapt, at both local and national scales, to the 
impacts identified by IPCC as likely or highly likely.  
But at the most basic level citizens should have been given the necessary information to 
make up their minds about the very reality of global warming – for otherwise any discussion on 
adaptation would appear devoid of any sense – and the human contribution to it – or else the 
whole point of mitigation might have seem unnecessary. It appears that in Mexico the social 
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relevance of this information was lost on the very journalists who should have been on the alert 
for it. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have developed a model of quality in journalism from its social function. By considering 
potential decisions the public might want to make on issues of interest and relating them to 
information points necessary to make those decisions, we have found a system in which these 
decision grids may systematically help journalists to prioritise vast amounts of information so as 
to guarantee that the coverage will not fail to serve its social function to the public. 
Using this system as a diagnostic tool for content analysis we have reviewed the coverage of 
IPCC’s Reports during 2001 in daily newspapers in Mexico and abroad. We found the Mexican 
dailies to be seriously lacking in relevant information for the Mexican public to have made 
decisions regarding global warming, its impacts, Mexico’s vulnerability, adaptation strategies 
and available technologies. In contrast, the three foreign newspapers analysed had both 
broader and deeper coverage, both in terms of number of published notes and the information 
contained therein, touching on all but one of the information points from our decision grid. 
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Newspaper communication on global warming: 
Different approaches in the US and the EU? 
 
Astrid Dirikx and Dave Gelders 
 
Abstract 
Global warming is one of the major policy challenges for contemporary societies. The 
construction and implementation of an environmental policy largely depends on public attitudes. 
Those public attitudes can be influenced by the mass media in several ways. Therefore, 
exploring the quality of the media coverage on global warming is important. So far content 
analyses of the communication on climate change have mostly focused on the USA and the UK 
press. Although the UK coverage has been examined several times, content analyses in other 
European countries are very sparse. Research of the EU coverage should be broadened, 
because previous research suggests that there might be differences in the way American and 
European media report on global climate change. Content analyses in the US press have 
shown that in many articles the emphasis is on scientific uncertainty. This critical reporting is 
less prominent in the UK, and in Germany the emphasis is on scientific certainty. On the other 
hand, the UK press reflects a very alarmist tone when it covers global warming and Germany 
describes global warming as a ‘climate catastrophe’, while US newspapers tend to use a more 
neutral tone. Because these results suggest that there might be differences between US and 
EU reporting, we argue that more research in Europe is needed and suggest a research method 
for pursuing it.  
 
Keywords: global warming, climate change, press communication, USA, EU, cultural 
differences/influences  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, to the Live Earth Concerts and the reports from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global warming was everywhere in 2007. 
Worldwide people are aware of and concerned about climate change (Corbett and Durfee, 
2004; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). As such, global warming is one of the major policy 
challenges for contemporary societies.  
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The construction and implementation of an environmental policy depends for a large part on 
public attitudes (Palfreman, 2006). A growing number of people state that they are concerned 
about the environment and the possible consequences of global warming. But several studies 
have shown that despite this concern, personal and social goals usually take priority over 
environmental issues. So in most cases the concern for global warming hasn’t translated itself 
into an increase of actual ecological behaviour (Bord, Fisher and O’Connor, 1998; Lorenzoni 
and Pidgeon, 2006). 
This paper will firstly outline that public attitudes on global warming can be influenced by the 
mass media in several ways. Because of this influence analyses of media-content are 
important. Therefore, some interesting findings from previous research on the communication 
on climate change will be discussed in the second part of this paper. Finally, it will be argued 
that there’s need for more research on European press communication on climate change and a 
research method will be suggested. 
 
2. The role of the media 
 
The mass media can play an important role in influencing people’s attitudes towards global 
warming. First of all there are several studies that argue that most citizens’ knowledge on 
scientific issues is provided by the mass media. Ungar (2000: 308) described science as ‘an 
encoded form of knowledge that requires translation in order to be understood’. It is widely 
assumed that the mass media play an important role in that translation. One of the most cited 
sources to support this claim is Dorothy Nelkin. According to Nelkin (1987) people understand 
science mainly through media coverage and less through experience or education. This is 
especially the case for issues that do not have any tangible consequences for people (ibid.). 
The ‘dependency theory’ of Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) states that the influence of the 
media in the construction of meaning is dependent on how readily available meaning-relevant 
experiences are in people’s everyday life. Most people do not have any experience of global 
warming, so the media can play an important role. Even if a person is confronted with 
circumstances of extreme heat, floods or drought, he or she will still often depend on the news 
to link those events to global climate change (Corbett and Durfee, 2005). Thus, the media help 
to generalize personal experiences and translate science into popular discourse.  
Secondly, there have also been found media agenda-setting effects for environmental 
issues. The theory of agenda-setting states that the salience of an issue in the media has an 
influence on the importance attached to that issue by the public. It says that maybe the media 
cannot tell people what to think, but can tell people what to think about (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972). In other words, the media seem to have the power to turn people’s attention to global 
warming. Ader (1995) for example found that the emphasis of the world famous newspaper The 
New York Times on environmental pollution was positively correlated to the importance that 
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people assigned to that issue from 1970 to 1990. The conclusion of that and other studies was 
that media help to set the agenda for the public debate on climate change (Ader, 1995; 
Anderson, Atwater and Salwen, 1985; Gonzenbach and Hester, 1997).  
Not only the amount of information that is provided by the media matters. The kind of 
information or the framing of the information also plays an important role. Entman (1993: 51-52) 
maintained that: ‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described’. As such, McCombs et al. (1997: 6-8) labelled framing as ‘second-order-agenda-
setting’. Frames implicitly or explicitly emphasize certain aspects of a complex issue. In doing 
so, frames make it possible for the public to rapidly determine why an issue is important, who is 
responsible and what might be the consequences. Thus, the way in which the media frame 
global warming can have an important effect on public understanding of environmental changes 
and by consequence on the actions that people are willing to undertake.  
Finally, the media in general play an important role in the social construction of risks 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff, 1995; Slovic, 2000). As noted earlier, the media help 
to generalize personal experiences. Theories of risk-perception have determined that people’s 
fear of a phenomenon increases with the number of people they believe are exposed to the 
problem (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1980; Ungar, 1992). In addition risk-analysis has 
shown that the public is most fearful of risks that are unknown, unobservable, and have a high 
catastrophic potential (Palfreman, 2006). Global warming has all of those characteristics and the 
media can, by generalizing and framing, easily amplify the fears that people have (Kasperson, 
Pidgeon and Slovic, 2003). In other words, the media play an important role in the way the 
public perceive the risk of global climate change. 
 
3. Previous research 
 
So far content analyses of the communication on climate change have mostly focused on the 
Anglo-Saxon media: the US prestige press and the UK national print press. Those studies 
resulted in some interesting findings. 
 
‘Balance as bias’ 
First of all, researchers have found that the journalists’ urge for balanced reporting can be 
misleading in the case of global warming coverage. Instead of apportioning weight according to 
the balance of evidence, equal weight is given to the both sides of an argument. Boykoff and 
Boykoff (2004) undertook a study of the US prestige press coverage of global warming from 
1988 to 2002. They state that there is a clear divergence of popular discourse from scientific 
discourse and that such a divergence is partly due to journalists’ adherence to the principle of 
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balanced reporting. Firstly, they found that the majority of the US prestige press articles give 
equal attention to the view that global warming is anthropogenic as to the view that global 
warming is purely caused by natural fluctuations. That is a form of informational bias because 
the majority of the scientific community confirms that human actions are contributing to global 
warming. Secondly, almost eight out of ten articles featured a balanced view on what should be 
done about climate change. In those articles equal weight was given to the opinion that 
voluntary actions will suffice as well as to the opinion that mandatory actions are needed. That 
is a second form of informational bias because there is general scientific consensus that 
immediate and mandatory actions are necessary (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004).  
The US media’s emphasis on scientific uncertainty has been found in several other studies 
too. Through a content analysis of US popular press articles about global warming from 1986 to 
1995, Zehr (2000) found that scientific uncertainty was a salient theme (Zehr, 2000). And 
Trumbo’s (1996) content analysis of five national US newspapers from 1985 until 1995 showed 
that scientists were ever less used as a news source while non-scientists, like politicians and 
special interest groups, were cited ever more. That change in the use of sources often led to an 
overemphasizing of the scientific uncertainty on global warming (Corbett and Durfee, 2005; 
Gelbspan, 1998). On the other side of the Atlantic, in Britain, the emphasis on scientific 
uncertainty was found to vary widely between newspapers (Carvalho, 2007). 
By balanced reporting the (US) press thus systematically distorts the debate on climate 
change. A minority of climate skeptics gets the opportunity to proclaim their views and equal 
weight is given to the opinion of a scientist as to that of a non-scientist. Those opinions are of 
course far from equal in a scientific debate concerning global warming (Gelbspan, 1998). It is 
systematically implied that there is no scientific certainty. Balance therefore actually leads to 
bias. This bias makes it possible for the US government to dismiss responsibility and delay 
actions until there is more, so-called, certainty (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). 
That emphasis on uncertainty is not without consequences for public perceptions of climate 
change. Corbett and Durfee (2004) found that readers of articles that emphasized controversy 
or uncertainty were less certain of global warming. The inclusion of controversy thus reduced 
perceptions of certainty. The results did suggest that an inclusion of scientific context may help 
to tone down the uncertainty, but in many articles that context is still missing (Corbett and 
Durfee, 2004).  
 
Emphasis on drama 
A second interesting finding concerning global warming coverage is that, in general, the 
media tend to use a discourse that emphasizes drama. McComas and Shanahan (1999) state 
that news media actively construct narratives about global warming and that in these 
constructions journalists are primarily led by dramatic considerations. The media not only want 
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to cover exciting stories, they also want to construct those stories as exciting (McComas and 
Shanahan, 1999: 35-36). In search for drama, journalists will, as found for example in the US 
press, focus on conflicts between climate change ‘defenders’ and climate change skeptics or 
‘naysayers’  (Brossard, McComas and Shanahan, 2004). 
Studies in the UK show that the British media take this emphasis on drama a step further 
than the American press and use an overall overwhelming alarmist tone (Ereaut and Segnit, 
2006; Hulme, 2007). Global warming is portrayed as a catastrophic and uncontrollable threat. A 
recent content analysis by Mike Hulme  (2007) in the UK national print press examined the 
coverage of three Working Group reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Results showed that alarmist and fatalistic discourses are more dominant than discourses that 
emphasize agency and empowerment. The language of catastrophe, fear, disaster and death 
seems to be dominant in British climate change reporting (Hulme, 2007). The media assume 
that by using that kind of discourse they will draw the attention of the public.  
The problem is that dramatic and alarming media portrayals can be very counter-productive 
in bringing people closer to the problem of global warming and changing their behavior. 
Stressing conflicts between scientists leads, as mentioned before, to more public uncertainty 
(Corbett and Durfee, 2004). And an alarmist discourse can have a distancing effect. The 
‘protection motivation theory’ (Rogers, 1983) states that when people are confronted with issues 
that are threatening but treatable, they will be motivated to change their behavior. But when the 
threat is bigger than the possibility to do something about it, then that can lead to a rejection of 
the proposed measures. So, by presenting climate change as an uncontrollable and extreme 
threat, people may get the impression that the problem is ‘just too big to cope with’ and that 
personal actions are not useful (Lowe, 2006; Rogers, 1983). In addition, a study by Cornelissen, 
Pandelaere and Warlop (2008) found that positive cueing of frequently performed ecological 
behavior – and not scare strategies – increased the amount of ecological choices that people 
make. Studies have shown that communication strategies based on fear, frequently fail in 
achieving the desired behavioral outcomes. Instead of bringing people closer to the issue, an 
alarmist repertoire can in that way distance the public from global warming (Dilling and Moser, 
2004; Ereaut and Segnit, 2006).  
 
Importance of ideologies 
A third interesting finding from previous research is the role that ideologies seem to play in 
the reporting on global warming. Carvalho and Burgess (2005) undertook a discourse analysis 
in three UK broadsheet papers (The Guardian, The Times, The Independent) over the period 
from 1985 to 2003. They found that values and ideological cultures are a key factor in explaining 
different interpretations of scientific knowledge on climate change by the media. In order to 
sustain their political preferences, the newspapers emphasize different aspects in the climate 
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change debate and assign different credibility to the claims-makers. In a later study Carvalho 
(2007) stated that ideology has implications for the interpretation of facts, that ideology is an 
important factor in the selection of experts and counter-experts and that the goals associated 
with knowledge also have an ideological basis. 
The importance of ideological standpoints was further underpinned by another study about 
the UK media by Ereaut and Segnit (2006). In their content analysis of print press, radio, 
television and the internet, in the years 2005 and 2006, they found that there are several distinct 
linguistic repertoires on climate change in the UK. They came to the conclusion that certain 
ideological positions tend to draw on certain repertoires more than others. Overall, the left-
leaning press recognizes the problem of global warming and calls for personal actions and 
innovations to deal with it. The right-leaning press on the other hand covers the problem of 
climate change, but often minimizes and undermines it with skepticism. Thus, in general we can 
say that ideologies play a role in the way the issue of climate change is constructed in the press.  
 
4. Need for more European research 
 
In general European governments are less reticent than the American administration about 
their actions against global climate change. The EU has politically supported and promoted the 
Kyoto Protocol and the UK has even taken up a leading role. The US on the other hand 
withdrew from Kyoto in 2001 (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). That raises the question if those 
different political attitudes reflect in different reporting. 
Although the UK coverage has been examined several times, content analyses of the media 
reporting on global warming in other European countries seem to be very sparse. We found 
some studies in Germany but, overall, European media have been much less analyzed than the 
American press. Therefore it would be very interesting to study this European coverage more 
extensively and compare results with those found in the US. 
Some differences between the US and the European media coverage on climate change 
have already been found. As stated earlier, the US press strongly emphasizes the scientific 
uncertainty concerning global warming. Although that emphasis on uncertainty can be found in 
some British newspapers as well, Boykoff and Rajan (2007) state that this more critical reporting 
is less prominent in the UK than in the US (Boykoff and Rajan, 2007; Carvalho, 2007). In 
Germany, Krauss and von Storch (2005) found that climate skeptics hardly get any attention in 
the press and that the emphasis is on scientific certainty (Krauss and von Storch, 2005; 
Carvalho, 2007). Thus, this is a first indication of possible differences in media reporting on 
global warming between the EU and the US. 
There have also been found differences in the tone that is used in covering climate change. 
It was pointed out earlier that the UK print press is characterized by an alarmist tone. When 
Mike Hulme (2007) compared the tone of front-page headlines of British and American 
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newspapers, he found that US newspapers tend to use a more neutral tone than the UK press. 
Although this was a small-scale study, it suggests that there might be significant differences 
between the tone that American and European media use in their coverage of global warming. 
Studies by Engels, Pansegrau and Weingart (2000) and by Krauss and von Storch (2005) in 
Germany support this assumption. Those two studies found that the German press labels 
climate change as a ‘climate catastrophe’ and thus also uses an alarmist tone (Engels, 
Pansegrau and Weingart, 2000; Krauss and von Storch, 2005).  
In sum, because previous research suggests that there are differences between the US and 
the EU in their reporting on global climate change, it is necessary to analyze the European 
media more thoroughly. By using similar research questions and similar content analysis 
instruments as used in previous studies, the possibility of differences between the EU and the 
US can be analyzed. In addition, the coverage in the different European countries can be 
compared. Is media coverage in several EU countries similar, or are significant differences likely 
to be found?  
 
5. Research method 
 
We propose a study that will focus on newspapers from several European countries. In the 
selection of countries we prefer that the UK and Germany will not be taken into account 
because several studies there have already been done and the aim is to expand European 
research. Possible interesting countries could be for example Belgium, The Netherlands and 
France because content analyses of the communication on climate change in these countries 
are to date non-existent or very sparse.  
In these countries we suggest an analysis of the printed news press. Not only are 
newspapers a very interesting source of communication on climate change because they 
usually give more elaborate information than for example television news, but examining the 
print press also makes an optimal comparison with previous, mostly Anglo-Saxon, content 
analyses possible. In the selection of newspapers the focus should mainly be on quality 
newspapers. Elaborate articles with background information and opinion articles are most likely 
to be found in prestige press newspapers and analyses in that kind of newspapers also make 
comparisons with most previous research possible. On the other hand, many people do not 
read quality newspapers and opt for the more popular press. A complete lack of popular 
newspapers in the analysis therefore does not seem justified. In each country newspapers with 
different ideological standpoints should be analyzed, because then it will be possible to examine 
if the results found in the UK (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Carvalho, 2007; Ereaut and Segnit, 
2006) are also found in other European countries.  
The lapse of time covered by the articles would ideally be the last two decades. The starting 
point could be 1985, the year in which the ozone hole was discovered and the year in which one 
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of the first crucial scientific meetings in the field of climate change was held in Villach, Austria 
and the analysis could run up to 2007. Bearing in mind the limited time there usually is to do 
analyses, examining twenty years of media coverage on climate change in three countries may 
be too much. Therefore we suggest to start the analysis in 2007 and work backwards from then 
on. That way it will definitely be known how the recent media coverage on climate change looks 
and there is no risk of having to stop the analysis in for example 1995, without knowing how 
climate change has been covered in the last few years. 
 
The content analysis should focus on four main questions: 
 
1. Is there ‘balance as bias’ in the European newspapers? Is emphasis placed on 
controversy and scientific uncertainty or do climate sceptics get relatively little attention? To 
examine this the content analysis measures of Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) could be used. They 
distinguished two content analysis measures to examine balance as bias in the coverage of the 
debate over anthropogenic contributions to global warming and in the coverage of decisions 
regarding action against global warming.  
 
2. In which ways is climate change framed? For example: is the human interest side of the 
issue emphasized, or is the focus on what might be the consequences of global warming? To 
examine this the frames that were distinguished by De Vreese, Semetko and Valkenburg (1999) 
could be used. They found that five frames constantly re-occur in newspaper coverage: a 
conflict frame, a human interest frame, a responsibility frame, a consequences frame and a 
morality frame. By using the coding measures of De Vreese et al. it could be examined which 
frames are mostly used in covering climate change.  
We conducted this kind of deductive frame-analysis on quality newspapers in France and the 
Netherlands (Dirikx and Gelders, accepted/in press). The results showed that the most 
frequently used framing methods were the consequences frame and the responsibility frame. 
Many of the articles made reference to the consequences of the (non-)pursuit of a certain 
course of action and of possible losses and gains (consequences frame). Additionally, a large 
number of the articles mentioned the need for urgent actions, referenced possible solutions and 
suggested that certain levels of government are responsible for and/or capable of alleviating 
climate change problems (responsibility frame). These findings are in accordance with our 
earlier suggestion that the European media focus on the scientific certainty concerning 
anthropogenic climate change and the need for mandatory actions. 
An additional research question could be which themes are most prominent. The themes 
that were distinguished by McComas and Shanahan (1999) in their study Telling stories about 
global climate change can be used as a starting point.  
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3. What is the tone of the reporting? Do the articles reflect an alarmist or a more neutral 
tone? For each article it could be analyzed which linguistic repertoire of those distinguished by 
Ereaut and Segnit (2006) it reflects. They found twelve repertoires that can be combined into 
three main groups: the ‘alarmist discourse’ that uses the language of fear and disaster, the 
‘optimistic discourses’ that reflect a tone of ‘everything is going to be alright’ and the ‘pragmatic 
optimistic discourses’ that have an underlying tone of ‘everything is going to be alright, as long 
as we do something about it’.  
 
4. Do different ideological standpoints reflect in different reporting? Do the left-leaning and 
the right-leaning press frame their articles about global warming in a different way? Do they use 
a different tone?  
 
Apart from those four main issues, morphological characteristics and structural organization 
of the articles like size, page number, section and headlines, could also be analyzed.  
By means of such content analyses we hope to shed some more light on European climate 
change reporting and analyze potential differences in reporting between the EU and the US, 
and amongst European states. 
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The role of culture in climate change policy making: 
Appealing to universal motivators to address a universal crisis 
 
Judy M. Ford 
 
Abstract 
Climate change poses the first universal crisis of our planet; an urgent crisis, which demands 
urgent and universal policy. This paper analyzes both the universalist theory, which underlies 
universal policy, as well as the concepts of culture and cultural difference, which have been 
used to subvert prior universal policy, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Vienna Declaration. 
 
Keywords: climate change, culture, universalism, policy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘in the first decade of the new millennium, humanity…is more globally united and 
interconnected, more sensitized to the experiences and suffering of others…more 
conscious of alternative future possibilities and ideals, more capable of collective healing 
and compassion, and, aided by technological advances in communication media, more 
able to think, feel, and respond together in a spiritually evolved manner to the world’s 
swiftly changing realities than has ever before been possible.’ 
- Richard Tarnas, Natural Capital Institute (2007) 
 
Climate change poses the first universal crisis of our planet. The natural world recognizes 
none of man’s arbitrary national borders, trade pact zones, or gated communities and affects all 
humans in an unpredictable manner. It is an urgent and universal crisis that demands an urgent 
and universal policy. 
But is universal policy possible in a world divided by cultural differences? Prior efforts, most 
notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and Vienna Declaration in 1993 
(herein referred to collectively as UDHR), have failed in the sense of a ‘universal policy’ as 
individual governments have been allowed to interpret and implement human rights to 
accommodate ‘cultural differences’.  
But how big are these differences? Are these differences more salient than any set of 
universal principals shared by all people? Or is cultural difference too often evoked to mask 
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economic, political and other interests, knowing that others cannot dispute it without being 
judged ignorant or insensitive?  
To look at the possibility of creating universal policy to address climate change, this paper 
will explore the role of culture in climate change policy making, looking at concepts of culture, 
cultural difference, universalism, and policy making, as well as the role that mythology, the 
media and our connected online world play in shaping our ability to construct a universal policy 
such as is needed to address a universal crisis of the scale of climate change.  
 
2. Concepts of culture, relativity, and universalism 
 
Of all the words in our language, none provokes more imagery, and misunderstanding, than 
‘culture’. The term ‘culture’ is commonly used in many ways, which roughly fall into two 
categories: 
 
1. Visual and performing art, music, or people deemed more knowledgeable or superior by 
comparison to their counterparts (e.g., the ‘high culture’ opera audience looking down 
their Galilean binoculars at the masses of ‘low culture’ eagerly anticipating Domino Day; 
Wijers, 2007). 
2. Anthropological studies of the audio and visual arts and behavior of an ‘exotic other’ 
(e.g., National Geographic magazine articles of half-naked, paint-covered bodies, 
indigenous crafts and ritual dances), which expose the anthropological frame of most 
cultural studies to date, a frame biased by its roots in colonialism. It assumes that 
culture is a set of characteristics held by exotic other peoples, which we – the norm – do 
not possess (Ashcroft et al., 1998).  
 
However, if we look at actual definitions of culture, versus the way culture is spoken of, we 
find the broader definitions favored by communication scientists. Here, culture is defined both as 
‘a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize an institution, 
organization, field, activity, or society’ (Merriam-Webster, 2007) and ‘a comprehensive concept 
covering all the symbolic and material expressions in words, gestures, images and sounds that 
people derive an identity from and use in their efforts to distinguish themselves from others’ 
(Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2006: 11).  
These definitions view culture as a set of ideas and behaviors that define a group of people, 
whether by gender, ethnicity, nationality, mother tongue, occupation, age, sports, hobbies, 
and/or even a passing phase. By this definition, no two humans are members of all and only the 
same cultural groups (Singer, 2000: 28).  
With membership in a cultural group comes identification with that culture. Identification may 
play out in a recognized dress code, mode of speaking, participation in certain rites, etc. These 
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outwards symbols and behaviors are as much to show camaraderie and solidarity with other 
members of the group as they are signals to outsiders and ‘opposing groups’. Throughout our 
lives, the relative importance of each identity is dependent upon the situation at hand. Some 
may remain in the background our entire lives, only to spring forward in sudden importance 
upon changing circumstances. ‘Individuals carry multiple identities, which form their own 
universally unique whole’ (Hamelink, 2006).  
The United Nations (2004: 4) Human Development Report of 2004 ‘Cultural Liberty’, states, 
‘culture is not a frozen set of values and practices. It is constantly recreated as people question, 
adapt and redefine their values and practices to changing realities and exchanges of ideas.’  
So not only is each individual a member of a unique set of multiple cultural groups, but the 
cultural practices and values of each of these groups are constantly changing. This dynamic 
reality is a far cry from the static anthropological and class-based ways that ideas of culture are 
most often invoked. Culture is not intrinsic or genetic, but something learned and judged through 
nurture. Research on adopted children, who grow up in a land other than their land of origin, 
and studies of differences between identical twins provide further evidence (Singer, 1987). In 
practice, however, culture is often referred to a pattern of behavior that is inborn and, therefore, 
unavoidable and unchangeable.  
 
Cultural difference  
If we look at concepts of cultural difference, we again see anthropologically-biased, group-
oriented cultural studies, such Values Orientation Theory (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961), 
and Hofstede’s (2001) well-known organizational research, which attempted to quantitatively 
classify whole nations1 along linear and absolute dimensions of beliefs, such as power, self, 
gender, predictability, and time. As conflict transformation expert, Michelle LeBaron (2003: 1) 
points out, ‘any generalization will apply to some members of a group some of the time’. The 
challenge, and danger, of course, is in understanding ‘who?’ and ‘when?’ ’some’ are. While 
these studies fit everyone in clean, little boxes and may be helpful for understanding broad 
cultural differences to some extent on a macro level, these theories ignore the immense 
complexity inherent in unique individuals and risk predestinating outcomes and the stereotyping 
associated with ethnocentricity.  
In an attempt to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings based on cultural differences, an 
entire ‘Intercultural Communications’ industry has blossomed, filled with academic and 
commercial training, seminars, and ‘Do and Taboo’-type books. Unfortunately, the more we 
hear about cultural difference, the more different we think we are and the more likely we are to 
assume that misunderstandings are cultural, and therefore, inherent, and therefore, unsolvable. 
The more likely we are to throw our hands in the air, call ‘cultural difference’ and walk away. The 
                                                 
1 Geert Hofstede (2007) classifies the entire Arab World and West Africa as homogenous blocks. 
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intercultural communications industry can actual leave its students feeling less at ease with the 
culture they will encounter than they would have without the ‘training’ and risk reinforcing and/or 
creating stereotypes by assigning a standard behavior to a large group of individuals 
(Undutchables, 2008). 
If we return again to the actual definition of culture as ‘the set of shared attitudes, values, 
goals, and practices that characterize an institution, organization, field, activity, or society’ 
(Merriam-Webster, 2007), than cultural differences could be defined as ‘differences in shared 
attitudes, values, goals, and practices between societies’. These differences in shared attitudes, 
values, goals, and practices are learned from our societies. Some carry deeper cultural 
significance than others, but many are simply practices that have no deeper significance, 
although these differences can cost multinational organizations time, money and 
embarrassment when they get it wrong.  
 
Ethnocentrism  
Our tendency to see our way as natural and correct and to fear/ loathe/ distrust different 
ways as unnatural and incorrect is often referred to as ethnocentricity. One of the most 
noticeable displays of ethnocentricity can be seen in the current discussions in historically 
Christian Western communities that are struggling to ‘integrate’ non-native ethnicities, especially 
those of Muslim faith. The latter accuses the former of not accepting ‘Western values’ of equality 
and freedom, while the former remain appalled by the lack of values in Western societies 
reflected in high rates of violence, promiscuity, and divorce, along with a perceived lack of 
respect towards elders and the community. Each group remains convinced that the other lacks 
values and plays into the set of ‘universal’ stereotypes identified in the 1970s by anthropologist, 
Robert LeVine, and psychologist, Donald Campbell (1972: 173). Blaming ‘cultural differences’ 
between the ‘native’ and the ‘newcomers’, based not on how long a family has been in the 
country, but largely on the color of their skin and religious beliefs, is easier than addressing the 
very realistic fears of increasing economic disparity, decreasing congregations in the native’s 
own faiths, and lack of space and opportunity.  
 
Stereotyping 
Stereotypes are widely held beliefs about a definable group, which is caused by a 
combination of tension between diverse groups, negative experiences, inequalities, perceived 
threats and repetitive images used in the media. Over time, stereotypes can become a widely-
accepted ‘cultural truth’, even in the face of multiple deviances. The stereotype becomes 
something to challenge, fight or disprove for members of these cultures instead of being judged 
on their individual behavior. We look for incidences which support the stereotype and tend to 
ignore incidences that contradict it (Burgess, 2003). 
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One of the original designers of Epcot Center, a permanent world fair located in Orlando, 
Florida, observed that visitors to the country pavilions typically disliked their ‘own’ country 
pavilion, while enjoying the others (personal communication). He hypothesized this happened 
because the country pavilions played to common stereotypes (e.g., German beer halls, 
Japanese pagodas, and Mexican Mariachi bands), which confirmed the stereotypes visitors hold 
of these countries. Yet, most visitors resented seeing their own country defined by its 
stereotypes, because they see they own country as naturally more complex.  
It is nearly impossible to find a ‘typical’ anyone because there will always be an exception for 
the uniqueness inherent in an individual. As we look harder at what makes the so-and-so so 
typical, we realize that those characteristics also describe other cultures and are, therefore, not 
unique to them. As language expert, Abraam de Swaan (2006) always reminds us, ‘precisely 
what makes us feel so unique may be the precise things we have in common with every other 
group.’ 
Even among studies of individual behavior within multi-cultural organizations (Gardenswartz 
et al, 2003), ‘personal values accounted for a large proportion of individual variation in readiness 
for contact with others from a different group’ (Connerley and Pedersen, 2005: 44). Even Clyde 
Kluckhohn, one of the creators of the Values Orientation Theory (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 
1961), ultimately concluded that, ‘despite wide differences in customs, there are apparently 
fundamental human values common to the diverse cultures of the world.’ (Parsons and Vogt, 
1962: 141). 
 
Identity politics 
Unfortunately, religious and ethnic groups have often been pitted against one another in the 
name of cultural differences to mask economic and political interests, avoid unpopular policy 
requirements (e.g., human rights and environmental responsibility), and justify discrimination 
against a particular group (e.g., gender, ethnicity, religion, age), knowing that others cannot 
dispute them without fear of being judged ignorant or insensitive. ‘Identity politics’ have been 
used by members of one ethnicity, religion, etc. to call attention to their own uniqueness, 
thereby creating dividing lines between themselves and ‘the other side’. However according to 
the UNHDR ‘Cultural Liberty Report’ (United Nations, 2004: 3): 
 
‘there is little empirical evidence that cultural differences and clashes over values are in 
themselves a cause of violent conflict. (While)…violent conflicts have arisen… (primarily)… 
between ethnic groups…there is wide agreement…by scholars that cultural differences by 
themselves are not the relevant factor. Some…argue…cultural diversity reduces the risk of 
conflict by making group mobilization more difficult…Wars (are caused by)… economic 
inequalities,… struggles over political power, land and other economic assets. Cultural 
identity… (is not)…a cause but…a driver for political mobilization. Leaders invoke a single 
identity, its symbols and its history of grievances, to ‘rally the troops’. It is not rare for groups 
to be dominated by people who have an interest in maintaining the status quo under the 
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justification of ‘tradition’ and who act as gatekeepers of traditionalism to freeze their 
cultures.’  
 
Genocide typically starts when one identity (e.g., religion, ethnicity) dominates and minimizes 
the relevance of other identities. By focusing on this one identity, individuals become ‘de-
humanized’ members of contrasting groups and can therefore collectively labeled as evil. By 
removing the individual human faces on members of this contrasting group, the members all 
merge into one homogeneous, two-dimensional face which is easier to dislike and distrust. 
Identity development plays an especially strong role in the first three stages of genocide – 
Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization identified by Gregory Stanton (Genocide Watch, 
1998). It is this inherent and inevitable concept of cultural identity and violence, which Nobel 
Prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen (2006), recently outlined. He argues that cultural 
identity-based violence is not inevitable and uses the manipulated brutality between Hindus, 
Sikhs and Muslims during the partitioning of British India as a quintessential example of identity 
politics in action. 
More recently, the Western propaganda leading up to the American-led invasion of Iraq fed 
on identity politics of Samuel Huntington’s (1993) Clash of Civilizations. Its discussion of a 
cultural war, a war of civilizations, and a defending of democracy, helped to justify a Christian 
Crusade-like march into ‘Muslim incivility’. Iraqis were alternatively mentioned as both terrorists 
and victims in need of liberation. However, as Reda Benkirane (2002: 2) of the Ecumenical 
Advocacy Alliance eloquently states: 
 
‘the problem with the application of Huntington's theory in the current context is that cultures 
and civilizations are now portrayed as playing the roles that nation-states played during the 
Cold War. Cultures and civilizations are seen as monolithic blocs acting on the geopolitical 
scene rather than as living and evolving organisms that need constantly to exchange and 
interact with their environment. Furthermore, the clashes Huntington classified as timeless2 
are more often camouflage for economic and political aspirations by local, regional and 
international power brokers.’ 
 
And, as Sen (2006: xvii) emphasizes, ‘the prospects of peace in the contemporary world may 
well lie in the recognition of the plurality of our affiliations and in the use of reasoning as 
common inhabitants of a wide world’. 
 
Political uses of cultural relativism 
Cultural relativists still argue, though, that ‘the concept of human rights is really a cover for 
Western interventionism in the affairs of the developing world, and that ‘human rights’ are 
merely an instrument of Western political neocolonialism’ (Tharoor, 1999/2000: 2). It is from this 
basis that Asian Values’ proponents, who helped engineer the Bangkok Declaration, claim that 
                                                 
2 Huntington (1993: 25) emphasized that the ‘conflicts of the future will occur along cultural fault lines 
separating…seven or eight major civilizations… (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization)’. 
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the ‘communitarian, Confucian and Buddhist Asian’ is focused on social, economic and cultural 
rights while the ‘individualistic, Christian Westerner’ is focused on civil and political rights. ‘Asian 
Values’ proponents do not question international legal human rights documents as such; they 
question the emphasis by Western countries on civil and political rights.  
However, they call more often to their ‘national identities in accordance with the ideals and 
aspirations of their peoples…’ (ASEAN, 1993: 1)3 as opposed to specific fundamentally different 
cultural values (Steiner, 2005). The need for governments to stabilize their political powers by 
meeting people’s basic needs can be found throughout history and government. It is on this 
precedent that ‘Asian Values’ proponents argue that they prioritize a certain set of rights. 
‘Objections to the applicability of international human rights standards have all too frequently 
been voiced by authoritarian rulers and power elites to rationalize their violations of human 
rights—violations that serve primarily, if not solely, to sustain them in power’ (Tharoor, 
1999/2000: 5). According to Kim Dae-jung (1994: 2), former South Korean President and Nobel 
Peace Prize Recipient, ’Asia has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and 
traditions…the biggest obstacle is not its cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian 
rulers and their apologists…it is widely accepted that English political philosopher John Locke 
laid the foundation for modern democracy. But almost two millennia before Locke, Chinese 
philosopher Meng-tzu preached similar ideas’. 
However, in 1990 the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), created during 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, asserted that because the UDHR was a ‘western 
secular concept of Judeo-Christian origin, (it was) incompatible with the sacred Islamic shari'a’ 
(Littman 1999: 1). Under the more extreme implementations of Sharia law, Muslim men have 
twice the power in a court than a woman or a non-Muslim man. However, the Prophet 
Muhammad created the Constitution of Medina (Sahifat al-Madinah), which was ‘based on 
tolerance, equality and justice...many centuries before such an idea existed anywhere else in 
the world (Sajid, 2004: 1). 
Ultimately, ‘there does not need to be any trade-off between respect for cultural difference 
and human rights and development’ (United Nations, 2004: 4).  
 
2. Universalism4 
 
‘The crucial task is to fundamentally strengthen a system of universally shared moral 
standards that will make it impossible, on a truly, global scale, for the various rules to be 
time and again circumvented with still more ingenuity than had gone into their invention. 
                                                 
3 The exact wording vis-à-vis universalism is ‘while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind 
the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds.’ 
4 For the purposes of this paper, I refer to the philosophical understanding of universalism to mean the 
belief that universal facts can be discovered, in opposition to relativism, such as those which underpin the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Such standards will truly guarantee the weight of the rules and will generate natural 
respect for them in the societal climate.’ 
- Vaclav Havel (2000: 4) 
 
 ‘When have you heard a free voice demand an end to freedom? Where have you heard 
a slave argue for slavery? When have you heard a victim of torture endorse the ways of 
the torturer? Where have you heard the tolerant cry out for intolerance?’  
- Kofi Annan (1997) 
 
Universalist concepts have existed since the ancient Greeks, but universalism is often 
considered an Enlightenment concept (Hall, 1979; West, 1993; Wood, 1991). Universalists 
assert that beneath cultural differences, all humans share core philosophical common 
denominators (Maleuvre, 2004), ground ideas (Campbell, 1991), human identity (Littman, 1999), 
archetypes (Jung, 1934-1954), human nature (Wilson, 1978) and contend that universal truths 
can be identified. They claim there are experiences, longings, and needs that might unite 
human beings, regardless of any cultural, gender, or religious differences.  
Universalism does not claim that we are all the same, nor does it refute that differences 
exist. The studies of these differences are important for effective international business and 
affairs. It is a disagreement about the extent to which differences, rather than universal 
principles, should be emphasized. Universalism has been understudied in the past primarily 
because cultural studies are typically based in either the anthropology field, which by its nature 
focuses on the unique patterns found in micro-slices of a specific culture and geography, or 
international relations, which focuses on state-based national differences. As E.O. Wilson 
(1999) claims, the study of human nature requires a cross-disciplinary study which crosses into 
communications, sociology, psychology, socio-cultural anthropology, political science, literature, 
theater and international relations.  
So, despite its vulnerability to claims of post-colonialism, researchers like Didier Maleuvre 
(2004: 134) claim: 
 
‘the bias against any homogeneity…is…misguided, since it is on the basis of this assumption 
of universal dignity that respect for differences is claimed. Dignity is bestowed because I see, 
beneath the patchwork of culture, the human being — a human being whom I recognize as 
being like me…Concepts of justice and law, the legitimacy of government, the dignity of the 
individual, protection from oppressive or arbitrary rule, and participation in the affairs of the 
community are found in every society on the face of this earth…Tolerance and mercy have 
always, and in all cultures, been ideals of government rule and human behavior.’ 
 
Universalism is not simply the art of learning to ‘delight in our differences’, as Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu has said (United Nations, 2004: v). It is reaching deeper to find universal 
connections that supersede the differences and appealing to them. Anthropologists can 
continue to study nuances of tribes, and we can continue to celebrate diversity, but if too much 
emphasis is placed on the differences, we risk losing sight of the similarities. We must 
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understand the economic, personal and political interests behind cries of cultural differences, 
without fear of being judged ignorant or insensitive. 
 
Universalism embraced 
The idea of universal principals was embraced long ago by religious, activist, media and 
commercial organizations and underpins the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
very concept of the United Nations; from missionaries preaching their gospels and activist 
petitioning for greater representation to movies geared to our inner hero and ‘glocal’ marketing 
campaigns ‘communicat(ing) in many languages but with one voice’ (Interbrand, 2005a: 4). 
However, evidence of its existence goes back to the earliest myths created by man to explain 
the world view of a people (Campbell and Moyers, 1991). According to the pioneer of modern 
comparative mythology, Joseph Campbell, all mythology around the world and throughout the 
ages has been based upon the same universal, timeless and transcending themes or ‘ground 
ideas’ that proved that the human psyche, regardless of sex, nationality, or culture, craved basic 
ideas around which the world could be understood (Campbell and Moyers, 1991). They help us 
understand the mysteries of life, the coming of age, and death; our relationship with the spiritual 
world, nature, and each other; and the hero’s journey, which ‘serves as a template for life’s 
major initiations – birth, coming of age, finding a partner and raising a family, growing old and 
dying’ (Gerringer, 2006: 19). 
Campbell argued that our physical environment and time in history shape the details of the 
myths we create, and that clashes between cultures are found in these details, not in the 
transcending themes underlying them. In the great Indian epic, Mahabharata, written more than 
2000 years ago, the great rishi, Bharadvaja, argued against the traditional caste system with the 
question ’how…(can)…we have caste differences… (when)…we all seem to be affected by 
desire, anger, fear, sorrow, worry, hunger, and labour (Sen, 2005: 3-4)? 
Campbell began with Carl Jung's (1968: 8 & 43, paraphrased) archetypes, the ‘collective, 
universal, eternal, inherited and unconscious images identical in all humans’, as a way of 
explaining why similar images reoccur in myths of completely different cultures. We see these 
images repeatedly in our dreams, which explains ‘why myths and most stories constructed on 
the mythological model have the ring of psychological truth…(and)…accounts for the universal 
power of such stories’ (Vogler, 1998: 15). The planning group for a new museum on mythology 
chose to focus on death as a key entry point for the exhibits because ‘all questions are rooted in 
death’ (Harness, 2007). 
 
Universalism in the media 
Storytelling still often follows the ancient patterns of the mythical heroes journey, and not 
coincidentally, the most successful films (e.g., Star Wars, Indiana Jones, Harry Potter, ET, and 
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The Lord of the Rings) both within the U.S. home market of Hollywood (Movie Web, 2007a and 
2007b), as well as outside the U.S. (IMDB, 2007), reflect this theme. According to Christopher 
Vogler (1998: 10), story analyst of the Walt Disney Company: 
 
‘the pattern of the Hero’s Journey is universal, occurring in every culture, every time. It 
is as infinitely varied as the human race itself and yet its basic form remains 
constant…stories built on the model of the Hero’s Journey have an appeal that can be 
felt by everyone, because they deal with the childlike universal questions: Who am I? 
Where did I come from? Where will I go when I die? What is good and what is evil? 
What must I do about it? What will tomorrow be like? Where did yesterday go? Is there 
anybody else out there?’  
 
Even the highest grossing films made outside of Hollywood’s global distribution reach: Wo 
hu cang long (Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon), La Vita è Bella (Life is Beautiful), and Ying 
xiong (Hero) (Kaufman, 2004; Lists of Bests, 2007; Film Fest, 2004) have been either martial 
arts fantasies or stories of unusual heroes, which appeal to these elements. Crouching Tiger is: 
 
 ‘putatively set in 19th century China, but it could be anywhere, any when. It is a place of 
high honor and deep feelings, a place where people are bound by traditions and held captive 
by their forms. It is also a place of wild and mythic landscapes...from stark desert…to magic 
misty green mountains with deep dark lakes and steeply cascading streams that come 
braiding, tumbling down the rockslide heights. High, reedy bamboo forests wave, wondrous, 
in sighing winds…apart from all else, this is grand storytelling! It has passion, love, 
revenge...it expresses deep need and longing..’ (Santoro, 2001) 
 
Research on international television programming has found that violence, sex, heartbreak 
(e.g., soaps), body humor (e.g., Mr. Bean) and basic humor (e.g., Friends, Nanny, Cosby, 
Bundy, Sex in the City, Simpsons, South Park) export well because they are simple to translate 
and play to universally-empathetic and recognized characters and themes (Kuipers, 2007). 
 
Universalism and cross-border interests 
Some cultural groups cross traditional ethnic and national borders, such as expats, deaf 
people, professionals in almost any field (Rotary Club, 2007), athletes, and elites (aSmallWorld, 
2007), as well as more harmful groups, such as pedophiles and racists. While individual 
academics attending an international conference will display any number of obvious signs of 
cultural difference, at the core, each attends the conferences and writes papers in order to 
present their work, which follows a common set of principles and rules, and be judged by their 
peers. 
 
Part of what fuels the connect-ability of these groups is the ability to find each other. Since 
the usage of email and the Internet has exploded in the past fifteen years, social scientists have 
noted several communications techniques spawned by this technology – blogs, email chain 
letters, online petitioning, instant messaging, and video sharing – that break traditional 
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boundaries. The Internet allows kindred souls to organize around their causes and essentially 
broadens the geographic reach of the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1991). 
When Amnesty International (2007) wants to petition for the release of political prisoners 
around the world or the National Resource Defense Council (2007) wants to protest a potentially 
harmful dam in Chile, Internet activism provides information dissemination, petitioning, and 
fundraising opportunities. The recent uprising in Burma was fueled by online bloggers 
(YouTube, 2007) and digital camera mobile phone users updating the outside world. When the 
Burmese government wanted to close its borders, it first shut down the Internet providers, a 
measure as effective as a physical closure of airports or checkpoints (Mydans, 2007).  
The environmental movement in particular has strengthened the embrace what one reviewer 
of the recently published One Planet book from Lonely Planet (2004: cover sleeve) called a 
‘celebration of…the connections and similarities that exist within…diversity… unifying moments 
in our superficially divided one and only planet.’ 
 
Universalism in commerce 
According to Interbrand, one of the top brand management firms in the world: 
 
 ‘brands are…central to…democratic societies. They…have a profound impact on…the way 
we see our world (2005b)…(They) symbolize a promise that people believe can be delivered 
and one they desire to be part of. Through emotion, brands can achieve the loyalty of 
consumers by tapping into human values and aspirations that cut across cultural differences. 
Global brands (transcend borders), act as ambassadors for nations and capture the spirit of 
an age’. Global brands appeal to universal principals, but must be locally adaptable (2005a: 
3-4).  
 
Coca-Cola (happiness), Louis Vuitton (luxury) Nike (sport), and Harley-Davidson (freedom) 
are often touted as great lifestyle brands. Coca-Cola in particular has used universalist 
messages, such as ‘One World, One Coke’, for decades, becoming the most valuable logo in 
the world, at >US$ 66B in 2007 (Interbrand, 2007).  
 
3. Universalism and climate change  
 
So what does a discussion on human rights, universalism, and cultural differences have to 
do precisely with climate change policy making? Climate change is a universal crisis that 
demands urgent, universal policy, just as human rights seemed a universal issue following the 
destruction of World War II. True universal deployment of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was derailed by politicians claiming ‘cultural relativism’ (ASEAN, 1993). The UN Resident 
Coordinator in China, Khalid Malik, has stated ‘A clean environment is a basic right’ (Malik, 
2007). This moves the discourse on climate change policy into the discourse on human rights, 
where cultural difference has effectively been used to deny universal implementation.  
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The motivation for this research is twofold: to debunk cultural difference as a real barrier to 
universal policy making in order to avoid a cultural relativist derailment on climate change policy 
as well; and to look at how the flipside of cultural difference, universal motivations inherent to all 
humans, can be invoked to successfully address climate change around the world.  
Climate change has been alternatively framed as an issue of human rights (Watt-Cloutier, 
2004; Malik, 2007), religious stewardship (Evangelical Climate Initiative, 2007), and morality 
(Gore, 2006). The former frames climate change mitigation as universally-humanistic right, while 
the latter clearly emphasizes our responsibility. 
 
Religion, morality, and the natural world 
 
 ‘Religious leaders, liberal and conservative…understand that all spiritual life begins with 
a sense of wonder, and that one of the first windows to wonder is the natural world.’ 
- Richard Louv (2007)  
 
‘science and religion are potential allies for averting mass extinction’  
- E.O. Wilson (2006) 
 
The religions of the world roughly fall into three categories: indigenous, polytheistic, and 
monotheistic. The primary difference between the faiths in these three categories lies in different 
perceptions about the origin of power. These beliefs impact how they view their relationship to 
nature. Indigenous religions generally perceive the earth as the primary source of power, 
viewing spirituality within the natural world, to which they must pay reverence, and see 
themselves as part of this greater system. Polytheistic religions generally perceive power as 
originating from within the self and view themselves as part of the natural world, but emphasize 
a simplicity of living in it which by its nature will tread lightly on the Earth. Monotheistic religions 
generally perceive power as originating from a heaven-based god. The natural world is seen as 
a gift from God, over which they act as benevolent rulers.  
Indigenous and polytheistic religions tend to see environmental care as self-evident and 
wholly in keeping with centuries of theological practice, while monotheistic religions view 
environmental responsibility as a modern subject to be debated. The latter struggles to reconcile 
their monotheistic responsibility to worship but one god with the fear that environmental care will 
be seen as a form of worship of the earth.  
However, as scientific evidence builds about the existence, causes and solutions of climate 
change, many of these religious leaders have spoken out about environmental responsibility 
and recognize that while they approach climate change from very different motivations and 
backgrounds, they share common interests with scientists and believers of other faiths in 
protecting the earth. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life recently reported that: 
 
‘In contrast to abortion and other hot-button cultural issues, which divide most religious 
groups in the United States, there is fairly strong consensus across faith traditions on 
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environmental policy…By a two-to-one margin (55% to 27%) respondents back strong 
regulations to protect the environment. Furthermore, the level of support is quite 
deep…Respondents in this survey were asked whether they favored stronger environmental 
regulations ‘even if they cost jobs or result in higher prices’…(in ranking) priorities for 
religious voters, environment (53%) ranks higher than abortion (46%) or gay marriage (33%) 
(Pew Forum, 2004: 1-2). 
 
Humans and the natural world 
But what about our right to a healthy environment? According to Harvard Entomologist, E.O. 
Wilson (1984: 10): 
 
‘Our intrinsic emotions…crave the sense of a mysterious world stretching 
indefinitely beyond. The greater our knowledge, the deeper the mystery and the 
more we seek knowledge to create new mystery. Our sense of wonder grows 
exponentially.’ 
  
In his innovative research on ant colonies, Wilson (1984) found that humans had looked to 
the natural world for understanding and meaning for millennia. In more recent years, biologists, 
psychologists, educators, and designers, have confirmed that humans respond more deeply to 
just about any natural thing more than we would to just about any man-made thing. There is a 
complexity and a balance to the natural world that man cannot re-create. Somehow we 
instinctively know this and respond to that pull. We prefer entities that are complicated, evolving, 
and sufficiently unpredictable to be interesting. Nature provides us with mystery.  
Given our choice, we will migrate towards a sanctuary that millennia ago would have 
improved our chances of survival. People in a variety of cultures and locations around the world 
prefer landscapes with tree groves that provide horizontal canopies, water, elevation changes, 
distant views, flowers, indications of other people or inhabited structures – all elements that 
indicate possible food, shelter, and places to explore. They make an artificial environment more 
habitable. 
Contact with nature provides people with a sense of joy, which translates into a more 
effective space for learning, working and living.  
In a study performed by the Heschong-Mahone (1999) group elementary school students in 
classrooms with the most [diffuse] daylight showed a 21 percent improvement in learning rates 
compared to students in classrooms with the least daylight. A study at Herman-Miller (2004) 
showed up to a 7% increase in worker productivity following a move to a green, day-lit facility. A 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study (Kumar and Fisk, 2002) found that U.S. 
businesses could save as much as $58 billion in lost sick time and an additional $200 billion in 
worker performance if improvements were made to indoor air quality. Workers were more 
excited about work, in better spirits at work, felt less fatigue, and rated their job satisfaction 
higher in the new building (Kats et al., 2003). 
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According to Robin Moore, an expert on the design of environments for children, ‘Natural 
spaces and materials stimulate a children’s limitless imagination and serve as the medium of 
inventiveness and creativity’ (Louv, 2007: 5). Louv further states that children played more 
creativity, cooperatively, and displayed longer attention spans with direct experiences in nature.  
Innovators in a wide variety of fields have studied the natural world for design inspiration. In 
many cases, nature already provides us with many complex, self-sufficient systems to study, 
mimic, and test, which is far more efficient than trying to build new, inferior systems of individual 
parts at random. We already live with several revolutionary products that were inspired by 
nature – Velcro (barbs on weed seeds); the Sydney Opera House (milkweed pods and sea 
shells); the telephone (mimicked the Human tongue and ear drum); and of course, the most 
famous of all bird-watchers…the Wright Brothers (Benyus, 2002). 
 
Future myth 
Nearly a decade ago Campbell predicted that ‘future myths’ would revolve around a common 
concern for the planet upon which we all depend to survive (Campbell and Moyers, 1991). 
Spurred by environmental degradation (United Nations, 2005), increasingly severe weather, 
storms and droughts, demographic shifts, growing environmental ethics and financial concerns 
(Smart Growth, 2007) climate change and environmental stewardship have become mainstream 
conversation.5 Charles Tilly’s (2006) research on meaning making assert that dramatic 
changes, like the severe climate changes experienced in nearly every corner of the world, have 
forced people of diverse backgrounds to find reasons – or what he calls ‘organized answers to 
the question of ‘why?’’ – for climate change. As Tilly further explains, ‘while explanations for 
causes and consequences of major events (are) bound to cultural and national conditions and 
history…(the) giving of reasons… connects people with each other…(and)…provides… shared 
accounts of what is happening’. These shared accounts begin to constitute a common 
explanation or myth about the world around us. Climate change is increasingly seen as one the 
‘great narratives in global society’ (Neverla, 2007), and through these conversations, societies 
can create a new mythology, which makes sense of the present and tries to predict the future. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
‘A Native-American taught me that the division between ecology and human rights was 
an artificial one, that the environmental and social justice movements addressed two 
sides of a larger dilemma. The way we harm the earth affects all people, and how we 
treat each other is how we treat the earth’  
- Paul Hawken (2007) 
                                                 
5 Fifty-eight percent of Americans, whose ‘ecological footprint’ marks one of the most disproportionate uses 
of the world’s natural resources (Venetoulis and Talberth, 2005) believe not only climate change as a 
result of global warming has already begun, but that it is the result of man-made operations, not natural 
cycles (Zogby International 2006) 
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Thanks to the recent IPCC (2007) Assessment Report, the Stern Review (2006) and the 
collective actions of millions within the social justice movement (Hawken, 2007), the general 
public finally understands that climate change is real and that our human activities are the 
primary cause of it. ‘Saving the planet’ no longer means that the planet itself needs to be saved 
out of some feel-good principal, but that the human race needs to act quickly in order to 
preserve the delicate natural balance which allows us as a species to live here. The planet will 
survive. Will we be able to survive upon it? What steps need to be taken to mitigate the worst 
scenarios predicted in the reports mentioned above? 
Unlike human rights, which are supported by the basic principles of religions and stable 
societies around the world, addressing climate change requires the engagement of millions of 
individuals performing multiple steps to reach a more obscure goal. In the Western world, this 
will likely include modifications of the consuming and mobile lifestyles to which we are 
accustomed. Successful engagement at this level requires personal, mass commitment to 
deeper, universal principals, such as those already found in mythology, art, religion, commerce, 
and human rights.  
2007 has been labeled the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000) on climate change; the year that 
the natural world earned front page coverage, an Oscar, and even the Nobel Prize. Most 
importantly, it earned the respect and urgency of the general public (WPO and CCGA, 2007), 
who now want to know exactly what they have to do to help. According to the National Institute 
for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM, 2004), 70% of Dutch citizens see climate crisis as 
a social dilemma, expect the government to organize a response and are prepared to adjust 
their own behavior if others around them do as well. However, policy makers, academics, and 
the media reporting on climate change often severely underestimate the willingness of 
individuals to engage in this process. Assumptions are made that ‘lifestyles must be maintained’ 
by business and governments, who, not coincidentally, may benefit from increases in energy 
uSage Publications. The Chairman6 of the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and 
Commerce Committee, who also represents the ‘auto’ state of Michigan, was so certain that the 
public was not willing to sacrifice that he threatened to introduce a huge carbon tax, simply so it 
could be defeated, in order to prove his point (Andrews, 2007).  
However, instead of assuming a lack of commitment, we must tap into the collective desire 
that already exists to unite against a common threat. Show normal people how to do something 
in the face of a worldwide crisis instead of leaving them to our human tendency towards the 
environmental fatalism, already documented in the first century B.C. (Hudson, 1993).  
                                                 
6 John Dingell also represents the Democratic Party, which is currently seen as more willing to address the 
climate change crisis (Earth Day Network, 2006).  
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Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, most U.S. Americans were prepared to 
sacrifice anything to prevent another attack. Unfortunately, instead of calling for a reduction in 
arms proliferation or oil usage or an increase in diplomacy and personal reflection, U.S. 
President Bush told Americans to go shopping (Bush, 2001). This was supposed to show the 
terrorists that they would not beat us by changing our (consuming) lifestyle. This is in sharp 
contrast to the calls, and answers, for rationing during WWII, the oil-crisis induced run on 
energy-efficient cars in 1973-4, and the water rationing during the California drought in 1976-7. 
During the California droughts, residents were not allowed to wash their own cars, nor run their 
sprinklers, and were encouraged to take short, ‘military’ showers. Even in the most Libertarian-
Republican type of neighborhoods, this kind of specific policy was welcomed. It was a collective 
cause around which neighbors rallied, made jokes, and used social pressure to ensure the 
reluctant conformed. 
The success or failure of worldwide cooperation on ‘global environmental governance’ is 
dependent upon many factors, but any true climate change policy must be made inside of a 
larger discussion of sustainable growth, while ‘connecting the dots’ between the economy, 
environment, security and energy. Research by IPCC Contributor and Fletcher Professor of 
International Negotiation, Adil Najam (2005), articulates how the G77 has effectively questioned 
the status quo assumptions of the G7 around the debate on climate change. ‘First multiple sides 
coalesced into G77 and (later) the concept of sustainable development… allowed for a valuable 
dialogue (on global warming) between (the) North and South’. Sustainability can be defined in 
many ways, but at its heart is the idea that any man-made structure or activity is self-sustaining 
(i.e., producing and using its own energy, water, and air (oxygen), consuming its own waste, 
and providing in advance for its own decomposition). In other words, zero impact. Our structures 
and activity must find the balance of a new triple bottom line (McDonough and Braungart, 2002), 
a workable sustainability between people, planet and profit, where every project looks at the 
social, economic, and environmental impacts it has on the world. 
In addition, we can learn from the natural world itself and those who live sustainably within it. 
Víctor Toledo (2000) demonstrates a clear link between indigenous peoples and biodiversity 
(90% of biodiversity lies within indigenous areas), providing clear evidence that our biodiversity 
can only be conserved if we ‘maintain, reinforce or give control to the indigenous communities 
on their own territories and natural resources as well as sufficient access to information and 
technology, which give the communities both an economic incentive and a legal basis for 
stewardship’ (Toledo, 2000: 10). In addition he argues that ‘indigenous societies house a 
repertory of ecological knowledge which generally is local, collective, diachronic and holistic’ 
(Toledo, 2000: 7). Their normal way of life minimizes waste and maximizes sustainability, 
exemplifying what we label carbon neutral/ low footprint lifestyle.  
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According to Friends of the Earth International (2007), more than 90 percent of food 
requirements in Africa are met with indigenous farming systems, such as saving seeds and 
native harvesting (LaDuke, 2007), which have sustained communities for millennia. Instead of 
battling over ‘who owns lifeforms, foods, and medicines7 that have throughout history been the 
collective property of indigenous peoples’ (LaDuke, 2007: 2) we should be learning from their 
practices and stop the ‘large-scale, industrialized, vertically integrated food production’ by global 
agribusiness conglomerates (Kingsolver, 2003). 
Further, since ‘there is no technofix to the disastrous impact of air travel on the environment8, 
the only answer is to ground most of the aeroplanes flying today’ (Monbiot, 2006). Climate 
change mitigation will require a general de-mobilizing of Western lifestyles and a re-
acquaintance with local sources. Distinguishing between the lack of trust and miscommunication 
inherent in lower-presence, mediated communication (Nevejan, 2007) and miscommunication 
that truly stems from culture difference will become even more critical.  
Finally, we must reclaim the discourse on climate change mitigation from the commercial 
world and stop looking to the individual, profit-driven entities within the commercial world to 
solve our universal crisis. Climate change will only be solved through collective, public action 
into which commercial enterprises will have the opportunity to feed new technologies and ideas. 
Decoupling climate change solutions from the commercial will allow more de-centralized, more 
local solutions to flourish (Arnoldy, 2007). Included in this process is the dispelling of the notion 
that we must choose between environmental stewardship and economic growth. In the just 
released California Green Innovation Index (Next 10, 2006: 3), ‘as a result of the first wave of 
green innovation, which began in the 1970s…California is more energy efficient and emits fewer 
greenhouse gas emissions per person than the rest of the United States, Germany, the United 
Kingdom or Japan. California’s economy has grown (20%) as a result of this first wave of green 
innovation’. In addition, its ‘ratio of (greenhouse gas) GHG9 emissions to GDP’ has dropped 
from 0.45 in 1990 to 0.35 in 2004. One particularly interesting chart (Next 10, 2006: 18) shows 
that ‘the growing separation (between carbon emissions cap and inflation adjusted GDP dollars 
per cap) illustrates the declining dependence of California's economic growth on environmental 
degradation’.  
In his denial that a choice must be made between economic growth and human rights, Sen 
(1999) explains, there is a ‘broad consensus on a list of ‘helpful policies’ that includes openness 
to competition, the use of international markets, public provision of incentives for investment and 
export, a high level of literacy and schooling, successful land reforms, and other social 
                                                 
7 Ninety-seven percent of all patents are held by industrialized countries (Howard, 2001). 
8 ‘Aviation is the fastest growing cause of climate change. By 2050 it will account for more than 15% of 
world wide CO2 levels…every tonne of emissions from aircraft has the effect of 2.7 tonnes due to its 
‘radiative force’…aviation is one of the single largest threats to climate stability, and consequently to life on 
earth’ (Garman, 2006: 1).  
9 Carbon emissions account for roughly 72% of all greenhouse gas emissions (Next 10, 2006: 18). 
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opportunities that widen participation in the process of economic expansion…(further)… there is 
overwhelming evidence to show that what is needed for generating faster economic growth is a 
friendlier economic climate rather than a harsher political system’. 
 
The ideas outlined above are by no means conclusive, but I am encouraged by the swell of 
interest and support, not only to address climate change, but our broken relationship with the 
natural world and our world community. I close this paper with… 
 
‘…nature, imaginative by necessity, has already solved many of the problems 10we are 
grappling with. Animals, plants, and microbes are the consummate engineers. They have 
found what works, what is appropriate, and most important, what lasts here on Earth. 
After 3.8 billion years of research and development, failures are fossils, and what 
surrounds us is the secret to survival…The conscious emulation of life's genius is a 
survival strategy for the human race, a path to a sustainable future. The more our world 
looks and functions like the natural world, the more likely we are to endure on this home 
that is ours, but not ours alone.’  
- Janine Benyus (2002) 
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Religious positions on climate change and climate policy in the 
 United States1 
 
Arjan (J.A.) Wardekker, Arthur C. Petersen and Jeroen P. van der Sluijs 
 
Abstract 
February 2006, a group of 86 evangelical leaders, under the auspices of the Evangelical 
Climate Initiative, challenged the Bush administration on global warming. Other religious groups 
and leaders in the USA, and other countries, have taken positions as well. As the US 
evangelical community seems to have a considerable influence on the views and policy of 
(Republican) national leaders, these developments are relevant for assessing US and 
international climate policy. Using argumentative discourse analysis, this paper analyzes the 
religious positions on climate change and climate policy in the United States, as evident in their 
communication in the media, opinion documents, and websites. Religious positions show a wide 
range of views, images, and discourses that deal with fundamental moral and ethical questions 
concerning climate change, stewardship and social justice. Our main conclusion is that both 
proponents and opponents of strict climate policy strongly value these concepts, but that they 
interpret them in different ways. A robust policy strategy (regarding support in the religious 
community) should pay careful attention to the effects of both climate change and climate policy 
on the poor in both developing nations and the USA itself. 
 
Keywords: environmental justice, equity, ethics, religion and environment, climate policy, 
United States 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
February 2006, a group of 86 evangelical leaders, under the auspices of the Evangelical 
Climate Initiative (ECI), challenged the Bush administration on global warming with their 
‘Evangelical Call to Action’ (ECI, 2006). Other religious groups and leaders in the USA and 
other countries have taken positions on this issue as well. The (religious-)ethical aspects of 
climate change are the central theme of their statements. The debate has attracted much 
attention in the media, and some attention in scientific forums as well (e.g. Kolmes and Butkus, 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the conference ‘Communicating Climate Change: Discourses, Mediations and 
Perceptions’, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal, 19-20 November 2007. An expanded version (including 
the worldview analysis presented at the conference) will be submitted for publication in a journal. 
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2007; Nisbet, 2006; Nisbet and Mooney, 2007). Simultaneously, climate change and climate 
policy have become more prominent in the US political debate as well, often with moral and 
religious-ethical connotations. For example, Al Gore notes in his ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ that it is 
‘deeply unethical’ to allow the rise in CO2 emissions to continue (Gore, 2006). President Bush 
referred in the State of the Union in January 2007 for the first time to climate change as a 
serious societal issue, noting that technological breakthroughs would allow us to become ‘better 
stewards of the environment’ (Bush, 2007). 
Climate change and climate policy raise many questions that have strong moral and ethical 
dimensions, which are important for policy formation and international negotiations (Brown, 
2003; Brown et al., 2006; Gardiner, 2006). The issue is riddled with social dilemmas due to e.g. 
the spatial and temporal dispersion of causes and effects, diffusion of responsibility for the 
problem, and lack of institutions through which different countries and generations can 
effectively influence each others’ behaviour (Gardiner, 2006; Jamieson, 1992). One of the main 
ethical dimensions of climate change therefore is the issue of distributive justice. Climate policy 
deals with the question of how best to divide a scarce resource that no one owns, i.e. how to 
equitably (both interregionally and intergenerationally) distribute the costs (e.g. climate change 
impacts) and benefits (e.g. economic growth) of emissions and responsibility for policy action to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change (Brown et al., 2006; Gardiner, 2004, 2006; Grubb, 1995; 
Singer, 2006). See e.g. Gardiner (2004), Groenenberg and Van der Sluijs (2005), and Grubb 
(1995) for extensive discussion of the ethical aspects of various approaches to assigning 
emission reduction targets. Other specific ethical issues include procedural justice (who gets to 
participate in policymaking and how), how to deal with the many uncertainties (who should bear 
the burden of proof, and if, when and how to act under uncertainty), research approaches (e.g. 
economic approaches such as discounting and cost-benefit analysis), and some specific policy 
approaches (especially geoengineering) (Brown et al., 2006; Gardiner, 2007; Jamieson, 1996; 
Singer, 2006; Toman, 2006). Generally speaking, climate change is an ethical, as well as 
religious, issue because it poses questions on how we ought to live and how humans should 
value and relate to each other and non-human nature. In addition to insights from economics 
and natural science, moral and religious-ethical considerations form an important input for 
policymaking on complex and uncertain issues such as climate change (Hogue, 2007; 
Jamieson, 1992; Rolston, 2006). 
Different religious views (or more generally, different philosophies of life) can lead to different 
approaches to environmental issues. One often-heard complaint, especially towards Judeo-
Christian traditions, is that the classic ‘dominion’ argument (mankind transcends and has rightful 
mastery over nature) results in the abuse and destruction of nature (Greeley, 1993; Guth et al., 
1995; ICT, 2006; Schultz et al., 2000; Trevors and Saier, 2006; White, 1967). One’s view on the 
relationship between man and nature influences one’s attitude towards ecology. A different, less 
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anthropocentric, approach to nature and religion (also included within Judeo-Christianity) would 
prove less destructive (White, 1967). Others point to ‘End Times thinking’ (dispensationalism) as 
an additional barrier to support for environmental policy (Guth et al., 1995). Presenting religious 
beliefs as the sole source of anti-environmental attitudes, however, seems too simplistic. 
Greeley (1993) and Schultz et al. (2000) argue that, while studies have indeed found a negative 
relation between Judeo-Christian beliefs and pro-environmental attitudes, this relation is often 
small and may be due to political and moral conservatism rather than religion itself. 
Nonetheless, different religious views do seem to be related to what type of concerns people 
hold. For example, Schultz et al. (2000) found that respondents who expressed more literal 
beliefs in the Bible scored lower on ecocentric environmental concerns, but higher on 
anthropocentric environmental concerns. No relation was found with self-reported pro-
environmental behaviour. These different bases for environmental concerns could however 
result in different views on both the nature of an environmental problem, as well as the 
desirability of various policy strategies to counter it. 
Considering the large influence of religion on public life in the United States, the strong focus 
on the ethical aspects of climate change in the religious debate, and the important choices that 
will need to be made in the coming years concerning international climate policy, it is interesting 
to explore the perceptions among religious groups on this issue. This study aims to provide an 
overview of the religious societal debate that is taking place among the US Judeo-Christian 
communities. What are their positions on climate change, what measures should (or should not) 
be taken to deal with it, and what moral and religious-ethical arguments form the foundations of 
these positions? Following from that, this paper presents some possible implications and 
lessons for policymaking. 
 
2. Structure and methodology 
 
Different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions: within a particular 
worldview, some forms of actions become natural whereas others become unthinkable 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Runhaar et al., 2006). This paper analyzes the views and 
positions of various religious groups on climate change and climate policy and the ways they 
give meaning to the issue. These matters are explored by means of argumentative discourse 
analysis (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995, 2005; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Majone, 
1981; Runhaar et al., 2006). Argumentative discourse analysis explores patterns in written or 
spoken statements and related practices in order to identify the representations of reality that 
are employed. It also explores the social-political practices from which social constructs emerge 
and in which the actors are engaged. The meaning of the scientific evidence in a given context 
is analyzed within the context of the particular social practices in which the discourse is 
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produced. In this paper, we employ the instrument of value mapping and argumentative analysis 
to analyze the discourses of interest. 
A Value Mapping and Argumentative Analysis (Fischer, 1995; Van der Sluijs et al., 2003) 
aims to analyze different positions in a debate in a structured way. Actors in a debate can agree 
or disagree on an issue on different levels. Four levels of agreement/disagreement are 
discerned: (1) the ideological view, (2) the problem setting and goal searching, (3) problem 
solving, and (4) outcomes and fairness. For each of these levels, the views and positions of 
actors are mapped and compared, i.e. whether there is agreement or disagreement, and why. 
The four levels form two themes: views on the problem (section 4) and views on the solutions 
(section 5), each with a fundamental and a practical layer (levels 1 and 4, and 2 and 3 
respectively). The ideological view is the deepest level where disagreement can occur and can 
lead to very different views of whether there is a problem or what it is. One can hold the view 
that a radically different ideological starting point is required. Ideological argumentation focuses 
typically on ideology and alternative societal orders. On the next level, problem setting and goal 
searching, groups may agree on the existence of a problem, but not on identifying precisely 
what the problem is, how to formulate it, and what the end goal or solution point should be. On 
the level of problem solving, groups may agree on the existence of a problem and further agree 
on policy goals but disagree on the strategies and instruments required to reach the goal. 
Problem solving argumentation typically focuses on effectiveness, side effects, and efficiency of 
methods. At the last level where disagreement can occur, outcomes and fairness, groups often 
care about the fairness of solutions to problems, but can hold different views on what constitutes 
fair outcomes. For example, one can hold the view that the policy at hand does not serve the 
public interest or public wellbeing. Fairness argumentation focuses typically on public interest, 
unexpected societal side effects, and distributive justice. 
This study centres on the societal debate on climate change among (Judeo-Christian) 
religious groups in the United States. It includes the recent discussions that have attracted 
widespread media coverage, as well as earlier and less visible initiatives. Broader issues, such 
as the debate in other countries, in other religions, general public perception, and general 
religious perceptions of ecology and nature (besides the views that were brought up in the 
discussion on climate change), are taken into account to a limited extent. These issues are used 
to position the debate in a broader context. The main scope of the study is an inventory of the 
various positions and arguments. An overview of the different stakeholders and institutional 
setting, and the extent and timing of the societal debate is also presented. The study does not 
assess the quality and scientific validity of the arguments and the processes and events that 
shape the debate. 
The field of study was initially explored by examining online news coverage on the recent 
statement of the Evangelical Climate Initiative, and later broadened. Sources were collected 
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using internet search and snowball sampling, and include opinion documents, press releases, 
website statements and frequently asked question sections, speeches, blogs, and online 
newspaper articles. These documents originate from religious groups/churches, associations 
and umbrella organizations of such groups, religious environmental groups and platforms, and 
individual leaders. Sources were selected based on their accessibility, relevance, and coverage 
of opinions, religious groups, and topics within the debate. In total, approximately 100 
documents have been selected and analyzed. The study is part of a large project on 
‘Technology and Religion’ by the Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends (STT), for 
which an essay was written as a primer on the topic for an interested general public (Wardekker 
and Petersen, 2008). Therefore, public accessibility was an important criterion. 
 
3. Participants in the religious climate debate 
 
The recent call by the Evangelical Climate Initiative (ECI) does not stand alone, and is not 
the first of its kind either. Similar calls and statements concerning climate change can be found 
originating from various Christian traditions in the United States, such as Evangelicals, Baptists, 
Catholics, Quakers, and umbrella organizations of multiple denominations, dating back to the 
early 90s (Wardekker and Petersen, 2008). Knickerbocker (1998) already describes a ‘growing 
trend among faith groups to emphasize the environment’, but apparently these initiatives never 
received much media attention (Hogue, 2007), at least until the recent revival of the debate. The 
majority of public statements originate from national associations of churches (e.g. the US 
Conference of Catholic Bishops) and national topical religious networks (e.g. the Evangelical 
Environmental Network). Media articles often quote the opinions of individual leaders in their 
own right (though their affiliation is usually mentioned). Regional associations and individual 
churches provide material as well. Besides calls for stricter climate policy, some other initiatives 
can be found that criticize these proposals. E.g. the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance (ISA) has 
published a response to ECI’s ‘Call to Action’ (ISA, 2007). This counter-movement consists 
mainly of topical groups and individual leaders, usually connected to conservative religious 
organizations. It is however interesting to note that the evangelical proponents of stricter 
environmental policy also present themselves as ‘biblically orthodox’ (EEN, 2007) and 
religiously/politically conservative in general, apparently in response to ‘identity framing’ 
attempts describing (religious) environmentalism as spiritualistic and drawing connections with 
liberalism, ‘new age’ like ideas, or even nature worship (see e.g. EEN, 2007; Ekklesia, 2006; 
Hagerty, 2006; Harden, 2005; Sirico, 1997) (it should be noted that religiously inspired 
opponents of strict policy face similar identity framing attempts, referring to them as fanatics). 
Climate change is also an issue in other arenas besides that of US Christian groups. Similar 
initiatives can be found in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia and The 
Netherlands, as well as on an international level, most notably from the World Council of 
  
58 
Churches. It appears however, that there is not as much of an open debate between groups of 
religiously inspired proponents and opponents of strict climate policy, as is the case in the 
United States. Opinion pieces can be found from many other religions as well, e.g. Judaism, 
Islam, and indigenous religions. In the recent US debate, Jewish groups/leaders often 
cooperate with the Christians. And finally, climate change has been an issue in the ‘general’ 
public debate, i.e. general public opinion (which includes religious views), for many years. 
These other arenas are occasionally referred to in this paper to provide context. 
 
4. Views on the problem 
 
A considerable portion of the debate on climate change among religious groups in the United 
States deals with whether the issue is a problem, what the problem is exactly, and what goals 
should be set for the future. Differences in opinion range from more practical matters such as 
which aspects of climate change and climate policy are considered important, to fundamental 
matters such as the world we would want to live in and how it should be managed. 
Most opinion documents that plea for stricter climate policy start with the statement that there 
is a scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, emphasizing certainty. A few 
sources treat uncertainties in a more open manner (e.g. USCCB, 2001). Furthermore, the 
consequences will be large and negative. Opponents of strict policy emphasize uncertainty, or 
sometimes claim certainty for the opposite. They see no consensus, only a limited and natural 
climatic change, and limited and not only negative consequences. Both parties refer to scientific 
reports, institutes, and (religious) scientists whom they consider reliable. In the recent debate, 
both groups have also actively formed coalitions with those scientists (e.g. Beisner et al., 2006; 
Harvard-CHGE and NAE, 2007; NAE, 2007; Spencer et al., 2005). 
 
4.1. Ideological view 
 
One of the most fundamental aspects of the debate on climate change among religious 
groups becomes apparent when examining their perspectives on why changing the climate 
through human activities is (or is not) morally unacceptable. The Evangelical Climate Initiative’s 
‘Call to Action’ states: ‘This is God’s world and damage we do to God’s world is an offence 
against God Himself’. This opinion is connected with the commandment to ‘love God and love 
what God loves’ (ECI, 2006), gratitude for the gift of creation and passing this gift on to future 
generations. Most sources mention generically damage to the world, nature, or the natural 
system. A few others more specifically mention destruction of habitats, vanishing of species or 
ecosystems, and decline in biodiversity. These issues concerning the impacts of climate change 
on nature relate to the concept of ‘stewardship’, which is prevalent in all of the large 
monotheistic religions: mankind has the role to look after the wellbeing of the natural world. In 
the religious debate, care for the environment or climate is often referred to as ‘creation care’ or 
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‘environmental/climate stewardship’, avoiding the negative connotations that many evangelicals 
have with ‘environmentalism’ (e.g. Hedman in Harden, 2005; The Economist, 2007c). Both 
proponents and opponents of strict climate policy use and value this concept; both groups 
regard God as the owner of the world and mankind as a steward with the task to take care of 
nature. They also use similar imagery, describing the world as ‘God’s garden’. 
While they use strikingly similar concepts and imagery, the interpretation of these concepts 
and images is very different, however. ECI’s ‘Call to Action’ and similar initiatives argue that 
God created the earth as ‘good’ and that it is mankind’s task to preserve ‘God’s good garden’ 
(EEN, 1994), here referring to the wilderness. In contrast, their critics argue that mankind’s task 
is to ‘fill and subdue the earth’ and to ‘turn the wilderness into a garden’ (Spencer et al., 2005), 
referring to a more ‘landscaped’ view of this garden. There are considerable differences in 
opinion on the relationships and roles of mankind, God, and nature. Opponents of strict policy 
tend to place mankind above nature and see nature’s role more as something to serve mankind. 
While mankind should take care of nature, ‘human beings come first in God's created order … 
And that primacy must be given to human beings and for human betterment’ (Land in Hagerty, 
2006). Their discourses place mankind as a ‘co-creator’ and relate to human development and 
population growth as a blessing and mission rather than a threat. They argue that God would 
not have created nature so fragile that mankind could easily destroy it, and that God would not 
have intended healthy nature and human development to be incompatible. Proponents of strict 
policy on the other hand emphasize mankind’s interdependence with nature, warning that the 
natural balance is threatened, and they see mankind as part of nature (reminiscent of many 
indigenous religions and eastern traditions, but similar thoughts are also expressed from e.g. 
Islam). Following this line of reasoning, some also relate protecting nature to the commandment 
to love one another: ‘We must see the whole creation as our neighbor.’ (ABC, 1991). Some 
discourses focus on development, overconsumption and wasting of resources as a threat to 
creation; one author even refers to this as ‘decreation’ (McKibben, 1999). Others express a 
more hopeful vision, posing (like their critics) that development and preserving nature are not 
incompatible, which is presented as a hope and incentive to improve. 
 
4.2. Problem setting and goal searching 
 
The religious deliberations frame climate change predominantly as a moral and religious-
ethical issue. Three specific ethical themes are in the forefront of the discussion: the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change on nature (as described above), the implications for future 
generations (intergenerational equity), and the implications for the poor. The latter issue – 
impacts of climate change on the poor – is the most prominent moral theme in the religious 
debate. It is usually referred to as ‘environmental justice’, a matter of social justice. In general 
public perception, moral issues are highly important as well (Kempton, 1991; Jaeger et al., 
  
60 
2000; Wardekker, 2004), and all three themes can be found in perception studies (see also e.g. 
Kempton, 1997; Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). However, unlike in the 
religious discourses, the care for future generations seems to be the most prominent factor 
(Kempton, 1991) (as is also apparent in ‘An Inconvenient Truth’; Wardekker, 2007). The 
religious sources mention a host of effects that could be negative for humans (the poor and 
future generations), such as droughts, floods, heat waves, decline in food production, more 
intense hurricanes, famine, spreading of diseases, more environmental victims and refugees, 
and increased risk of violent conflict. Some sources also specifically mention negative effects in 
the United States, e.g. damage and victims due to natural disasters and national security risks 
due to increases in environmental refugees and conflicts elsewhere. 
Effects of climate change on the poor are considered a problem because, as the ‘Call to 
Action’ states: ‘we are called to love our neighbors, to do unto others as we would have them do 
unto us, and to protect and care for the least of these’ (ECI, 2006). Most sources use the term 
‘the poor’ in a generic way. Often, it seems to be applied to the poor in developing nations (i.e. 
relating to interregional equity), but sometimes it refers to the poor in the United States as well. 
Impacts of climate change on developing nations are seen as morally unacceptable, for two 
reasons. Firstly, the developing nations are harmed, and receive the most severe impacts, 
through a problem that up till now is caused mostly by the developed nations (‘do unto 
others…’), appealing not only to harming others, but even stronger, to ‘the rich’ harming ‘the 
poor’. An occasional source adds to this that this harm is done in the process of becoming even 
richer. Secondly, the statements remark that the developing nations are also the most 
vulnerable, and the least able to adapt to climate change. The vulnerability argument is also 
used in reference to the poor in the United States itself. Implications for future generations are 
seen as reason for concern, as the choices made today determine the world they will live in. 
Their chances should not be diminished, and the gift of creation should be passed on. 
Opponents of strict climate policy are present at this level of the debate only to a minor extent. 
They share the concerns for the poor (and future generations) with proponents of strict policy, 
but doubt that anthropogenic climate change will pose a significant threat. For as far as there is 
a problem, that problem is a lack of development, not the impacts of climate change. Developed 
nations, they state, are better able to adapt to climatic changes and weather extremes, and 
have more money to spend on the environment as well. The goals of proponents and 
opponents are very different: one group aims to limit anthropogenic climate change and 
therefore its impacts, and the other group aims to improve development and therefore increase 
societies’ resilience. 
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Figure 1. Examples of religious opinions on climate change. 
 
5. Views on the solutions 
 
The second theme of the debate on climate change among religious groups in the United 
States is how to cope with the issue. As with views on the problem, this question involves both 
practical matters, such as which policy strategies are deemed useful, as well as more 
fundamental matters, such as the fairness of these policy strategies and how society in general 
should respond to climate change. 
 
5.1. Problem solving 
 
The ‘Call to Action’ and many other sources start their discourse on the solutions with the 
statement that action is urgent, because impacts already occur and because choices made 
today fix emissions for some time due to the long life expectancies of technologies. They 
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present ‘packages’ of policy options, ranging from government regulations, and technological 
innovation, to adaptation, and behavioural changes. 
Many sources, especially opinion documents, press releases, and newspaper articles, 
present generic ideas, such as energy efficiency, energy from renewable sources, technologies 
that emit little CO2, and hybrid vehicles (the latter being a more specific idea that seems 
popular). Other sources, often more educational documents aimed at their own communities, 
mention more specific options and present ‘tips’ and ‘success stories’ of e.g. companies, 
churches, and individuals. With regard to options for governmental action, the recent initiatives 
mainly point to ‘market based cost-effective mechanisms’ such as ‘cap-and-trade’. The ‘Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act’ (most recently: Lieberman et al., 2007) by Senators McCain 
and Lieberman in particular is mentioned as a useful and important option. It reduces emissions 
through ‘a business-friendly cap-and-trade program that would spur investments in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, making our U.S. economy more efficient and reducing our 
dependence on foreign sources of energy’ (EEN, 2005). 
Religious communities see an active role for themselves as well. National and regional topical 
networks and church associations organize public campaigns, e.g. by releasing statements and 
attracting media attention and by developing commercials, and influence other actors by 
lobbying among companies and politicians, for example. They also prepare and distribute 
informational and educational materials on climate change and energy saving to local churches, 
so they can educate themselves and their members, and urge churches and religious leaders to 
set a good example. News articles and information documents note that (at least some) local 
churches have indeed taken this role upon themselves. E.g., the Maine Council of Churches 
notes: ‘Churches across the state have stepped up to the challenge, carrying out energy audits, 
organizing special workshops and programs of worship focused on climate change, pledging to 
reduce their own contributions to global warming and making known their concerns to elected 
officials and the general public through letters, meetings, and articles in the media.’ (MCC, 
2007). Other interesting examples are the ‘What Would Jesus Drive?’ campaign, shareholders 
initiative ‘Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility’, and ‘The Regeneration Project’ with the 
‘Interfaith Power and Light’ campaign with many religious green energy suppliers in multiple 
states (see e.g. Stults, 2006). Opponents of strict policy reject most policy proposals. The best 
way to cope with climate change, they suggest, is to decrease vulnerability through adaptation, 
economic development, and if emissions need to be reduced, through technological innovation.  
  
5.2. Outcomes and fairness 
 
The critics of the recent evangelical initiative strongly oppose drastic steps to prevent/limit 
further climate change, also from the point of view of concern for the poor. These efforts are 
largely futile, costly, and divert resources from more beneficial uses. In addition, they argue that 
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strict climate policy will be very harmful for the poor, both in the US and in developing countries. 
Proponents of strict policy share these concerns, at least to some extent. 
Opponents of strict policy note that they have the same motive for action (concern for the 
fate of the poor) and recognize the other religious initiatives as ‘well-intended’. However, they 
state that ‘It matters little how well we mean, if what we do actually harms those we intend to 
help.’ (ISA, 2007). They argue that limiting greenhouse gas emissions, and reducing energy 
consumption to reach that goal, would require significantly increasing the costs of energy. This 
would slow economic growth and would also result in increasing prices for other goods and 
services, including basic necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, and heating/cooling. 
Furthermore, they pose that a call for strict policy (such as ECI’s ‘Call to Action’) ‘asks the poor 
to give up or at least postpone their claims to modern technology that is essential for a better 
future for themselves and their children’ (Beisner et al., 2006: 14) by resisting the growing use of 
cheap (fossil) energy and, in general, dealing with developing nations through a form of ‘eco-
imperialism’. While the wealthy can afford such things, the burden would be borne most heavily 
by the poor. In the United States itself, their situation would worsen due to increased costs of 
living on an already limited budget, loss of jobs due to economic downturn, and limitations in 
using energy for essential things such as heating and air-conditioning (which would reduce their 
resilience against weather extremes). In developing nations, the poor would be harmed by a 
less healthy world economy and reduced availability of cheap, reliable energy sources. Their 
opinions on what could be done to responsibly cope with climate change vary from not 
obstructing economic growth, by keeping energy inexpensive, and adaptation strategies ‘for 
whatever slight warming does occur’ (ISA, 2006), to stimulating economic growth and innovation 
by promoting sustainable and efficient technologies. ‘By exporting advanced technologies, 
developed nations would improve their environmental quality and enable their people to become 
wealthier, healthier and safer’ (Spencer et al., 2005). Interestingly, the proponents of strict policy 
share these concerns. E.g.: ‘Developing nations have a right to economic development that can 
help lift people out of dire poverty’ (USCCB, 2001), and ‘We must make a distinction between 
the ‘luxury emissions of the rich’ and the ‘survival emissions of the poor’’ (Hallman, 2005). They 
place the responsibility for preventing/limiting further climate change with the developed nations, 
and suggest limiting the environmental impacts of development – as did the opponents of strict 
policy - by sharing advanced technologies with the developing nations. Several sources also 
state that the rich have the responsibility (both on a social and individual level; ECI, 2006) to 
assist the poor in adapting to climate change. In the US opinion documents, this policy option 
does not take the foreground, but the notion is supported. On the international level, the World 
Council of Churches gives considerable attention to adaptation (see e.g. Robra, 2006). Few 
sources calling for strict policy specifically deal with the consequences of climate policy for the 
poor in the United States itself, although they are optimistic on the economic effects of policy 
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and sustainable technology. One source (QEW, 2007) does suggest increasing funds for the 
Low Income Energy Assistance Program. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The issue of climate change is receiving an increasing amount of attention within religious 
communities in the United States and in the rest of the world. The Evangelical Climate 
Initiative’s (ECI) ‘Call to Action’ and its follow-ups are recent examples, and have attracted 
considerable attention in the media. Calls to politics to take more notice of the issue originate 
from a multitude of religious convictions and movements. Some opposition to these initiatives 
exist as well. In the US, several Jewish-Christian groups have organized a counter-initiative to 
ECI, criticizing its views on climate change and climate policy. 
The present study analyzed this debate by looking at published sources, focusing on Judeo-
Christian groups in the United States. This limits the analysis mostly to the statements of 
religious leaders and figureheads on the topics of environment and climate change. An 
interesting question, however, would be to what extent these views are actually supported by 
their congregations. E.g. do the same perceptions of the issues of climate change and climate 
policy live in the religious community as a whole, how large is the group of religiously inspired 
proponents of strict policy, are there differences in perception between demographical groups 
(e.g. between urban and rural believers, the latter of whom may already have some type of land 
ethic), and how do they apply their beliefs in their daily lives? Surveys cited by several sources 
(e.g. EEN, 2005) show support for climate policy in the religious community, but these are fairly 
generic. Furthermore, do the awareness raising activities of churches (e.g. being an example, 
educational activities, etc.) actually result in behavioural changes, and to what extent has this 
religious debate permeated into entrepreneurial and policy communities? It would also be 
interesting to study perceptions in other countries and other religions. While no organized 
religiously inspired opposition to strict policy was found on the international level and a number 
of other countries that were briefly examined (and this finding was confirmed by other 
participants in the STT project), that does not mean that such opposition does not exist. 
Furthermore, how do religious communities in developing and newly industrialized countries, 
e.g. in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, perceive climate change and attempts to solve this issue 
(such as climate impacts, biofuel production/plantations, and development in these countries)? 
The perceptions on climate change among religions such as Islam (especially regarding its 
large influence in Asia and Africa, and increasing influence in Europe as well) and Hinduism 
(especially regarding its large influence in growing economies such as India) would be most 
interesting to study further as well. Harvard University’s Forum on Religion and Ecology has 
performed similar studies on several religions regarding ecology in general in the past. 
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Religious groups in the United States frame the discussion on climate change and climate 
policy mainly as an ethical issue. Three specific ethical themes are at the forefront of the 
debate: the effects of anthropogenic climate change on nature (creation care, or 
environmental/climate stewardship), the implications for future generations (care for one’s 
children; intergenerational equity), and the implications for the poor (environmental justice; 
interregional equity among other things). The implications of climate change – and climate 
policy – for the poor is the dominant theme. Proponents and opponents of strict policy employ 
the same concepts, images and motives in their discourses, but have very different 
interpretations of these things. Concerning the effects on nature, proponents state that God 
created the earth as ‘good’, and that mankind is part of nature and has the task to preserve this 
‘garden of God’. Climate change threatens creation and is therefore morally unacceptable. 
Opponents of strict policy place nature in a more serving position to mankind, who has the task 
to turn the earth into a ‘garden’. Concerning implications for the poor, proponents of strict policy 
argue that the poor (particularly in developing countries) will face the most severe impacts of a 
problem that the rich have created, while they are the most vulnerable and least able to adapt. 
Developed nations have the moral duty to prevent this. They suggest various policy strategies, 
ranging from regulations to technology, adaptation and behavioural change. Recent initiatives 
favour cap-and-trade schemes in particular. Religious communities take an active role, by 
setting an example, educating their members and lobbying. Their critics however are concerned 
about possible negative effects of climate policy on the poor, both in developing nations and in 
the United States. They fear that the poor will have to bear the heaviest burden of such policies 
and press for increased resilience through economic (and technological) development instead. 
Proponents of strict policy share these concerns to some extent, and clearly place the 
responsibility for action with the developed world. A robust policy strategy (regarding support in 
the US religious community) would have to pay careful attention to the effects of both climate 
change and climate policy on the poor in developing countries and the United States itself. 
While it remains to be seen what effects this religious debate will have on US climate policy, 
several aspects make it very interesting. Firstly, the recent initiatives are attracting attention in 
the media and among scientists, corporations, NGOs, et cetera; secondly, these initiatives do 
not stand alone; and thirdly, they are actively forming coalitions with these other parties. Calls 
for more strict policy emerge from many other sectors of society, ranging from politics to 
corporations, farmers, and ‘security hawks’ (The Economist, 2007a,b). Coalitions are formed, 
including between ‘unlikely’ partners (e.g. joint media campaigns by evangelicals, Fortune 500 
companies, and environmental movement; Gunther, 2006). As such, the religious initiatives 
should not be seen in isolation, but as part as a larger societal debate on climate change, which 
could lead to greater pressure to participate in international climate policy. And fourthly, religious 
environmental initiatives seem to be making environmental care accessible to the conservative 
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side of the political spectrum. Where the conventional environmental movement is highly 
distrusted among evangelicals/conservatives, these church based initiatives seem to take upon 
themselves roles similar to environmental groups. 
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Framing climate change in Montreal 2005: 
An environmental justice perspective 
 
Mirja Vihersalo 
 
Abstract 
This paper is based on my Master’s thesis where I discuss climate politics from the 
perspective of international environmental justice. I examine how climate change is framed as a 
problem from the point of view of responsibility in the political statements of the Montreal Climate 
Conference in 2005. I analyse the research data with the help of frame analysis and Perelman’s 
theory of argumentation thus looking for argumentation concerning responsibility, its underlying 
premises and techniques of argumentation. The results suggest that climate change is framed as 
a problem in two different ways. In some statements (mainly from developed countries) climate 
change is considered as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Here, describing climate 
change as a treatable global problem and highlighting economic aspects is typical. In other 
statements (mainly from developing countries) climate change is represented as a problem of 
vulnerability and scarce resources. The perspective is local and statements emphasise climate 
change as a threat to the development efforts of these countries. The premises and techniques of 
argumentation differ between frames. In addition, there is struggle within frames; both frames 
encompass different claims about how responsibility should be distributed and what responsibility 
includes. 
 
Keywords: environmental justice, responsibility, climate politics, Montreal Climate Conference, 
framing, rhetorical analysis  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last few decades a vast scientific and economic literature on climate change has 
emerged but surprisingly little has been written on ethical dimensions (Brown, 2003: 229). This 
has also been the case in the Finnish policy and newspaper discussions which have 
concentrated on the physical and economic aspects of climate change and policies. Yet, as 
Brown (2003: 229) points out ’because human-induced climate change will most hurt the poorest 
on the planet, seriously reduce the quality of life for future generations, and threaten plants and 
animals around the world, global warming must be understood to raise very serious and deep 
ethical questions‘. In this paper, which is based on my Master’s thesis, I discuss climate change 
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and politics from the perspective of environmental justice, which as a broad concept directs 
attention to how environmental benefits and burdens are distributed among currently living 
people, among current and future people and among human beings and non-human nature, as 
well as how their views are taken into account in environmental decision-making. I highlight some 
aspects of environmental justice more by focusing on one theme in the politics of climate change 
in particular, namely on responsibility. In addition, I concentrate on the international dimension 
and distributive justice. Internationally climate change is governed through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and through its legally binding 
amendment, the Kyoto Protocol. States negotiate these treaties and the future direction of 
international climate politics in annual Conferences of Parties, where states that have ratified the 
Convention or Protocol are represented by their delegations. In this paper environmental justice is 
examined through the Conference of Parties held in Montreal in 2005. The Conference was 
significant and historical because in addition to being the eleventh Conference of Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change it also served as the first Meeting of 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol since it came into force in 16 February 2005. It was one of the most 
productive conferences as well, and the largest intergovernmental climate conference since the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 with some 10000 participants.  
As a whole the perspective of my research towards climate politics is a cultural political one. 
Hajer (1996: 256) speaks of the cultural political approach as a way to ask ’what sort of society is 
being created in the name of protecting nature‘. In other words, environmental policies and 
discourses also have broader cultural implications. Hence, in this research the perspective directs 
attention to the ways of speaking about climate change; how it is defined and framed as a 
problem but also what perspectives of social reality are connected to these definitions (see Haila 
and Jokinen, 2001: 280). Therefore one purpose is to reveal premises and commitments which 
operate so that some issues and scenarios seem relevant while alternative scenarios are 
excluded. A central question in the cultural political approach according to Haila and Jokinen 
(2001: 281) is also the relation of environmental politics between social and political inequalities. 
 
2. Environmental justice, responsibility and climate politics 
 
2.1. Environmental justice and responsibility 
 
Environmental justice encompasses various different issues. Cases of environmental 
injustices can be seen everywhere; in the local struggles between forestry and other livelihoods in 
Finland, in the export of toxic wastes from developed nations to developing as well as in the 
causes and consequences of climate change. The term ‘environmental justice’ has its origins in 
the environmental justice movement developed in the USA, which attracted attention to the 
connection between race and exposure to environmental risks. The environmental justice 
movement has broadened to address global issues as well. These range from the exploitation of 
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commons resources in developing countries to the shifting of environmental pollution from 
developed to developing countries (Byrne et al., 2002: 8-9). International environmental justice 
relates mostly to the relationship between developed and developing countries, which has been 
uneven and imbalanced. Global environmental problems such as climate change, ozone 
depletion and declining biodiversity have further emphasised the need to focus on the 
international dimension of environmental justice (Byrne et al., 2002: 9).  
Evidently, the notion of environmental justice has been used to advocate various different 
issues. I follow the suggestion of Ikeme (2003: 200) to consider environmental justice as ’the 
broad, overarching concept encompassing all justice issues in environmental decision-making‘. 
As a theoretical framework I consider environmental justice to encompass distributive and 
procedural dimensions (see Anand, 2004; Ikeme, 2003; Paavola, 2005, Paavola and Adger, 
2006) as well as three justice relations or specific issues of justice (see Lehtinen, 2003; Sajama 
2003; Sachs and Santarius, 2007). The distributive dimension refers to the distribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens (see Anand, 2004; Ikeme, 2003) or to the beneficial and 
adverse effects of environmental decisions or action (Paavola 2005: 312). The procedural 
dimension, on the other hand, refers to participation, being able to influence the decision-making 
process (Ikeme, 2003: 197-200), and recognition (see Schlosberg, 2004). In other words, the 
distributive dimension is concerned with outcomes while the procedural dimension is concerned 
with the way the outcome is attained. The justice relations, on the other hand, refer to the 
question about community of justice (see Dobson, 1998); among whom environmental benefits 
and burdens are divided and who are taken into account in procedures. The three justice 
relations are: the relation between all the human beings in the world living today (intra-
generational justice), the relation between current and future (as well as precedent) human 
beings (intergenerational justice), and finally the relation between human beings and rest of the 
nature (biosphere justice) (see Lehtinen, 2003; Sajama, 2003; Sachs and Santarius, 2007).  
In this paper I focus on the distributive dimension and the intra-generational aspects, and 
more specifically on international issues within climate politics. I examine environmental justice 
through the content of responsibility and the distribution of responsibility between states. Justice 
is thus considered as ‘the fair distribution of rights and duties’ (Björn, 2003: 24 - translated): 
justice means that duties or responsibilities are to be divided between parties fairly. But what 
does responsibility actually mean? One way to define responsibility is ‘the actor’s power to 
influence something so that the activity promotes, maintains or violates some values or 
objectives’ (Raitio and Rytteri, 2005: 119). Responsibility can be divided in terms of the dimension 
of time. Birnbacher (2000: 9-10) distinguishes between ex post and ex ante responsibility; the 
former is retrospective and refers to answerability of an act or default in the past, whereas the 
latter is future oriented and refers to obligations and duties. Both aspects are present in climate 
politics.  
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2.2. Politics of climate change and environmental justice – distributive justice issues  
 
The distributive dimension of international environmental justice draws attention to the causes 
and consequences of climate change as well as to mitigation and adaptation policies.  
 
Causes and consequences of climate change 
The justice concerns within the causes of climate change refer to the question ‘who have 
caused the problem?’ because countries do not release the same amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions to the atmosphere (Sachs and Santarius, 2007: 183). As Adger (2004: 1712) sees it, 
‘climate change is a fundamentally unjust burden, an externality from past and present polluters 
that use the global atmosphere as an open-access resource’. That is, certain countries, 
businesses and people have contributed to climate change historically as well as at present more 
than others. In addition, greenhouse gas emissions (at least carbon dioxide emissions) correlate 
closely with income levels (IPCC, 2001b: 87) and thus considerable emissions mean 
considerable economic benefits. Internationally compared, in the year 2004 the Annex I countries 
of the UNFCCC accounted for 46% of global greenhouse gas emissions while their population 
accounted only for 20% of the world population (IPCC, 2007b: 3). In addition, UNEP has 
estimated (in Sachs et al., 1998: 72) that between 1800 and 1988 developed countries have 
produced over 80% of the global increase in the atmospheric carbon dioxide. The intra-
generational perspective raises the question whether the atmosphere is considered as a global 
resource; are everyone equally entitled to it? The intergenerational perspective, on the other 
hand, makes one to consider the rights of future generations to a healthy atmosphere and 
environment, but also to ask whether the current generations can be held responsible for the 
activities of the past generations.  
The positive and negative impacts of climate change – ecological, economic, social, cultural, 
etc. – also raise questions of justice as the distribution of the projected impacts of climate change 
will not be even. In addition, the way climate change affects countries is at variance with their 
historical responsibility for these impacts (Ikeme, 2003: 200). Reasons to the uneven distribution 
are the present climate or location of countries as well as their relative wealth and level of 
economic and technological development – rich and technologically advanced countries have 
more capacity to anticipate and to adapt to changes (Pittock, 2005: 120-121). The most 
vulnerable regions with low adaptive capacity of human systems are Africa, developing countries 
of Asia, Latin America, and small island states (IPCC, 2001a: 14-17). Economically speaking, 
impacts will be negative in many developing countries while many developed countries will have 
both economic gains and losses up to a temperature increase of a few degrees Celsius; this will 
increase the disparity in well-being between these countries (IPCC, 2001a: 8). Climate change 
also has ecological impacts. Some species may benefit from climate change and their abundance 
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or range may increase, but some species will suffer as climate change increases the risk of 
extinction of some species and loss of biodiversity (IPCC, 2001a: 4-5). 
Questions of justice related to the impacts, adaptation and mitigation of climate change are 
closely connected. An important question is how much warming and how vast impacts will be 
allowed. The UNFCCC gives an answer to this; the ultimate objective of the Convention is to 
stabilise ‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.’ (UN/FCCC, 1992: 4) But how effectively will climate change be dealt with 
and how fast will greenhouse gas emissions be reduced? 
 
Mitigation and adaptation 
Climate change mitigation is negotiated and regulated within the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. Currently the developing or non-Annex I countries do not have emission reduction 
obligations, whereas the developed or Annex I countries that have ratified the Protocol have 
agreed to binding emission reductions in the period 2008-2012. However, at some point 
aggregate emission reductions will be needed as the emission reductions of 1.3 billion people in 
Annex I countries may become inadequate compared to the growing emissions from 4.7 billion 
people in non-Annex I countries (IPCC 2001b, 89). How, then, should the burden of mitigation be 
divided? What would be a just distribution of the atmosphere if the world’s absorbing capacity will 
be taken as the upper limit of greenhouse gas emissions? Thompson and Rayner (1998: 318) 
discuss three basic ethical positions on distributive issues: 1) egalitarian, 2) contractarian, and 3) 
libertarian. The egalitarian perspective relies on parity; equal shares to all – also in the case of 
emission rights. Thus the emission permits would be allocated on a per capita basis, and the 
common suggestions are contemporary and historical per capita allocations. The contractarian 
perspective is based on proportionality where benefits are allocated according to, for instance, 
contribution or need. Emission rights allocation suggestions are some kind of combinations, for 
example combining population size, GDP and current emissions. The libertarian view calls for 
allocation based on priority through successful competition. In climate politics this would mean 
allocating emission rights on the basis of countries’ GDP or in proportion to their current 
emissions; historic emissions would not be added in. Allocation according to this view takes place 
through markets by preference or the ability to pay. 
According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report some warming and impacts will inevitably 
take place in the future (IPCC, 2007a) and therefore some adaptation will be necessary. The 
distributive justice implications of adaptation refer to the adaptive responses producing certain 
positive and negative effects as well as to the scale and distribution of residual climate change 
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impacts (Paavola and Adger 2006, 597). Here, the main distributive justice dilemmas according to 
Paavola and Adger (2006, 595 and 597) are the responsibility of developed countries to climate 
change due to their greenhouse gas emissions, the amount of assistance the developed 
countries should give to the adaptation of developing countries, the distribution of burden of 
assistance among developed countries, and the distribution of assistance between recipient 
countries as well as between adaptation measures. 
 
2.3. Responsibility within climate politics  
 
Responsibility is a concept and a theme often discussed in the literature about justice in the 
politics of climate change and it is regarded as an important aspect when considering measures 
against climate change. Ikeme (2003: 200), for instance, sees the distribution of responsibility as 
a major environmental justice issue in the climate change debate. He does not, however, specify 
the meaning of responsibility. Responsibility is usually mentioned when discussing historic 
emissions. For example, Gardiner (2004: 583) discusses responsibility for past emissions and 
sees it as a justice issue of practical and theoretical importance. Paavola and Adger (2006: 595) 
and Paavola (2005: 310) consider the question of the responsibility of developed countries for 
climate change impacts as one of the main justice dilemmas in terms of adaptation to climate 
change. Adger (2001: 923-924), too, discusses responsibility in this historic sense, but also in 
relation to current and future activities. He argues that ‘Justice within mitigation issues surrounds 
both the historical responsibility for enhancing atmospheric concentrations of the main 
greenhouse gases and in allocating present and future responsibility for action’ (2001: 923). 
Distribution of burdens in managing climate change encompasses, for instance, emission 
reductions (Tóth, 1999: 2). Responsibility is thus something to be shared in relation to current and 
future mitigation and adaptation policies.  
 
2.4. Framing climate change  
 
How has climate change been constructed and framed as a problem at the international level? 
And how are countries disposed towards climate change and the justice questions it raises? 
In his dissertation, Tirkkonen (2000) discusses discourses within climate politics. According to 
him (2000: 14-15), the hegemonic climate discourse is based on scientific knowledge about 
climate change and its management through international environmental politics. Tirkkonen 
identifies several linkages between the hegemonic climate discourse and ecological 
modernisation. These are, for instance, the preventive aspects in climate politics, international 
management of the problem, market centricity and the idea of combining both environmental 
protection and economy, known as the idea of a positive sum-game (2000: 203-4). Ecological 
modernisation has become a widespread western environmental discourse (Laine and Jokinen, 
2001: 64). In addition to the hegemonic climate discourse, there are also counter and alternative 
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discourses. The counter discourses in climate politics are: 1) structural discourse which discusses 
climate change as a deeper global political, moral, economic, and cultural crisis (Wynne, 1994 in 
Tirkkonen, 2000: 15), and 2) adaptation discourse which emphasises the need to face climate 
change impacts. Both of these discourses are constructed from the premises of the hegemonic 
discourse but they question the measures the hegemonic discourse promotes. Instead, the 
structural discourse would primarily aim at reconstructing unjust economic structures and 
supporting developing countries, whereas the adaptation discourse would allocate resources to 
adaptation in order to avoid impacts. In addition, there are two alternative discourses, that is 
discourses that are not dependent on the framework of the hegemonic discourse. The first one 
questions the foundations of the hegemonic discourse, either climate change itself as a 
phenomenon or the grounds of international climate politics, or both. Another alternative 
discourse frames the concern about climate change as solely power politics or competition on 
research financing. Tirkkonen maintains that the hegemonic discourse and its counter discourses 
have grown more powerful, whereas the alternative discourses have become more marginalised 
(2000: 13-15).  
What about the perspectives of countries towards justice and responsibility in the politics of 
climate change, how do they, then address these questions? Ikeme (2003: 200) discusses 
environmental justice conceptions of the South and the North that he has identified by a literature 
survey and argues that their ideas about environmental justice differ. According to him (2003: 
200), the developed countries focus on the ‘most economically efficient path for minimising 
climate impact and delivering global ecological health and stability’; emissions are reduced where 
it is most cost effective and where there are greatest emission reduction opportunities. This also 
means that the developed countries accept that in terms of costs they should bear greater burden 
than the poor countries, and that giving resources to the developing countries is accepted, not 
because of historic emissions, but because of an ethical duty to help the poor, a sense of charity. 
They put little emphasis on historic emissions and their constraints on the development of 
developing countries. The developing countries, on the other hand, concentrate on three notions. 
Firstly, they seek compensatory justice; historical emissions should be taken into account in 
addressing present entitlements. Secondly, developing countries support the idea of burden 
sharing based on equal per capita entitlements and thirdly, they also stress procedural justice 
issues; increased participation in the climate change negotiations. The developed and developing 
countries thus agree that the developed countries should bear a greater burden for climate 
protection and that transfer of resources should be allowed to the developing countries although 
they base their conceptions on distinct reasons and moral positions (Ikeme, 2003: 200- 203).  
 
 
 
 
  
41 
3. Research design, data and methods 
 
The general purpose of my Master’s thesis is to examine climate politics from an 
environmental justice perspective. In the empirical part I focus on distributive dimension and intra-
generational aspects within environmental justice, and more specifically on responsibility from an 
international viewpoint. My research problem is the following: How is climate change framed as a 
problem from the point of view of responsibility in the political statements of the Montreal Climate 
Conference in 2005? This is divided into three research questions:  
 
1) How do different parties perceive the content and distribution of responsibility in 
climate politics in the statements presented in the Montreal Climate Conference? 
2) What are the premises underlying these conceptions? 
3) What rhetorical techniques are applied to representing and explaining responsibility 
in climate politics? 
 
In this paper, I concentrate mainly on the research problem. Figure 1 illustrates the research 
design in my thesis.  
 
Figure 1. Research design 
 
 
3.1. Research data and data collection 
 
The research data consists of all the political statements made by Ministers and heads of 
delegation in the high-level segment of the Montreal Climate Conference in 7-9 December 2005. 
There are 120 statements in total, comprising statements on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, 
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the European Union, the Least Developed Countries, the Alliance of Small Island States, and on 
behalf of the Annex I parties to the Convention that are member states and observer states of the 
Arctic Council; and 115 individual statements from states that are parties to the either the 
Convention or both the Convention and the Protocol (81 states). Most of the statements – 81 of 
them – were from states belonging to non-Annex I parties while 39 statements were from Annex I 
parties. The statements made by states present the official view and position of the country and 
thus exclude the diverse voices of, for example, individuals, non-governmental organisations or 
indigenous peoples. Statements represent the state as one unanimous actor even though the 
state operates within different policy sectors with diverse and competing objectives and interests 
as Jokinen (2001: 80-81) notes. Accordingly, statements are compromises. 
 
Data collection 
The statements are found as webcast in the web site of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (www.unfccc.int). I listened to the statements and transcribed them. After having 
transcribed all the statements, I still listened to them once more to revise and to make corrections 
to the texts. In total there were 118 sheets of data, that is about 1 sheet per statement. The fact 
that some of the statements were interpreted in English at the Conference might have changed 
some of the original meanings and emphasis. However, the analysis of the data is based on 
general and recurrent findings, not on individual words, phrases or ideas. Before using the actual 
research methods I studied and processed the data with Atlas.Ti.  
 
3.2. Research methods: rhetorical analysis and frames 
 
Rhetorical analysis and Perelman’s theory of argumentation 
I use rhetorical analysis in the sense of discussing ‘how some versions of reality strive to 
present themselves as convincing and acceptable, and how the listeners, readers or interlocutors 
are made to commit themselves to them’ (Jokinen, 1999: 126 - translated). I employ the concepts 
and tools developed around the new rhetoric of Chaïm Perelman which discusses the general 
principles of making claims credible and worth of committing oneself to as well as different 
techniques of argumentation (Summa, 1995: 76-77). There are three central aspects in the new 
rhetoric of Perelman: 1) the relationship to the audience, 2) the premises of argumentation and 3) 
the techniques of argumentation (Tuulentie, 2001: 45; Kuusisto, 1996: 275-88; Summa, 1995: 77-
84). The first aspect, the speaker’s relationship to the audience, means that argumentation is 
essentially argumentation for someone (Jokinen, 1999: 128). The second aspect, the premises of 
argumentation, refers to some areas of unanimity between the speaker and the audience on 
which the speaker can base the justifications of argumentation; they are one means of 
constructing convincing claims (Summa, 1995: 78 and 1996: 69). The premises are the basis of 
argumentation that can be taken for granted. Perelman distinguishes between premises that 
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relate to reality and premises that relate to preference or preferable. The former refers to facts, 
truths and presumptions, which are associated with the idea of normality, whereas the latter 
refers to values, hierarchies and the locus of the preferable (Perelman, 1982: 23). The third 
aspect, the techniques of argumentation, discusses also the ways to convince an audience. 
Whereas the premises can be regarded as already accepted general justifications, the techniques 
of argumentation aim at justifying certain conclusions (Summa, 1995: 80). Perelman distinguishes 
between arguments that are given in the form of a liaison which ‘allows for the transference to the 
conclusion of the adherence accorded the premises’ and arguments in the form of dissociation 
which ‘aims at separating elements which language or a recognised tradition have previously tied 
together’ (Perelman, 1982: 49), that is, the course of argumentation is either associative or 
dissociative (Summa, 1995: 81). I focus on the second and third aspects of Perelman’s theory.  
 
Frames as methodological and interpretative tools 
In sociological research the concept of ‘frame’ comes from Erving Goffman (1974) who used 
frames in the meaning of schemes of interpretation through which people observe, recognise and 
name different events and activities; frames give sense and meaning to these events 
(Väliverronen, 1996: 106). The idea of diversity is essential; in most events many issues take 
place simultaneously, and people may also interpret and frame the same event in different ways 
(Horsti, 2005: 49). Goffman and others have used frame analysis to examine the interaction of 
people face to face in different situations. However, it has also been applied in a broad sense to 
the research of social problems and movements, to journalism (Väliverronen, 1996: 108) as well 
as to the research of environmental social science. In this research frames are essentially 
practical methodological and interpretative tools for answering my research problem: ‘how climate 
change is framed as a problem from the point of view of responsibility’. Frames as a 
methodological device resemble the concepts of discourse or interpretative repertoire (Saaristo, 
2000: 43). The idea is that climate change is not the same kind of problem for every state, but 
there are different versions of it, which emphasise but also leave out different questions and 
measures. A frame thus embodies a shared understanding about climate change as a problem, 
but also more broadly a shared understanding about what is the preferred social world and values 
within it. The frames in this research, as with Väliverronen (1996: 111), are the result of concrete 
empirical research, not the basis of it. 
 
3.3. Analysis of data 
 
During the analysis and interpretation I concentrated on two main issues when reading the 
statements. First, I considered how climate change is discussed by the states in general; how 
climate change is framed as a problem. As I started to be familiar with the research data, I began 
to distinguish roughly two ways of describing and speaking about climate change. Framing thus 
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encompasses reading the statements as a whole. The research problem is answered partly with 
the research questions and partly with the other aspects of the statements, and the most 
prevalent and important features of these are included in the frames to shape more generalised 
ideas about climate change as a problem. The frames hold shared ways to speak of, understand, 
construct and justify the problem. However, the frames can also contain different claims about 
responsibility.  
Secondly, in order to answer the research questions I searched for argumentation concerning 
responsibility in climate politics. Claims concerning the content and distribution of responsibility 
answer my first research question. For the second and third research questions, I analysed what 
kind of premises underlie these claims and what kind of justifications support them. The premises 
and the techniques of argumentation are salient in how arguments are presented as credible, but 
they also construct climate change as a problem. I further grouped these claims (and thus states) 
according to their content into coalitions.  
Figure 2 represents the analytical framework which I used when reading and analysing the 
research data. This figure is inspired by a figure presented by Perimäki (2001: 5) in her study 
about the actors and arguments in the Finnish climate politics (see also Best, 1987: 102 for a 
figure similar to Perimäki’s). The figure connects the social context or rhetorical situation (see 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998: 234-35) with the aspects of argumentation as understood by Perelman.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Analytical framework: social context and argumentation 
 
The forum, the speaker, and the audience refer to the social context of the statements, the 
rhetorical situation. The forum of the rhetorical situation is Montreal Climate Conference and the 
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speakers of the rhetorical situation are the Ministers and heads of delegations representing the 
states. There were about 9500 participants in total in the Conference of which 2800 were 
members of official delegati 
ons (Berghäll, 2005: 5). This is the concrete audience of the rhetorical situation. However, the 
concept of audience is not restricted to the audience in attendance, as the audience can be 
global through the media. The speaker and the audience also relate to the first aspect of 
Perelman’s theory, the relationship to the audience. The premises are the second aspect in 
Perelman’s theory. They can be either reality based - premises that relate to reality -, or 
preference based - premises that relate to preference or preferable. Justification refers to the third 
aspect of Perelman’s theory - the techniques of argumentation which are divided into associative 
(quasi-logical arguments, arguments that are based on the structure of reality, and arguments 
which establish the structure of reality) and dissociative techniques. The conclusion refers to the 
claim.  
 
4. Results 
 
The results suggest that from the point of view of responsibility climate change is framed as a 
problem in two different ways: in some statements climate change is considered as a problem of 
greenhouse gas emissions while in other statements climate change is discussed as a problem of 
vulnerability. Within these frames, however, there are different perspectives about responsibility 
for the problem.  
 
Climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions 
Climate change is considered as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions from the point of 
view of responsibility in the statements of the developed countries and most countries with 
economies in transition, that is Annex I parties, as well as in the statement of China. Climate 
change is seen as a treatable problem, which can be managed. Climate change is mostly 
discussed from a global perspective; it is seen as a shared, global problem with global impacts. 
Typical of this frame is also the role of technology in dealing with the problem; new 
environmentally friendlier technologies are considered as the solution to emission reductions. 
Some statements also discuss a more profound change as a solution – disconnecting emissions 
from economic growth in general with the development of societies towards a path similar to 
ecological modernisation; economic growth without environmental harms with the help of 
technology. Market mechanisms and the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are expected 
to deliver these changes. Economic discourse plays an important role in the statements, too. The 
premises in the claims concerning responsibility refer largely to economic motives such as lower 
costs, creating jobs, producing economic growth, etc. Economic reasoning in climate change 
activities is common; for instance, not acting against climate change is seen to be more 
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expensive than acting. Furthermore, climate change measures or environmentally friendlier 
activities are seen as compatible with economic growth or they are even considered to generate 
economic growth.  
Typical of this frame is reality-based premises underlying the claims. The most common of 
these premises refer to factual issues (obviousness and scientific results) and to economic 
motives (lower costs, signal to markets). Characteristic is also justifying claims with metaphors 
such as journey (Kyoto first step, path to further reductions, move forward, etc.), which describes 
current commitments as only the beginning and that much more needs to be done. In addition, 
the metaphors of war (battle against climate change, combating climate change, etc.) and world 
(world needs, world expects, world action, etc.), which construct climate change as a problem 
that is global and common to all and create unity among nations, are typical features. Commonly 
used dissociative techniques suggest that the current commitments from the developed countries 
alone are not enough to address climate change or that there is no conflict between growth and 
environmental protection or that climate change is both a challenge and an opportunity. 
The argumentation concerning responsibility within this frame is future oriented. There is, 
however, disagreement in two issues: 1) what is the relation of economy and climate change 
activities, and 2) how to share the burden of mitigation. In the first question there are two 
alliances that both highlight economic aspects and speak in favour of economic development, but 
dissent in whether climate change is compatible with the objective of economic growth. The USA, 
Australia and China claim that activities to combat climate change should enhance economic 
development. By saying this they reserve the option to withdraw from negotiations that deal with 
activities that they see harmful or neutral to their economy. On the other hand Canada, Japan 
and a group of European countries emphasise that climate change is compatible with economic 
growth, and that the economy may actually benefit from reacting to climate change. By claiming 
this, these countries try to nullify the argumentation of those not willing to participate in climate 
change activities on the grounds of economic reasons. As a consequence, the values and the 
moral responsibility within this frame refer to development, especially to the economic 
development of societies. Either countries’ economic development cannot be endangered due to 
climate policies or economic development and addressing climate change are realised together. 
In the second question about the burden-sharing of future mitigation there are three distinctive 
groups. Canada, Japan and a group of European countries claim that the developed countries 
are mostly responsible for mitigation but the developing countries also need to participate 
increasingly; the current mitigation responsibilities of the developed countries is not enough. 
Russia, New Zealand and some European countries see also that mitigation is a global 
responsibility but that countries should contribute the best they can according to their capabilities 
and amount of current emissions. In consequence, most of the statements refer to global 
mitigation, or at least more global than currently. While developed countries have the main 
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responsibility, developing countries, especially the emerging ones with more capabilities and 
emissions, also need to participate increasingly. Besides the aforementioned argumentation, 
there are also individual claims concerning the distribution of responsibility; those of China, USA 
and Australia. China demands that states should honour the basic principles of the UNFCCC, 
especially that of common but differentiated responsibilities, which China sees to be reflected well 
in the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, the statements of the USA and Australia do not consider 
responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol. Australia calls for a framework that enables effective 
action from all major emitting countries while the USA relies on voluntary action by partnerships 
between all countries. 
 
Climate change as a problem of vulnerability 
Climate change is also discussed from another perspective: in the statements of most 
developing countries it is framed as a problem of vulnerability from the point of view of 
responsibility. Whereas the global aspects were highlighted in the first frame, this frame does the 
opposite by discussing climate change from a local perspective. Thus the statements emphasise 
environmental, social and economic impacts to their countries or to developing countries in 
general by describing local climatic hazards amply. Focusing on the social and economic 
development endeavours and challenges is also common within this frame. Climate change is 
described as a threat to the social and economic development efforts of the developing countries 
because of their low capacities required to anticipate, react or to adapt to the impacts. 
Furthermore, climate change is considered to reduce even more their scarce resources and thus 
hinder poverty eradication and solving other major problems the developing world is facing. 
Attaining the Millennium Development Goals is also regarded as difficult due to the additional 
burden of climate change. The premises of argumentation also highlight these aspects by 
referring to the development of developing countries (Millennium Development Goals, sustainable 
development, poverty eradication, etc.). In addition, the premises include issues such as 
vulnerability, low adaptive capacities and specific circumstances of the developing countries. 
Another characteristic feature is that financial and technological resources are considered as the 
means to solve the problem, to strengthen the capabilities of developing countries and thus 
reduce their vulnerability. Consequently, financial aid and transfer of technology are emphasised, 
and the statements call for assistance from the developed countries. Regardless of this, many 
states describe themselves as active in developing climate change measures. Adaptation to 
climate change is also seen as essential.  
Characteristic of this frame is that the premises in the claims are preference-based. Most of 
these premises refer to vulnerability, low adaptive capacities, and specific circumstances or 
adaptation needs of the developing countries. The most common reality-based premises can be 
summarised as development, including poverty eradication, Millennium Development Goals and 
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sustainable development. It is also typical to justify claims by referring to some Article of the 
Convention or the Kyoto Protocol as well as by using dissociative techniques implying that the 
Annex 1 countries are not really meeting their emission reduction commitments or their promises 
of technical and financial assistance. 
The argumentation concerning responsibility within this frame is mostly future oriented but also 
discuss past and current responsibilities. The states seem to agree on some questions: there is a 
quite general tone noticeable in the statements handing the main responsibility over to the 
developed countries. Also the idea that the developed countries have not assumed their 
responsibilities in giving resources nor in emissions reductions is shared in the statements. There 
is, however, different kinds of emphasis and diverse perspectives on two issues: 1) how to 
support the development of developing countries, and 2) how to share the burden of mitigation. 
There are two ideas about what to do with the first question. On the one hand, many countries 
call for environmentally friendly technologies and financial resources to be made available for the 
developing countries. Some OPEC-countries, on the other hand, see that using fossil fuels should 
be continued with the help of carbon capture and storage because the development prospects of 
OPEC-countries suffer from selective climate policies. Both views involve the developed 
countries: it is them who should give resources or reduce emissions in different ways. Regarding 
the second question about the burden-sharing of future mitigation there are three distinctive 
suggestions. A group of G-77 countries, a number of which are also least developed countries, 
see that while more efforts are needed from all, binding emission reductions are acceptable only 
from Annex I countries. Other G-77 countries, on the other hand, distribute responsibility on the 
basis of common but differentiated responsibilities, amount of emissions, capabilities and 
resources. A few states consider that developing countries can have the possibility of taking 
voluntary commitments if it supports sustainable development and does not limit their economic 
and social development. . 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The assumption of this research was that climate change is essentially considered as an 
environmental problem and that this aspect would be visible in the research data. However, the 
statements highlighted other aspects much more; climate change was described as an economic 
or as a developmental problem of current human beings. The role of environment both in the 
statements in general and as justification was minor. Climate change was also discussed very 
distinctively and framed as a problem in two very different ways. In addition, the premises of 
argumentation differ clearly between these two frames. However, it is interesting that although the 
perspectives and justifications of these frames were very different, the claims concerning the 
distribution of responsibility themselves were somewhat alike. There were also other similarities 
between the two frames. First, both considered technology to be the answer to the problem. 
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Secondly, climate change was seen as a problem that the existing politics and structures are able 
to manage; only one statement questioned the purpose of economic growth and current 
development. Climate change was thus not seen as a symptom of something bigger which would 
need structural, value and life-style changes. What was missing in the statements were the 
concrete targets and objectives. Furthermore, except for EU members, countries do not consider 
a specific time-frame in which climate change should be addressed; the EU countries discuss a 2 
Degrees Celsius limit to warming but do not address the impacts this amount of warming would 
have on different regions and the environment. From the perspective of environmental justice it is 
peculiar that historical responsibility does not get more room as a justification of developing 
countries. In addition, only some statements demanded emission reductions of the USA and 
Australia within both of these frames. It is also noteworthy that the rights of future generations 
were not considered more and their role as justification was quite small. Furthermore, the 
environment itself and animal and plant species – or even the environment as natural resources – 
was largely absent, and it would be interesting to examine its position in climate change 
negotiations more. In the future there is also a need to transcend the developed-developing 
country divisions, which I had to use in this research, and instead describe international climate 
politics with the help of fresh and more meaningful groupings.   
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Stakeholder dialogue as a communication and negotiation tool in scientific 
inquiry 
 
Anne Cristina de la Vega-Leinert and Dagmar Schröter 
 
Abstract 
A stakeholder dialogue aimed to facilitate the development and dissemination of the ATEAM 
European vulnerability assessment of global change impacts. This participative experiment 
constitutes a milestone in integrated ecological modelling. Participating ecosystem managers, 
sectoral representatives and policy advisers significantly influenced the research content and 
process. The usefulness of the projects’ outcomes for stakeholders and an evaluation of the 
dialogue are presented.  
Three challenges are highlighted. First, the increasing complexity and uncertainty of global 
change modelling and the multiplication of its results raise the question of how to best 
communicate modelling outcomes to society. Second, scientifically credible and socially relevant 
participative research implies the need for transparency in the research process, so that goals, 
underlying assumptions and methods of scientific inquiry may be adequately scrutinised and 
debated. Finally, stakeholder dialogues are valuable processes of negotiation, which may help to 
reconcile the differing needs of fundamental and applied global change sciences. 
 
Keywords: science-stakeholder dialogue, participative research, ecosystem modelling, global 
change, vulnerability assessment 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The present paper focuses on communication between scientists and societal actors during 
participatory research on climate change. This includes two main domains: 1) communication on 
climate change and, 2) communication on the research itself. If the former emphasises the 
content, the latter focuses on the form and the process the research takes.  
Science-stakeholder dialogues have been defined as a ‘structured communicative process of 
linking scientists with selected actors that are relevant for the research problem at hand’ (Welp et 
al., 2006a). This approach, among other participative research methods, has become important in 
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the last two decades in a range of academic fields. The underlying rationale is closely related to a 
paradigm-shift in science epistemology, namely the post-normal paradigm (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993). For these authors, a scientific domain such as climate change science is 
characterized by the universal scale of the processes it studies and their long-term impacts, and 
the intricate interactions between natural and human systems. A typical positivistic, deductive, 
quantitative approach reaches its limits in such complex issues. Alone ‘normal’ science is unable 
to bring society critical answers due to:  intractable cumulative uncertainty, which makes 
predictions impossible; critical ethical and political dilemmas, for which a range of valid, often 
conflicting societal perspectives exist; and finally the high stakes these value-laden issues are 
associated with, which demand urgent societal debate and decisions. One of the methods of the 
proposed ‘post-normal’ science is to involve societal actors in the research process to satisfy a 
series of goals. These range from data collection methods, where stakeholders are invited to 
share their knowledge and information, to fully participative exercises, where scientists and 
stakeholders become partners and jointly decide the research scope (Welp et al., 2006a, b).   
This paper presents and discusses insights gained during the science-stakeholder dialogue 
exercise implemented within ATEAM (Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Assessment and 
Modelling). This EU framework 5 research project officially run from 2001 to 2004 and was 
coordinated from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research, Germany. Its overarching 
goal was to produce maps of European impacts and vulnerability to global change, explicitly 
conceived and implemented with policy-makers and environmental managers in mind (Metzger et 
al., 2008; Schröter et al., 2005). For this purpose a stakeholder dialogue initiative was embedded 
in the research process. This experience profoundly affected the way participating scientists 
designed and performed their work and constitutes a milestone in integrated ecological modelling 
for the purposes of global change impact and vulnerability assessments. The underlying 
hypothesis is that stakeholder dialogue, and participative methods in general, play a valuable role 
in the elaboration and evaluation of complex global change models, which may be both 
scientifically credible and socially relevant.  
First, the overall project and the stakeholder dialogue are presented. The stakeholders’ 
selection criteria, including biases, are discussed. Second, stakeholders’ influence on the 
research is summarised. Finally, the dialogue content and process are discussed in terms of their 
relevance for participating stakeholders and scientists. 
 
2. Overall aims of the ATEAM and the stakeholder dialogue 
 
ATEAM aimed at assessing quantitatively the vulnerability1 of human sectors (i.e. agriculture, 
forestry, water, biodiversity, mountain tourism, and carbon-storage potential) to global change. 
                                                 
1 The degree to which an ecosystem service is sensitive to global change combined with the degree to 
which the sector that relies on this service is unable to cope with the change. 
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Since it was primarily an ecosystem modelling project its entry point to vulnerability was through 
the possible impacts on ecosystem services2, such as wood production and snow availability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of the ATEAM project with the specific interactions between scientists and 
stakeholders (from Schröter et al., 2004). 
 
The project methodology is presented in Figure 13. It used a typical deductive, quantitative, 
natural science approach. Firstly, its umbrella concept, vulnerability, was described and broken 
down into constitutive elements (i.e. Exposure, Sensitivity, Adaptive Capacity) following 
established conceptual frameworks. Secondly, driving forces were identified (i.e. climate and land 
use changes), scenarios were built and proxy indicators were derived and quantified through 
ecological modelling. Thirdly, a generic, semi-quantitative index for adaptive capacity was derived 
                                                 
2 Conditions and processes through which ecosystems and the organisations that make them up sustain 
and fulfil human life.  
3 For the precise description of the methodology and the terminology used, consult Schröter et al. (2004, 
2005). 
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from established socio-economic indicators. Finally, all these indicators were combined to 
produce an aggregated index of vulnerability expressed on a geographically explicit grid of 
Europe of 16 km x 16 km. 
The stakeholder dialogue aimed at adjusting the project’s results to better suit stakeholders’ 
needs with the following goals: identifying and evaluating indicators of change in ecosystem 
services; determining useful modelling scales (spatial and temporal) and units for these 
indicators; discussing adequate thresholds for these indicators, beyond which sectoral adaptive 
capacity could be exceeded; developing stakeholders’ ability to use information derived from 
scenario analysis; and discussing and disseminating the project’s results. 
 
Potential stakeholders were identified using the snowball approach (Biernacki and Waldorf, 
1981). To complement this a systematic selection matrix was designed based on three main 
categories: 1) the human activity sectors considered in the overall assessment (e.g. 
‘Agriculture,’); 2) the type and main interests of stakeholder organisations (e.g. private firm, public 
management, non-governmental organisations); and 3) the scale of activity of these organisations 
(i.e. from local to international). The resulting stakeholder database included 204 identified 
stakeholders, 152 of which were invited to our activities with 584 participating in at least one 
activity. 
Sectoral representatives, consultants and private businesses were particularly targeted for the 
‘Agriculture’, ‘Forestry’, ‘Water’ and ‘Tourism’ sectors, since decision-makers and managers in 
these sectors are often private agents. In contrast, stakeholders from public or independent 
sectors were approached for the ‘Biodiversity and nature conservation’, ‘Carbon storage’ and 
‘Mountain environments’ sectors, since the associated ecosystem services are often non-
marketed (Reid et al., 2005), and policy-making occurs at national and/or European levels (e.g. 
climate mitigation, ecological directives). Policy-makers per se were deliberately not included in 
the stakeholder matrix, since the project targeted stakeholders who though influential could 
nevertheless express their views freely. In the end, most targeted organisations had a European 
to global focus of activity, the scales at which the ATEAM results are the most relevant.  
 
The stakeholder selection criteria included: (inter-)sectoral expertise, some knowledge on 
climate and environmental issues, general interest for scientific issues and an open, curious and 
critical mind. Stakeholders’ known or presumed views on global change did not however 
constitute a selection criterion to encourage multiple perspectives. Rather than a public 
participation exercise, we pursued a focus group approach with selected participants. Therefore a 
                                                 
4 These numbers strictly refer to the stakeholders identified, approached or participating within the ATEAM 
dialogue activities reported upon here. Many more stakeholders were less directly involved within ATEAM 
via: 1) additional dissemination and outreach activities carried out within the project, and 2) parallel 
stakeholder networks and activities developed within other projects or institutes, within which ATEAMers 
participated (for a complete report on these see Schröter et al. (2004). 
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representative sample of society was not aimed at. Although repetitive attempts were made to 
engage as many different stakeholders as possible, including private companies and specific 
consumer/interest groups, most chose not to participate.  
Our selection criteria, combined with stakeholders’ decision criteria to participate or not, 
produced a ‘green’ and ‘scientific’ bias in the participating group. Stakeholders needed to be 
convinced that they would gain significant benefits before they committed any amount of time and 
effort into extra-professional activities. Communication skills and a feel for how to engage 
stakeholders and demonstrate the relevance of the research project for their activities certainly 
helped to gain stakeholder support. However, in some cases the research topic was simply too 
disconnected from stakeholders interests to secure their participation.  
 
Throughout the ATEAM project three general and three smaller scale sectoral stakeholder 
workshops were organised. ATEAM scientists participated in 11 further stakeholder events 
organised within collaborating initiatives (see Schröter et al., 2004). Furthermore, multiple 
informal exchanges between scientists and stakeholders took place. The primary goal of the 
formal stakeholder workshops was to facilitate the exchange of information and discussion 
between scientists, which were involved in modelling development, and stakeholders, who could 
provide expert knowledge on on-going strategies and practice in natural resource policy and 
management. Typically, formal workshops gathered an equal number of scientists and 
stakeholders, with the total number of participants not exceeding 40. Formal events lasted from 
an afternoon to two days and were organised in a series of plenary and sector-specific working 
groups. Additional stakeholder events were a series of information side-events, where the 
ATEAM project, its methodology and results were presented, although here the emphasis was 
mostly on the unilateral transfer of information from project representatives to potential users, 
rather than on exchange between scientists and stakeholders.    
 
3. Evaluation of the ATEAM stakeholder dialogue 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
At main events, stakeholders were asked to complete a questionnaire on the project and 
workshop content and format. Informal feedback was collected during the events. External 
observers moreover evaluated the workshops and provided recommendations for future events 
(Jürgens, 2001; Vreugdenhil, 2003). Finally, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the 
project leader and coordinator, and one scientist per modelling sector to explore views on the 
impacts of the stakeholder dialogue on their research. The sections below summarise the main 
points made by participants, observers and scientists.  
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3.2. Stakeholders’ influence on ATEAM research process and content 
 
If the project’s aim to define and produce stakeholder-relevant results was, as such, a 
powerful coordination tool, which continuously steered the consortium’s work, stakeholders 
themselves had a significant impact on the ATEAM research. This included: 1) thought-provoking 
perspectives and opinions on the research framework, the near final results and their 
meaningfulness for stakeholders’ activities; 2) suggestions on ways to further improve result 
communication/dissemination; and 3) contributions to future research agenda.   
Practically, stakeholders reviewed and evaluated the methodology and some assumptions 
used in developing the land use scenarios and specific ecosystem models, as well as the 
temporal and spatial scales of the results. Stakeholders helped scientists to select and prioritise 
the indicators of ecosystem services for the assessment framework and to gain insights on how 
ecosystem services were recognised and managed. They provided invaluable information on the 
multiple facets and challenges of sectoral management practice and adaptation. They also 
enthusiastically supported additional exploratory case studies, particularly that on biomass energy 
potential (Tuck et al., 2006) and agricultural adaptive capacity (Reidsma et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Menu of the ATEAM Atlas of European Vulnerability. 
 
Finally, to ease the presentation, dissemination and analysis of the project results a digital 
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compilation of the project’s most salient results, the ATEAM Atlas of European Vulnerability5, was 
developed (Metzger et al., 2004; Metzger and Schröter, 2006) (see Figure 2). This tool allows 
users to select indicators of impact and vulnerability, using the socio-economic, climate and land 
use scenarios they are most interested in. The maps are placed in a fact sheet, which provides 
succinct information on the models, scenarios and indicators used, the main underlying 
assumptions and additional references. Aggregated resulted can be decomposed and both 
relative and absolute data can be viewed. Furthermore, simple queries can be performed and 
users can zoom on specific environmental regions or countries. Early versions of the tool were 
improved with the help of stakeholders’ comments. The final version of the ATEAM Atlas of 
European Vulnerability is freely available under: http://www.pik-potsdam.de/ateam/ateam.html 
 
3.3. Stakeholders' evaluation 
 
Content evaluation 
Stakeholders generally found ATEAM’s conceptual framework, the vulnerability assessment 
methodology, and the Atlas of European Vulnerability interesting and innovative. The temporal 
and spatial scales of ATEAM analyses were, however, of unequal relevance. The 1990, 2020, 
2050, 2080 time slices were useful, for example, for stakeholders in the ‘Forestry’, ‘Carbon 
storage’ and ‘Biodiversity and nature conservation’ sectors, and to a lesser extent in ‘Mountains 
environments’, for which long-term management is key. However, for the ‘Water’ and ‘Agriculture’ 
sectors short-term estimates for the next five to ten years would have been more useful. For 
many stakeholders the spatial scale of the assessment remained too coarse, despite its 
exceptionally fine resolution in comparison to other global change assessments.  
The identification and assessment of specific ecosystem services, which could be significantly 
impacted in future, were most relevant for the majority of stakeholders, since this information 
forms an appropriate basis for exploring adequate adaptation strategies at European to regional 
levels. In comparison, the aggregated index for ‘adaptive capacity’ and ‘vulnerability’ per se were 
judged of limited value (Schröter et al., 2005). Such concepts and indicators therefore seem to 
have more pertinence as an element for broad scale academic analysis than for practical 
environmental management (Patt et al., 2005). Stakeholders are generally acutely aware of 
existing needs and opportunities to adapt to change in their management practice and sectoral 
adaptation is closely intertwined with economically viability. Stakeholders critically review current 
policies, market fluctuations and environmental changes, which may benefit or endanger their 
activity. They are thus continuously re-appraising the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of their 
activity to changing conditions (albeit without using this terminology). ATEAM’s macro-scale, 
generic index of adaptive capacity does not provide the specific information stakeholders wish 
                                                 
5 The ATEAM Atlas of European Vulnerability is available to download at: http://www.pik-
potsdam.de/ateam/ 
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and is thus of limited interest to them. Scientists and stakeholders however agreed that the 
components of sectoral adaptive capacity, the interactions between macro and (inter-)sectoral 
adaptive capacities, and between these and vulnerability were key areas for future research.  
Also within the land use scenarios, stakeholders isolated specific driving forces, which they 
believe should be better taken into account in scenario and model assumptions, in particular 
policy, market trends, sectoral management, consumer preferences and extreme events. Within 
the modelling of terrestrial carbon storage, stakeholders inspired a major research re-orientation 
by prioritising the implementation of more realistic forest management and land use changes over 
the improved representation of the nitrogen cycle in dynamic vegetation models, which was 
originally planned. Stakeholders further agreed that in disseminating research results, it should be 
clearly pointed out that scenarios represent alternative choices of society, rather than possible 
futures that unfold independently from societal and individual decisions. 
 
Stakeholders’ confidence in ATEAM’s results was enhanced as significant agreement across 
modelling results and scenarios was demonstrated. For example, tree productivity increases in 
most scenarios in North European but is limited by water availability in Mediterranean areas. Also 
all scenarios and results from all sectors agree on particular regional vulnerabilities, for example 
that of the Mediterranean and Mountains regions (Schröter et al., 2005). Consequently, 
stakeholders particularly encouraged comparative assessments of impacts of alternative policies 
across different economic sectors, which might allow decision-makers to better choose between 
different future pathways.  
 
Nevertheless, there was a broad consensus that ATEAM results, or any state-of-the-art 
vulnerability assessment, would not directly influence decision-making and management 
behaviour due to the still too large temporal and spatial scales and associated significant 
cumulative uncertainty. Stakeholders, who await predictions or detailed quantified outputs to 
guide their decision-making, will be disappointed by the lack of ‘answers’ from integrated 
modelling. Integrated assessment results should therefore not be viewed as potential provider of 
predictions (‘truth machines’, see Shackley and Darier, 1998), but as compilation of best current 
knowledge, and as food for thought and debate within a wider social discourse on global change. 
However, specific modelling tools produced to facilitate decision-making (e.g. decision support 
systems) may play an important role when targeted at a group of stakeholders. Efforts in this 
direction included the development of a tool for natural reserve selection that takes into account 
economic and ecological considerations (Araújo et al., 2002) and a comparison of the 
effectiveness of different reserve selection tools under climate change (Araújo et al., 2004). 
Finally, stakeholders attached great importance to information on the economic cost and 
benefits of a specific policy (e.g. does it make economic sense to switch to biomass energy 
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crops?). Thus, linking ATEAM’s vast information pool to economic valuation could be one way to 
increase the meaningfulness of the project’s results for stakeholders in the future, although it 
might be necessary to overcome a strong resistance from nature scientists to attach monetary 
values to ecosystem service provision. Environmental and economic model coupling is a 
development that goes in this direction (Jaeger et al., 2002).  
 
Process evaluation 
An evaluation questionnaire was distributed to stakeholders at three events6. In total 22 
stakeholders out of 58 handed back questionnaires. All numbers quoted below within brackets 
refer to respondents answering ‘Yes’ or ‘Mostly’ to questions out of a total of 22 respondents7. 
Most respondents believed that the ATEAM workshops had been generally relevant to their 
work (19) and worth their time out of work (18). Most appreciated the content and the range of 
topics covered and found presentations interesting (21). Most gained some useful insights on the 
topics covered (21), and thought they would be able to integrate some of these in their work (19). 
For some, too many topics were covered (2), which prevented in-depth discussions on the 
specific subjects they were interested in (e.g. local scale impacts on biodiversity, downstream 
activities in ‘Agriculture’ or ‘Forestry’ sectors, sectoral adaptive capacity).  
Most stakeholders felt comfortable enough to express their opinions (21) and believed that 
these had been adequately valued by participants (19). Some emphasised the need for unbiased 
moderation. In later events, stakeholders were offered the possibility to alternate with ATEAMers 
as moderators. It seems that active participation, constructive criticism and an atmosphere 
conducive to developing trust and friendliness were achieved. Stakeholders also valued the 
opportunity to network with peers and scientists as a way to encourage synergies and 
collaboration. Fellow participants were relevant to many, who envisaged keeping in contact with 
some of them independently from ATEAM events (12).  
Most respondents had been sufficiently interested in ATEAM to envisage participating in 
follow-up activities (17). Eventually, 11 out of 58 participated in at least two dialogue activities. All 
respondents wished to receive further information on the project and its final results, and many 
had already talked about ATEAM to colleagues (18). It seems that for respondents, ATEAM had 
successfully engaged participants, raised interest in its research and provided a dynamic and 
stimulating discussion and dissemination platform.  
The main criticisms on the dialogue process were the infrequence of the events, the long time 
between events and the lack of regular and transparent feedback in between activities. Some 
stakeholders expressed some frustration if they felt that their comments had not been adequately 
                                                 
6 The 2nd and 3rd general stakeholder workshop and the Mountain and Biodiversity sectoral stakeholder 
workshop. 
7 For the full results of the evaluation questionnaires see: de la Vega-Leinert, A.C. et al. (2004) available 
from the author. 
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taken on board. These critiques relate to a key issue in participative research. By asking 
stakeholders’ opinion, ATEAM also raised the expectations that these opinions could and would 
be fully taken into account. However, the tight research plan and set list of deliverables the 
project had committed itself to produce meant that the margin of manoeuvre scientists had in 
addressing stakeholders’ comments was significantly narrower than stakeholders thought. 
Clarifying as early as possible and as repeatedly as necessary how far stakeholders may 
influence the research programme is thus critical. Important stakeholders’ concerns did 
nevertheless find their way into ATEAM research (e.g. the above mentioned study on agricultural 
adaptive capacity). Other concerns may only be addressed adequately through fundamental 
model developments over the long term (e.g. bridging gaps between global modelling scales and 
local management needs).  
Stakeholders encouraged the scientific community to continue raising relevant societal 
questions, regarding global change impacts and adaptation. They generally believed that ATEAM 
succeeded in formulating strong messages on European vulnerability to global change, which 
provided some guidance in policy and decision-making for a range of stakeholder groups 
(including landowners’ and farmers’ organisations, forestry and biodiversity managers, and 
environmental non-governmental organizations), and contribute to increasing societal awareness. 
Both stakeholders and scientists agreed that the way results are framed, interpreted and 
communicated plays a major role in how modelling outputs are used. Nevertheless, views on the 
best approaches to foster an informed use of scientific results differed. For scientists the ATEAM 
Atlas should address issues of data clarity and comprehensiveness. Although stakeholders 
praised this initiative, some would have preferred meaningful user-targeted syntheses and policy 
recommendations, based on key mapped outputs. In trying to meet this request a delicate 
balance has to be found between honesty about the uncertainty of the results and clarity of the 
message conveyed.  
 
3.4. Scientists’ perception and evaluation of the dialogue 
 
Initially scientists’ attitudes regarding the stakeholder dialogue and its meaningfulness in 
serving the research plan were mixed. Enthusiasm and interest about developing significant 
elements of applied and participative research met scepticism on whether this activity would add 
substantially to the research in view of the costs involved (i.e. time, effort, resources, which could 
have been spent on the modelling itself). There was also anxiety about the potential failure to 
provide the information stakeholders sought.  
The project incorporated elements of qualitative, exploratory, participative social sciences in a 
framework otherwise centred on fundamental quantitative ecological modelling. There was some 
uncertainty on how to perform this well. In the peer community some viewed this initiative ‘at best’ 
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as a marketing trick to attract funding or ‘at worst’ as a ‘non scientific’ goal, which would discredit 
the overall project’s scientific credibility. This represented a significant risk and it required much 
effort to convince some project members and peers that the dialogue with stakeholders was a 
valid choice from the scientific point of view. The latter was achieved by not compromising in core 
parts of the research plan (e.g. the detailed modelling developments and the benchmarking 
exercise – see Morales et al., 2005), which were not presented to stakeholders. These formed 
the main scientific achievements per se of the project and guaranteed scientific credibility in the 
ecological modelling peer community. As consensus was forged on the originality and feasibility 
of the overall methodology, including the generic adaptive capacity index, and of importance of 
the stakeholder dialogue component, the project achieved scientific recognition in the 
interdisciplinary global change assessment community.   
All interviewed scientists clearly took the need for consultation and transfer of scientific 
information to stakeholders seriously. They expected to obtain valuable feedback from 
stakeholders on specific issues (e.g. on thresholds of change in ecosystem service provision 
beyond which sectoral adaptive capacity would be endangered). This was not always the case, 
and some scientists felt somewhat frustrated at having invested substantial efforts into the 
dialogue for apparently little return. Like stakeholders, most scientists believed that the dialogue 
had been too fragmented. In terms of timing moreover, the first workshops were simply too early 
for some scientists, who felt they had not had become sufficiently familiar with new models, or 
had not developed them to their satisfaction. These critiques relate to the way the dialogue was 
designed and implemented: i.e. few, far-apart, content-rich workshops. This format reduced the 
time available to explore some pertinent questions scientists and stakeholders had. Scientists 
and stakeholders alike would have welcomed more frequent, focused meetings, and to move 
away from the general ‘presentation-feedback’ mode, to a ‘working group’ approach. Some 
scientists thus pursued in-depth interactions with stakeholders outside the ‘official’ dialogue 
activities.  
Scientists generally felt comfortable during the dialogue interactions, since all stakeholders 
were science-literate and sympathetic to, or even experienced in ecological and/or global change 
modelling. Scientists found it easier to communicate with stakeholders who had a clear agenda 
(e.g. managers, scientific advisers, NGOs) than with some who systematically focused on, or 
lobbied for, their own interests (e.g. a few private managers and consultants). A common 
language first needed to be established, which occasionally required long discussions to adjust 
the terminology to better suit stakeholders’ opinions. For example, the term ‘unprotected land’ 
was renamed ‘undesignated land’ in the land use scenarios, after stakeholders insisted that all 
land management included some degree of protection. Even if terminology discussions take time 
and may appear tedious or frustrating, they are in fact necessary negotiation processes, which 
helps to develop a broad consensus.   
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Scientists generally experienced stakeholders as understanding, curious and interested and 
some thus wondered if the lack of a ‘cultural shock’ did not imply that the project had failed to find 
‘real’ stakeholders. However, when some stakeholders insisted on their own agenda, even if this 
played a minor role in the wider scope of the project, some scientists experienced them as 
‘pushy’ or ‘narrow-minded’. This illustrates just how complicated the selection of the appropriate 
stakeholders for a given project can be. Within ATEAM, stakeholders needed to be able to 
understand the basic science, while being able to detach themselves sufficiently from their 
particular interests in order to contribute to a collective discussion.  
Some scientists emphasised the challenges involved in communicating the usefulness of 
abstract, long-term exploratory research (e.g. global change scenarios). Stakeholders appeared 
to be primarily interested in obtaining ‘relatively certain’ information on near-future sectoral 
impacts of global change at local scale. These seemingly irreconcilable expectations may have 
been prompted by the format chosen. Stakeholders were confronted with scenarios already 
largely developed, the assumptions and related value judgment of which they were asked to 
comment upon. Initially stakeholders reacted by pointing out driving forces, which were critical for 
them, sometimes only to hear that these were or could not be included at this stage (e.g. on the 
role of the agro-industry). Explicitly, this activity opened the black box of scenario making to allow 
stakeholders to evaluate it. Implicitly, however, stakeholders were asked to accept and trust that 
the scenarios produced were as best as could be within existing constrains. These ambivalent 
aims could explain the apparent mismatch in interests and expectations. Effectively most 
stakeholders deal with uncertainty in their decision-making and develop their own mental models 
and scenarios to perform their work (although they may not use this terminology). It is precisely 
these abilities that are funnelled into stakeholder-led scenario-making processes, within which 
stakeholders are given free reign to identify key driving forces and to elaborate narratives, which 
are then formalised and quantified by scientists (Shackley and Deanwood, 2003). Unfortunately, 
the timing and workplan of the project did not allow using this method within ATEAM, since this 
should have taken place well before the scenarios were actually constructed to give time to 
scientists to actually devise methods to incorporate stakeholders’ ideas. 
Two external observers noted that stakeholders had little possibility to set the agenda of the 
meetings, to take an active part in the overall decisions on the research programme and outputs, 
or to be adequately informed on how their comments were incorporated within the research 
(Jürgens, 2001; Vreugdenhil, 2003). These are valid critiques. Indeed more flexibility could have 
been built in to allow decisions and discussions to be steered more substantially by stakeholders. 
Key stakeholders could theoretically have been brought in as early as the project proposal 
development stage. However, since the research plan was already largely set and agreed with 
the funding agencies, before the first stakeholders were contacted, the methodology for modelling 
and scenario design and its implementation was only marginally influenced by interactions with 
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stakeholders. Nevertheless, the Work Package on Synthesis was left relatively open at the 
beginning of the project. Here there was sufficient flexibility and resources to explore methods 
and tools in a learning-by-doing approach to best compile and communicate the results of the 
project and to adjust substantially to stakeholders’ comments. It is within this part of the project 
that the ATEAM Atlas was developed (Metzger et al., 2004; Metzger and Schröter, 2006). The 
digital atlas was, however, also a solution proposed and developed by scientists with little 
contribution of stakeholders, apart from the feedback they provided during the final general 
workshop. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
4.1. A paradox in global change assessment research? 
 
Global change models are increasingly being coupled to combine the insights of both 
biophysical and socio-economic disciplines (Muetzelfeldt, 2003). More comprehensive results are 
thus produced, which help uncovering clear trends and/or a range of possible outcomes, while 
computer tools allow representing them in ever-finer resolutions (McCarthy et al., 2001). These 
results are however based on broad or generic assumptions, and even the finest models produce 
considerable uncertainty (Reilly et al., 2001). At the same time global change models, such as 
those used in ATEAM, produce large amounts of interesting results, and browsing through them 
requires much dedication. For example, the ATEAM vulnerability atlas is a compilation of over 
3000 maps and many more summarising charts (Metzger et al., 2004; Metzger and Schröter, 
2006). Despite the considerable achievement of producing these scientific results, there seems to 
be a paradox in presenting vast amounts of uncertain results in a format that suggests a high 
level of accuracy.  
It would be interesting to investigate what viewers instinctively take in when observing the 
maps in Figure 3. How would they combine the message from the text, which points at significant 
areas of modelling uncertainty, with the detail of the colour contours? Regardless of how much 
and how precise information one gets on the uncertainty levels involved in the computation of this 
modelling output, this sort of figures may become a cognitive trap, in that, it is argued, they give 
contradicting messages on the reliability of these model outputs. If the text invites the viewer to 
cautious analysis, the level of detail displayed in the figure invites the viewer to associate 
“precision” for “accuracy” and possibly to take the result for granted. Moreover, a non-informed 
user will intuitively focus on the region/sector he/she is more interested in and overlook the broad 
simplifications and uncertainties attached to them. The potential for misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the results is thus large. ATEAM dealt with this serious issue by embedding 
all maps in succinct fact sheets. However, although clear flags can be built in to draw attentions 
to limits of modelling, these demand the users to commit the time and effort to understand them.  
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Figure 3. Annual precipitation anomaly for the A2-scenario (2091-2100) compared to 1961. The 
relative spatial pattern projected by each climate model remains the same over different emission 
scenarios, and only the size of the anomaly varied between the emission scenarios for one and 
the same Global Climate Model. Therefore these maps demonstrate the complete relative spatial 
variability of the climate projection on the annual timescale, even though only one emission 
scenario (A2) is shown (taken from Schröter et al., 2005) 
 
One way to tackle this paradox is to research methods to better assess and manage 
uncertainty in global change models (e.g. Rotmans and van Asselt, 2001). Another way, preferred 
by stakeholders, is to produce targeted lay syntheses, with specific modelling outputs. This could 
be understood as the responsibility of scientists, since they would effectively take control of the 
whole scientific knowledge production, integration and communication process. However, few 
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scientists are keen to perform all these tasks, while those who do are often considered as 
‘interpreters’ or ‘communicators’ of science rather than scientists per se. In ATEAM a middle way 
was explored: to take the initiative and the risk to dedicate substantial resources to collaborate 
with stakeholders and to open with them the black box of modelling. If stakeholders did not obtain 
the precise results they were after, the dialogue gave them the opportunity to debate not only the 
possible implications of global change, but also to better understand global change modelling 
itself, including the attached uncertainty. This is a first step in developing participating interfaces 
in ecological modelling, which promote collaborative inquiry as proposed by van den Hove 
(2006). 
 
4.2. Transparency as a basis for open negotiation   
 
Participatory research is about creating the opportunity for confrontation and discussion of 
different worldviews and perceptions. By opening a window for interactions, scientists are inviting 
stakeholders to have a say on the research process and content, and are thus opening 
themselves to critique as well as praise. This feedback is extremely valuable but can be difficult to 
accept if it does not correspond to the expectations scientists have. Different participants have 
different expectations about what the dialogue and research should be about. The scope, 
boundaries and desired outcomes of the research and the dialogue exercise should ideally be 
collectively discussed and agreed upon, or at least clearly stated so that stakeholders understand 
what is expected from them, and what they can expect from participating in the process. Indeed, 
participants, whether scientists or stakeholders, have an implicit and explicit agenda when 
engaging in a dialogue process. Explicitly, scientists may for example want to evaluate their 
research with stakeholders, implicitly however they may also seek their endorsement to push 
their method and results forward. Explicitly stakeholders may want to obtain more information and 
implicitly to steer scientific research in specific directions suited to their particular needs. There is 
nothing wrong about these objectives as such, if these are made transparent, so that participants 
are aware of the diverse motivations at hand, and so that conflicting interests may be addressed 
openly. To reconcile these widely different expectations and views within a participative research 
process, science-stakeholder dialogue can be a valuable method and an innovative negotiation, 
or even mediation platform. For the latter, however a sympathetic, fair, open and rigorous third 
party is required, that both parties may accept and trust in this demanding but profoundly 
rewarding process of collective learning.   
The scientists involved in ATEAM feel a strong responsibility in supporting a transition to 
sustainability by producing meaningful information for European policy and decision-makers. To 
improve the societal relevance of ATEAM’s results was thus an explicit aim of the project. At the 
same time, scientists wanted to improve the state-of-the-art of ecological modelling per se. 
Another explicit goal was thus to achieve scientific credibility and recognition among the scientific 
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peer community. These two explicit aims were not incompatible but raised different, sometimes 
conflicting priorities: e.g., on how to adapt the planned research programme to best tackle 
stakeholders’ needs. Moreover, scientists face substantial restrictions in terms of data availability 
and quality. Even if resources were unlimited, many interesting scientific approaches and 
stakeholders’ suggestions could not have been addressed for simple want of appropriate data. 
The many, sometimes mutually exclusive, research avenues possible needed to be prioritised. In 
this process, stakeholders provided valuable input to better balance scientific and socially 
relevant research questions. 
 
4.3. Reconciling scientists’ and stakeholders’ expectations 
 
If global change research is to overcome the discrepancies between stakeholders’ 
expectations from science and current capability to fulfil these, further and stronger bridges are 
needed to reinforce dialogue and collaboration between science, policy and society. To raise the 
visibility and meaningfulness of vulnerability assessments as critical means to better understand 
global change and its potential worrying impacts on society, two trends are being followed, the 
common denominators of which are science-based stakeholder dialogues. On the one hand, 
uncertainty has emerged in the last decade as a major issue in global change modelling and in 
the vaster context of the ‘post-normal science’ paradigm (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Key 
issues identified here are how to better communicate scientific uncertainty to policy-makers and 
society, and more generally how to facilitate decision-making in face of uncertainty. These lines of 
reflection have fostered the development of a rich discourse bringing together representatives of 
science, policy and society to contribute to a better understanding of modelling opportunities and 
limits (e.g. Dessai and Hulme, 2004). The ATEAM dialogue process can be understood as a 
further step in this direction. On the other hand, some assessments seek to explicitly target 
specific policy- and management-orientated questions at higher spatial resolution, in close 
consultation with interested stakeholders. The aimed products here are smaller, dedicated 
models, clear and targeted result syntheses, and self-explanatory information tools, which 
consider national and subnational scales. Both avenues can feed each other, for mutual benefits, 
in particular in bridging the gap in temporal and spatial scales relevant for scientists and 
stakeholders, and to create a more dynamic scientific agenda, better suited to the rapidly 
changing policy agenda. The ATEAM analysis has also a role to play in this second area of 
research. It has for example already served as a broad basis for downscaled assessments 
(Zebisch et al., 2005). The vulnerability atlas and the tool for natural reserve selection developed 
within ATEAM are moreover valuable initiatives towards a better communication of global 
assessment results (Araújo et al., 2002, 2004; Metzger et al., 2004; Metzger and Schröter, 2006). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The potential of numerical modelling as a guide for policy-making primarily relies on its 
scientific credibility at disciplinary and interdisciplinary levels, but also on the degree of societal 
relevance and  acceptance that models achieve among policy and decision-makers. We argue 
that both are to a certain extent a negotiated social process rather than purely a scientific 
exercise. This is the fundamental challenge integrated assessments face, namely to achieve an 
acceptable level of simplification and associated uncertainty while at the same time still 
encompassing the key complexity of the simulated systems. 
In tackling this challenge, vulnerability assessment research is being pulled by two opposing 
forces related to different interpretations of the role of scientific inquiry. Van den Hove (2007: 818) 
thus distinguished issue-driven ‘science for action’ from curiosity-driven ‘science for science’. The 
former fosters a user-orientated discipline focused on satisfying stakeholders’ short-term 
information needs (where scientists may become commissioned consultants or advisers). The 
latter prefers a discipline where the definition of research problems, priorities and methodologies 
remain primarily in the hands of scientists and where stakeholders play a peripheral role. A 
middle ground between these visions thus needs to be found in vulnerability assessments 
research, so that societal relevance does not take precedence over scientific excellence and 
credibility, or vice versa. This compromise will have to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis 
from the design to the implementation stages. To this end, innovative approaches to move away 
from the perception of science as top-down production of expert answers to one of science as 
collective exploration of the plausible are required. Here scientific inquiry is conceived as a 
process of co-creation of knowledge where scientists and stakeholders collaborate as partners, 
each bringing to the partnership valuable questions, conceptualisations, contents and methods 
(Welp et al., 2006a). Furthermore, dialogue processes dedicated to debating uncertainty as 
perceived by scientists and lay people could help solving significant misunderstandings about the 
potential and limits of modelling. This would provide valuable opportunities to reflect on 
constructive manners to communicate uncertainty, and to incorporate it in decision-making. 
The ATEAM stakeholder dialogue has been an important result. The project collaborated with 
an expanding stakeholder network and its assessment approach was improved through 
stakeholders’ critique. The original research plan and the ecosystem modelling per se were not 
fundamentally changed by stakeholders. However, stakeholders provided healthy and 
constructive ‘outsider’ views. Through this experience scientists considerably adjusted their 
thinking and work. They gained valuable insights on stakeholders’ perceptions on ecosystem 
services and global change and on ecosystem management and sectoral adaptive capacity. 
Together scientists and stakeholders contributed to developing bridges between the generators of 
scientific knowledge and their users. 
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We believe that stakeholders need to understand the roles and limits of scientific enquiry and 
modelling performances. It is vital to understand that scientists cannot provide predictions of 
future global change impacts and vulnerability, instead they make projections and explore 
multiple scenarios. Stakeholders should not expect that such a task is feasible, as large 
uncertainty is unavoidable since society is continuously shaping its future in a complex 
unpredictable manner. Similarly, scientists should be cautious when committing themselves to 
producing stakeholder-targeted products and more broadly results that are socially relevant over 
the short term. To achieve these, scientists need to yield a substantial part of their decision power 
over to the targeted stakeholders, or at least to negotiate openly with them the main lines of the 
proposed research. At the same time scientists may need to accept the challenge of better 
communicating their research in formats preferred by stakeholders, or to dedicate more time still 
to ‘educate’ stakeholders to understand and use scientific results, while stakeholders ‘educate’ 
scientists to produce more relevant and helpful information. 
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The challenges of communicating climate change 
 
Anabela Carvalho 
 
 
In an article from 2000 Sheldon Ungar stated that, unlike the ozone hole, climate change 
never generated a ‘hot crisis’. Looking at the prominence of the issue in the national and 
international political agendas and the volume of media coverage that it has sustained in the 
last five years or so one is led to believe that things have changed. A series of remarkable 
events has contributed to transform climate change into one of the most high profile issues 
of the present moment: hurricane Katrina, Al Gore’s film and book An Inconvenient Truth, 
the Nobel prize that was awarded jointly to him and to the IPCC, the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change, Live Earth, and the gloomy forecasts of the 4th IPCC 
Assessment Report all concurred to putting climate change on the media, the public’s and 
the political agendas, which then tend to feed each other. In fact, multiple surveys indicate 
that people around the world are aware of the issue and very concerned, are willing to act 
upon it and expect politicians to take the lead. Yet, global greenhouse gas emissions have 
continued to rise rapidly. 
The scientific, political and economic complexity of climate change brings up a number of 
challenges for communication, which are enhanced by the multiple time and spatial scales of 
the problem, the ethical, social and cultural values involved in decisions, and the urgent 
need for concerted action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. As recently shown by 
Moser and Dilling (2007), promoting social change to address climate change faces a 
number of hurdles but is ever more pressing. In this context, a number of questions beg for 
answers: What are the meanings associated with climate change in different parts of the 
world and how have those meanings been produced, reproduced and transformed? How 
have the media in different countries been representing this issue? How do people perceive 
it and to what extent are they integrating it into their actions? To what extent is climate 
change making us rethink our practices of consumption and mobility? What are the relations 
between political action or inaction and given forms of discursive construction of climate 
change?  
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Stemming from a conference that took place at the University of Minho on 19-20 
November 2007 and from a research project entitled ‘The Politics of Climate Change: 
Discourses and Representations’, this book looks at three main aspects: the discourses of a 
variety of social actors on climate change, from scientists to religious leaders; the 
reconstruction of those discourses in the media and the multiple depictions of the issue in 
the press, television and the Internet; and people’s perceptions, understandings and 
attitudes in relation to the issue. Most importantly, the book aims to contribute to 
understanding the circular relations between these three aspects: discourses, mediations 
and perceptions. The organization of the book in three parts corresponds to these themes 
and throughout the chapters, the links, connections and impacts between those three 
aspects keep coming to light. 
The first study, by Anne Cristina de la Vega-Leinert and Dagmar Schröter, focuses on the 
communication between scientists and stakeholders on climate change. Reporting on the 
outcomes of a stakeholder dialogue in Germany, the authors examine the difficulties and the 
benefits associated to exchanging ideas with various types of people and the gains derived 
from the negotiations that occur in those processes. They highlight the challenges involved 
in bridging the language of science and the language of other social fields.  
Mirjia Vihersalo’s chapter is about the ways climate change was framed in policy 
statements in the Montreal summit of 2005. She concludes that there were two main frames. 
In one frame, climate change was considered as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions 
and therefore a treatable global problem, with an emphasis on economic measures. In the 
second frame, climate change was represented as a problem of vulnerability and scarce 
resources. Vihersalo also identifies the different forms of argumentation and the struggles 
associated to those two discourses. Her analysis shows that multiple understandings of 
climate change can be found in official discourses alone. Far from being seen as an 
environmental problem only, climate change is recurrently embedded with other issues, such 
as social and economic development, which shape meanings, standpoints and decisions in 
particular ways. 
In the same line, Arjan (J.A.) Wardekker, Arthur C. Petersen and Jeroen P. van der Sluijs 
look at religious discourses on climate change in the USA and the arguments used to 
support or oppose strong policy on the issue. Given the weight of the evangelical community 
that is the focus of this study, the authors argue that it is worth paying more attention to the 
values underlying these discourses and how the same principles can be the basis for 
arguing for different outcomes. 
Judy M. Ford looks at how cultural difference is discursively constructed and reinforced in 
ways that counter universal policy standards on climate change and that support various 
interests, including the maintenance of lifestyles and identities based on high-energy 
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consumption. She contrasts that with the universal values that are embedded in human 
relations to the environment and points out various universal motivators. 
The second part of the book opens with a review of research on media and climate 
change by Astrid Dirikx and Dave Gelders. They start by discussing the roles of the media in 
the public perception of the issue with reference to various academic traditions, from 
agenda-setting studies to frame analysis. Dirikx and Gelders outline some of the key 
conclusions of existing research on media representations of climate change and conclude 
with a suggestion for more research in European countries. The research questions 
presented at the end of their paper constitute a promising agenda for investigating mediated 
discourses on climate change. 
Cecilia Rosen Ferlini and Javier Crúz-Mena focus on the coverage of scientific 
knowledge on climate change in the print media and on the related social responsibilities of 
journalism. They propose evaluating news practices on climate change based on a 
‘functional model’ that questions whether journalism provides citizens information needed to 
make relevant decisions. Their analysis of the representation of the IPCC’s 2001 
Assessment Report in three Mexican quality newspapers, leads to a dismaying picture as, 
unlike newspapers from other countries, they failed to inform about the key conclusions of 
the IPCC and hence, Rosen and Crúz-Mena argue, impaired readers’ ability to make 
decisions in relation to climate change. 
Based on the analysis of the representations of climate change in the Portuguese media 
in a set of critical moments, Anabela Carvalho and Eulália Pereira examine the discourses 
and ‘discursive repertoires’ circulating in the public sphere, and discuss the problems 
associated with representations of the issue in the press and television news. They also link 
those representations to the discourses of scientists, politicians and business people, among 
other social actors. 
The third part of the book focuses on citizens’ perceptions of climate change. Joop de 
Boer’s paper examines the role of mental models in relation to climate change. Based on a 
wealth of data from European surveys, he concludes that climate change is widely perceived 
by people as a common cause of various changes in nature but that citizens do not have a 
clear understanding of the energy situation of their countries and that a frame for climate-
proofing decisions is missing. 
Using an extensive questionnaire to examine people’s social representations of climate 
change and their relations with the media, Rosa Cabecinhas, Alexandra Lázaro and Anabela 
Carvalho conclude that the media are the main source of information on climate change and 
that patterns of use of information sources (type of source and frequency of use) are a 
predictor variable of levels of concern, behavioural engagement and knowledge on climate 
change, although they do not affect risk perceptions or the valence of images associated 
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with climate change (negative or positive). They point out that more research is needed on 
media consumption, social networks and social representations on climate change. 
The book closes with a study by Wojciech Biernacki, Anita Bokwa, Boleslaw Domanski, 
Jarosław Dzialek, Karol Janas and Tomasz Padło. They examine perceptions of extreme 
‘natural’ phenomena in Poland, namely floods, strong winds and landslides. Among other 
interesting results, they conclude that there is a common cognitive dissonance between the 
sense of risk and evaluation of personal responsibility in contributing to it, as in the case of 
construction of houses in floodplains. This may be an indication of the kind of denial 
strategies people may employ in dealing with the causes and the impacts of climate change. 
Biernacki et al also conclude that while the quality of the news about environmental issues is 
poor in Polish media they are the preferred means of information about extreme phenomena 
(in particular local mass media) and recommend that local authorities pay more attention to 
their role in the communication of risk. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The project ‘The Politics of Climate Change: Discourses and Representations’ was 
funded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(POCI/COM56973/2004). 
 
References 
 
Moser, S. C. and Dilling, L. (eds) (2007) Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating 
Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ungar, S. (2000) ‘Knowledge, Ignorance and the Popular Culture: Climate Change Versus 
the Ozone Hole’, Public Understanding of Science 9 (3): 297-312. 
 
Author information  
 
Anabela Carvalho (PhD, University College London) has done research on various aspects 
of the communication of climate change. Her interests also include the mediated 
communication of science, political and social issues, political communication and discourse 
analysis. She is Assistant Professor at the University of Minho and Chair of the Science and 
Environment Communication Section of the European Communication Research and 
Education Association (ECREA). 
Institutional affiliation and contacts: Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade, 
Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal 
Email: carvalho@ics.uminho.pt 
